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AMERICA

THE GREAT WAR
1914—1916



EX-PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EMPEROR WILLIAM II, IN 1910.
THE FORMER KAISER AND HIS GUEST REVIEWING GERMAN MILITARY MANEUVERS NEAR BERLIN

AMERICA

Great Crises In Our History
Told by Its Makers

A LIBRARY OF ORIGINAL SOURCES

Volume XI
The Great War
1914—1916

ISSUED BY

AMERICANIZATION DEPARTMENT



VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS
OF THE
UNITED STATES

CHICAGO, U. S. A.

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THE GREAT WAR
1914—1916

AUTOGRAPH LETTER OF FRANZ JOSEPH TO THE KAISER

ON June 28, 1914, at Sérajevo, Bosnia, the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort, Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg, were assassinated by one Gavrilo Princip, abetted by Bosnian-Austrian confederates. Both victims were unpopular at the Hapsburg Court, but their assassination was arbitrarily declared by Austria to have been plotted in Serbia.

The accompanying letter, dated Vienna, July 2, 1914, from Emperor Franz Joseph, together with the *Annexe Mémoire*, was delivered to the Kaiser in Berlin July 5 by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count de Szogyény-Marich. The *Mémoire* had been drafted fully a month before the Sérajevo tragedy, showing clearly that the Dual Monarchy designed to shackle Serbia and that the killing of the heir to the Hapsburg throne simply served as a convenient, if not welcome, pretext. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, vainly opposed hasty overt action. In 1918 he was murdered as "the man who brought on the war."

I SINCERELY regret that You should have been obliged to give up Your intention of going to Vienna for the funeral ceremonies. I should have liked personally to express to You my sincerest thanks for Your sympathy in my keen sorrow—a sympathy which has greatly touched me.

By Your warm and sympathetic condolence You have given me renewed proof that I have in You a sincere friend worthy of confidence and that I may count upon You in every hour of grave trial.

I should have liked very much to discuss with You the general sit-

uation, but as that has not been possible, I take the liberty of sending to You the subjoined *mémoire* pre-

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pared by my Minister of Foreign Affairs, which was drawn up before the terrible catastrophe of Sérajevo, and which now, following that tragic event, appears particularly worthy of attention.

The attack directed against my poor nephew is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by the Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists whose sole aim is the weakening of the Triple Alliance and the destruction of my Empire.

By the foregoing declaration, it is no longer an affair at Sérajevo of the single bloody deed of an individual but of a well-organized conspiracy, of which the threads reach to Belgrade and if, as is probable, it be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government, nevertheless it cannot be doubted that the policies leading to the reunion of all the Southern Slavs under the Serbian flag is favorable to crimes of this character and that the continuance of this state of things constitutes a constant danger to my house and to my realm.

This danger is rendered more grave from the fact that Roumania, despite the alliance with us, has entered into friendly relations with Serbia and, on her own territory, permits against us an agitation just as venomous as that allowed by Serbia.

It is painful to me to suspect the fidelity and the good intentions of so old a friend as Charles of Roumania, but he himself has twice declared during these last months to my Minister that by reason of the aroused and hostile sentiments of his people toward

us he would not be in a position in case of need to carry out his obligations of alliance.

Furthermore, the Roumanian Government encourages openly the activities of the Kulturliga, favors a rapprochement with Serbia and carries on, with Russian aid, the creation of a new Balkan alliance which can only be directed against my Empire.

Once before, at the beginning of the reign of Charles, such political fancies as these propagated by the Kulturliga disturbed the good political sense of Roumanian men of state and the danger arose of seeing Your realm launched on a policy of adventure. But at that time Your venerated grandfather in an energetic and far-sighted fashion intervened and pointed out to Roumania the road which assured to her a privileged place in Europe, and she became the strong support of the existing order.

Now the same danger threatens this kingdom; I fear that counsel alone is insufficient and that Roumania cannot be retained in the Triple Alliance unless, on the one hand, we make impossible the creation of the Balkan League under the patronage of Russia, by the entrance of Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance, and unless on the other hand, we make it clearly understood at Bucharest that the friends of Serbia cannot be our friends, and that Roumania cannot consider us as allies unless she detaches herself from Serbia and represses with all her force the agitation directed in Roumania against the existence of my Empire.

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The efforts of my government should in consequence be directed toward isolation and the diminishment of Serbia. The first step in that direction will be to strengthen the present situation of the Bulgarian Government in order that the Bulgars, whose real interests coincide with ours, shall be preserved from a return to friendship with Russia.

If they realize at Bucharest that the Triple Alliance has decided not to abandon the alliance with Bulgaria, but that it is disposed to invite Bulgaria to an understanding with Roumania and to guarantee its territorial integrity, we may perhaps succeed in bringing her back from the dangerous step to which she has been led by her friendship with Serbia and her understanding with Russia.

If this should succeed, a reconciliation of Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey could be attempted. There would then arise, under the patronage of the Triple Alliance, a new Balkan alliance, the aim of which would be to put an end to the invasion of the Pan-Slavist tide and to assure peace to our states.

But this will not be possible unless Serbia which is at present the pivot of Pan-Slavist policy is eliminated as a political factor in the Balkans.

And You, also after this last terrible happening in Bosnia, will see and know that one cannot think of smoothing out the differences that separate us from Serbia, and that the maintenance of peaceful policy by all the European Monarchies will be threatened as

long as this focus of criminal agitation in Belgrade remains unpunished.

THE ANNEXE MEMOIRE

FOLLOWING the great disturbances of the last two years, the situation in the Balkans has cleared up to such a point that it is now possible to review the results of the crisis, and to establish in what measure the interests of the Triple Alliance, and more particularly those of the two Central Imperial Powers, have been affected by these events and what consequences result from them for European politics and for the Balkan policy of these Powers.

If without prejudice we compare the present state of affairs with that existing before the crisis, we must decide that the result looked at from the point of view of Austria-Hungary as well as from that of the Triple Alliance, cannot be considered in any way as favorable. . . .

The principal point is that following the development which led to the second Balkan war, Bulgaria aroused herself from the Russian spell, and today can no longer be considered as an auxiliary of the Russian policy. The Bulgarian Government strives, on the contrary, to enter into more intimate relations with the Triple Alliance.

To these favorable elements, however, are opposed unfavorable factors that weigh more heavily in the

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balance. Serbia whose policy has for years been animated by hostility toward Austria-Hungary, and which is completely under Russian influence, has achieved an increase of territory and of population that exceeded by much her own expectations. Turkey, whose community of interests with the Triple Alliance was progressing well, and who constituted an important counterpoise against Russia and the Balkan States, has been almost entirely pushed out of Europe, and has seen her situation as a great power gravely compromised. Territorial proximity with Montenegro and the general strengthening of the Pan-Serbian idea have brought closer the possibility of a new expansion of Serbia by means of a union with Montenegro. Lastly in the course of the crisis, the relations of Roumania with the Triple Alliance have essentially changed. . . . We see, on the other hand, that Russian and French diplomacy have carried on a unified action, in conformity with a preconcerted plan to exploit the advantages obtained and to change certain factors that were from their point of view unfavorable. . . .

The thought of freeing the Christian Balkan people from Turkish rule, in order to use them as a weapon against central Europe, has been for a long time the secret thought of Russian policy, by the traditional interest of Russia for these people. In these latter days has been developed the idea, put forward by Russia and taken up by France, of uniting the Balkan States into a Balkan alliance, in order by this means

to put an end to the military superiority of the Triple Alliance. The first condition before the realization of this plan was that Turkey should be pushed back from the territory inhabited by the Christian nations of the Balkans, in order to increase the strength of these States and to render them free to expand to the west. This preliminary condition has been, on the whole, realized by the last war. On the other hand, after the end of the crisis, a division separated the Balkan States into two opposing groups of nearly equal strength: Turkey and Bulgaria on the one hand, and the two Serbian States, Greece and Roumania, on the other.

To put an end to this division in order to be able to use all the Balkan States or at least a decisive majority, to upset the balance of European power, was the latest task to which, after the end of the crisis, Russia and France applied themselves. . . .

There is no doubt of the basis upon which, according to the intentions of French and Russian diplomacy, these differences and rivalries might be reconciled and a new Balkan alliance created. What could be the actual aim of such an alliance in the present circumstances for the Balkan States? There is no longer reason to consider a common action against Turkey. It can, therefore, only be directed against Austria-Hungary and can only be accomplished on the basis of a program that should promise to all its members extensions of territory by a graduated displacement of their frontiers from the east to the west,

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at the expense of the territorial integrity of the Monarchy. A union of Balkan States upon any other basis would be impossible to imagine, but on this basis not only is it not impossible, but is in a fair way to be realized. One cannot question that Serbia under Russian pressure would consent to pay a considerable price in Macedonia for the entry of Bulgaria into an alliance directed against the Monarchy and looking forward to the acquisition of Bosnia and the adjacent territory. . . .

The relations of Austria-Hungary with Roumania may be at this moment characterized by the fact that the Monarchy relies entirely upon its alliance and, before as since, is ready to uphold Roumania with all its force if the *casus foederis* shall arise, but that Roumania detaches itself one-sidedly from its obligations of alliance and shows to the Monarchy only the prospect of neutrality. Even the neutrality of Roumania is only guaranteed to the Monarchy by the personal affirmation of King Charles [a guaranty] which naturally is of value only for the duration of his reign and the accomplishment of which depends upon the King's keeping always the guiding hand on the direction of the foreign policy. . . .

Under these conditions it is impossible to consider the alliance with Roumania as of sufficient certainty and extent to serve Austria-Hungary as a pivot in her Balkan policy. . . .

To destroy, with the assistance of the Balkans, the

military superiority of the two Imperial powers is the objective of Russia.

But while France seeks the weakening of the Monarchy, because that is favorable to her ideas of revanche, the designs of the empire of the Tsar have a much greater extent. . . .

For Russia has recognized that the relation of her plans in Europe and in Asia, plans which correspond with internal necessities, gravely affect the important interests of Germany, and must inevitably arouse her to resistance.

The policy of Russia is determined by an unchanging situation, and is consequently constant and foresighted. Russia's policy of encirclement directed against the Monarchy, which does not pursue a world policy, has for its final aim to make it impossible for the German Empire to resist the aims of Russia or her political and economic supremacy.

For these reasons those in charge of the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary are convinced that it is in the common interest of the Monarchy, as in that of Germany, to oppose energetically and in time in this phase of the Balkan crisis, the development foreseen and encouraged by Russia by a pre-concerted plan.

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The above *mémoire* had just been finished when there occurred the terrible events of Sérajevo. The complete extent of this abominable assassination can hardly be realized; at all events it appears undeniable

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proof, if indeed any were yet lacking, of the impossibility of extinguishing the hatred between the Monarchy and Serbia, as well as the danger and the violence of the Pan-Serbian propaganda, which hesitates at nothing.

Austria-Hungary has not been lacking in good will and in the spirit of conciliation, to bring about reasonably good relations with Serbia, but it has just been shown that these efforts have been completely impotent and that the Monarchy must expect in the future to deal with the bitter, irreconcilable and aggressive enmity of Serbia.

In these conditions the Monarchy must tear away with a strong hand the net in which its enemy seeks to entangle it.

GERMAN DISPATCHES AND THE KAISER'S NOTES

AMONG the hundreds of documents written, received or annotated by the Kaiser, that were found in the Imperial Government archives after the German Revolution, were these dispatches to the War Lord from his diplomats in the various European capitals, June, July and August, 1914. Not the least interesting, if not incriminating, part of them consists of the Kaiser's annotations which display his highly excited state of mind, filled by turns with apprehension, anger and rage. The frankness with which he expresses himself, in the privacy of his study, shows the naïve way in which he was accustomed to sit in judgment on European affairs.

"In these notes," comments former Premier Viviani, of France, who incorporates the dispatches in his review of the war, "*As We See It*" (Harper & Brothers), "he incited to violence, prevented smoothing down of difficulties, coerced his ambassadors and . . . like a raving maniac . . . insulted England, insulted Italy, threatened the whole world."

DISPATCHES

ANNOTATIONS BY THE KAISER

VIENNA, June 30, 1914.
Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Vienna.
(German Documents, No. 7.)

. . . Here I hear even serious people express the desire of settling accounts with the Serbs once for all. A series of conditions should be sent to the Serbs, and, if they did not accept these, energetic

Now or never!

steps should be taken. I take advantage of every such opportunity for quietly but earnestly discouraging precipitate measures.

Who told him to do this? It is very foolish. This does not concern him in the least. It is entirely Austria's affair to decide what he is to do.

Vienna, July 10, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Vienna. (German Documents, No. 29.)

His Majesty discussed the situation with the greatest calm. Then he expressed his cordial thanks for the attitude of our august Sovereign and of the Imperial Government and declared that he now shared our opinion completely, that he thought as we did that a decision must be reached in order to put an end to the intolerable state of affairs in Serbia.

As His Majesty's memorial is dated a fortnight ago, this thing is lasting too long. Nevertheless, it was only drawn up in order to make clear the reasons for the decision.

Vienna, July 14, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Vienna. (German Documents, No. 49.)

. . . The Count told me that he had been the man who had always advised prudence, but that every day had strengthened his opinion that the Monarchy must come to an energetic decision in order to give proof of its vitality and put an end to the intolerable state of affairs existing in the south-east. . . .

Certainly.

As to the time for the delivery to Serbia, it has been decided that it would be better to await the departure of M. Poincaré from St. Petersburg—that is, the 25th. . . .

That is too bad.

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*Therapia, July 21, 1914.
Dispatch from the German Am-
bassador at Constantinople.
(German Documents, No. 99.)*

. . . Not only Bulgaria, but also Rumania and Turkey, would range themselves unreservedly on the side of the Triple Alliance, if Austria should administer a severe lesson to Serbia.

We shall remind these gentlemen of this at the right moment.

*London, July 24, 1914. Dis-
patch from the German Amba-
sador at London. (German
Documents, No. 157.)*

. . . But he [Sir Edward Grey] doubted very much that it would be possible for the Russian Government to advise the Serbian Government to accept the Austrian demands without reservation; a state accepting such terms would cease to count among independent states. He, Sir Edward Grey, found it dif-

This would be very desirable. It is not a state in the European sense of the word; it is a band of brigands!

ficult at this time to give advice to St. Petersburg.

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg. (German Documents, No. 160.)

. . . Russia knows what is owing from her to the monarchical principle, and the present case does not in the least affect this principle.

She knows this better since her fraternizing with the French Socialist Republic.

Berlin, July 25, 1914. Dispatch from the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor. (German Documents, No. 168.)

. . . The text of the Austrian note was written in such an aggressive and awkward fashion that public opinion in Europe and Italy would be against Austria, and so Italian Government could oppose it. . . .

He wanted to swindle Albania, and Austria has bristled up.

Piffle!

. . . My impression is that the only way to keep Italy in the Alliance is to promise her compensations soon enough in case Austria proceeds to make annexations of territory or occupies Lovcen.

The little thief always wants to gobble up something whenever the rest do.

Berlin, July 25, 1914. Dispatch from the Imperial Chancellor to the Emperor. (German Documents, No. 182.)

The Chief of Staff of the Navy informs me that Your Majesty, in view of a telegram issued by the Wolff Agency, has ordered the fleet to prepare to return rapidly to German harbors. . . .

It is unbelievable that such intentions should be credited to me! Unheard of! Never would I have thought of such a thing after my Minister reported to me the mobilization at Belgrade! That may bring about mobilization by Russia, which will cause Austrian mobilization! In that case I must concentrate my forces on land and sea. In the Baltic there is not a single warship! Moreover, I am not in the habit

of taking my military measures in accordance with a Wolff telegram, but with an eye to the general situation, which is what the civilian Chancellor has as yet been unable to understand.

*London, July 29, 1914.
Dispatch from the German
Ambassador at London. (Ger-
man Documents, No. 368.)*

Sir Edward Grey has just summoned me. The Minister was absolutely calm, but very serious, and he received me with the words that the situation was becoming more and more tense. . . .

But he deemed mediation an urgent necessity if those concerned did not wish to have things become a European catastrophe. . . .

The strongest and most unparalleled trait of English pharisaism that I ever saw! Never would I make an agreement concerning the fleet with such low-down fellows!

If, instead of mediation, there should be a warning to St. Petersburg and Paris to the effect that England would not help them, it would immediately calm matters.

England uncovers her-

self, now that she thinks us chasing scarecrows and that our fate is, so to speak, sealed. The vile rabble of shopkeepers sought to deceive us by means of dinners and speeches. The grossest deceit lay in the words addressed to me by the King through Henry: "We shall remain neutral and try to keep out of this as long as possible." Grey inflicts a denial upon the King and what he said to Lichnowsky is due to his remorse because he feels that he has deceived us. At the same time, it is a threat combined with a bluff for detaching us from Austria, preventing mobilization, and throwing back upon us the responsibility for war. He knows quite well that if he said one single word in earnest and energetically to Paris and St. Peters-

burg and invited them to be neutral, both would instantly be quiet. But, instead of this, he threatens us! The ignoble clown! Vile dog's excrement! England alone bears the responsibility for war or peace and it is no longer we! This must be proved publicly!

(*German Documents, No. 401.*)

. . . Here we have, in all its nakedness, the terrible situation slowly and surely engineered by Edward VII, continued and systematically developed by conversations, afterward denied, of England with Paris and St. Petersburg, and finally brought to its conclusion by George V, and now to be made a reality. Thus, the stupidity and awkwardness of our ally are to be the rope for hanging us. . . . A grandiose

conception which arouses admiration even in him who is to be ruined thereby! Edward VII, after his death, is stronger than I, who am alive! . . . And we are caught in the noose. . . . Now all these machinations should be exposed pitilessly, the mask of Christian pacificism should be publicly torn off, and this Pharisaical hypocrisy about peace should be pilloried! And our consuls in Turkey and the Indies, our agents, etc., should foment a savage insurrection of the entire Mussulman world against this nation of odious shopkeepers, these conscienceless liars, since, even if we are to be bled white, England must at least lose India.

*London, August 1, 1914.
Dispatch from the German Am-
bassador at London. (German
Documents, No. 596.)*

Sir Edward Grey has just read me the following declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet:

"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. . . . Such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Pow-

The rubbish talked by this man Grey shows that he has absolutely no idea what he ought to do. Now we shall await England's decision. I have just learned that England has cut the Emden cable. This is a war measure! And while she is still negotiating.

er, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require." . . .

. . . When I asked him whether, if we respected Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite declaration that Great Britain would remain neutral, the Minis-

What a low cheat!

ter answered that this was not possible for him, but that this question would play a great rôle in public opinion here. . . .

. . . He had also asked himself if it would not be possible for us and for France, in case of a Russian war, to stand in arms opposite each other without attacking. I asked him whether he was in a position to state to me that France would enter into a compact of this nature.

The fellow is insane or an idiot! Moreover, the French began the war and violated international law by having their aviators throw bombs.

My impression is that Mr. Grey is a low scoundrel who is afraid of his own dirty tricks and of his lying policy, who does not wish to take part openly against us, but wishes to be forced to do so by us.

*Rome, August 1, 1914.
Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Rome. (German Documents, No. 614.)*

. . . He made ceaseless repetition of the external and internal reasons militating here against participation in the war. . . .

The rascal! The King has not yet answered me even!

. . . Through a man in the confidence of M. Barriere I have received secret information that M. Barriere declared that the Italian Government had taken steps to draw closer to the English Government. Perhaps, in spite of the denial of the Marquis di San Giuliano, conversations have already been begun with England.

So if we do not respect Belgian neutrality England will attack us and Italy detach herself from us—that is the situation in a nutshell!

So our allies are betraying us also!

*Rome, August 4, 1914.
Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Rome. (German Documents, No. 850.)*

. . . Even a partisan of the Triple Alliance like Giolitti, who has just returned here, thinks that the casus foederis has not arisen, that the country needs tranquillity and should remain neutral, since there is no reason for its active participation.

The unbelievable scoundrel!

THE WILLY-NICKY TELEGRAMS

Exchanged Between the Kaiser and the Czar—and Others

THE KAISER TO THE CZAR

THESE are the concluding telegrams that passed between William II (Willy) of Germany and Nicholas II (Nicky) of Russia, each exonerating himself and holding the other responsible for starting the World War. They were among the documents found in the Wilhelmstrasse archives after the German Revolution, and were arranged and edited for official publication by Karl Kautsky, who was assassinated in consequence.

With them are two other telegrams, one from Prince Henry of Prussia to King George of England; the other from the Princess of Pless to the Kaiser.

Receiving no response to his last telegram, the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German army and navy at 5 p. m., August 1, 1914. As a fact, all the European chancelleries were aware that Russia regarded an armed attack on Serbia as an act of war on herself.

IT is with the gravest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Serbia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime, to which Archduke Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Serbians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country. You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and I, have a common interest as well as all Sovereigns to insist that

all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this case politics play no part at all.

On the other hand I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin.
WILLY.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

THE CZAR TO THE KAISER

Peterhof, July 29, 1914.

Am glad you are back. In this most serious moment I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country. The indignation in Russia, shared fully by me, is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far. NICKY.

THE KAISER TO THE CZAR

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I received your telegram and share your wish that peace should be maintained. But as I told you in my first telegram, I cannot consider Austria's action against Serbia an ignoble war. Austria knows by experience that Serbian promises on paper are wholly unreliable. I understand its action must be judged as tending to get full guarantee that the Serbian promises shall become real facts. This reasoning is borne out by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria does not want to make any territorial conquests at the expense of Serbia. I therefore suggest that it would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable, and, as I already telegraphed to you, my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course military measures on the part of Russia, which would be looked upon by Austria as threatening, would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardize my position as mediator, which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help. WILLY.

THE CZAR TO THE KAISER

Peterhof, July 29, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly. Whereas official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship. Your loving

NICKY.

THE CZAR TO THE KAISER

Peterhof, July 30, 1914.

Thank you heartily for your quick answer. Am sending Tatischtschew this evening with instructions. The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defense on account of Austria's preparations. I hope from all my heart that these measures won't in any way interfere with your part as mediator, which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us.

NICKY.

PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA TO THE KING OF ENGLAND

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Am here since yesterday. Have informed William of what you kindly told me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday, who gratefully received your message.

William, much preoccupied, is trying his utmost to fulfill Nicky's appeal to him to work for maintenance of peace and is in constant telegraphic communication with Nicky, who today confirms news that military measures have been ordered by him equal to mobilization, measures which have been taken already five days ago.

We are furthermore informed that France is making military preparations, whereas we have taken no measures, but may be forced to do so at any moment, should our neighbors continue, which then would mean a European war.

If you really and earnestly wish to prevent this terrible disaster, may I suggest you using your influence on France and also Russia to keep neutral, which seems to me would be most useful.

This I consider a very good, perhaps the only, chance to maintain the peace of Europe.

I may add that now more than ever Germany and England should lend each other mutual help to prevent a terrible catastrophe, which otherwise seems unavoidable.

Believe me that William is most sincere in his endeavors to maintain peace, but that the military preparations of his two neighbors may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenseless.

I have informed William of my telegram to you, and hope you will receive my informations in the same spirit of friendship which suggested them.

HENRY.

THE KAISER TO THE CZAR

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Best thanks for telegram. It is quite out of the question that my Ambassador's language could have been in contradiction with the tenor of my telegram. Count Pourtalès was instructed to draw the attention of your Government to the danger and grave consequences involved by a mobilization; I said the same in my telegram to you. Austria has only mobilized against Serbia and only a part of her army. If, as is now the case, according to the communication by you and your Government, Russia mobilizes against Austria, my rôle as mediator, which you kindly entrusted me with, and which I accepted at your express prayer, will be endangered, if not ruined. The whole weight of the decision lies solely on your shoulders now, who have to bear the responsibility for Peace or War. WILLY.

THE KAISER TO THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA

New Palace, July 30, 1914.

I thought that I should not refuse the personal request of the Czar to undertake an attempt at mediation to prevent a general conflagration and maintain the peace of the world. Yesterday and today I have had proposals submitted to your Government by my Ambassador. They envision, among other things, that Austria, after the occupation of Belgrade or other places, should state her conditions. I will be sincerely grateful to you for notifying me as soon as possible of your decision.

Your faithful friend. WILLIAM.

KING OF ENGLAND TO PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA

London, July 30, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Serbian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile

suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of Europe. GEORGE.

PRINCESS PLESS TO THE KAISER

London, July 31, 1914.

Belgrade has fallen, Serbia is punished, let Austria return now so that the peace of Europe is assured. Only your Majesty can influence this and hold Russia back, otherwise under such conditions I fear for Germany. God be with your Majesty now and always. DAISY.

THE KAISER TO THE KING OF ENGLAND

New Palace, July 31, 1914.

Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the statement I got this night from Vienna, which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from Chancellor that official notification has just reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results

of the mediation I am working at and left me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take measures for insuring safety of my eastern frontiers where strong Russian troops are already posted. WILLY.

THE CZAR TO THE KAISER

Peterhof, July 31, 1914.

I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe. Your cordially devoted, NICKY.

THE KAISER TO THE CZAR

Berlin, July 31, 1914 (2 p. m.).

Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid, I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of

Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defense. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in your hands to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.

WILLY.

THE CZAR TO THE KAISER

Peterhof, August 1, 1914.

I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have

from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of the two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply. NICKY.

THE KAISER TO THE CZAR

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply from Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers. WILLY.

THE KAISER'S VERSION

From His Memoirs

*I*N his "Memoirs," from which this account is taken by permission of Harper & Brothers, the German Kaiser admits leaving Berlin and cruising in Norwegian waters during July of 1914, at the behest of his Ministers. His trip had the double advantage of "advertising to the world the remoteness of Germany from a Balkan squabble and of getting a difficult personage off the scene." The Kaiser omits to explain that under cover of diplomatic negotiations Germany had done all the preliminary work of mobilization. It needed only the touch of a button to set her great military machine in motion; but, as Buchan, the historian, observes, "In order to delude the world she was anxious that this final pressure should be subsequent to the official mobilization of her opponents, that on them the responsibility might appear to lie."

William II returned to Berlin July 28, and war was formally declared August 1, at 1:15 p.m.

way and remain at home. The Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Office held a view contrary to mine and wished me to undertake the journey, as they considered that it would have a quieting effect on all

AFTER the arrival of the news of the assassination of my friend, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, I gave up going to Kiel for the regatta week and went back home, since I intended to go to Vienna for his funeral. But I was asked from there to give up this plan. Later I heard that one of the reasons for this was consideration for my personal safety; to this I naturally would have paid no attention.

Greatly worried on account of the turn which matters might now take, I decided to give up my intended journey to Nor-

Europe. For a long time I argued against going away from my country at a time when the future was so unsettled, but Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann told me, in short and concise terms, that if I were now to give up my travel plans, which were already widely known, this would make the situation appear more serious than it had been up to that moment and possibly lead to the outbreak of war, for which I might be held responsible; that the whole world was merely waiting to be put out of suspense by the news that I, in spite of the situation had quietly gone on my trip.

Thereupon I consulted the Chief of the General Staff, and, when he also proved to be calm and unworried regarding the state of affairs and himself asked for a summer leave of absence to go to Carlsbad, I decided, though with a heavy heart, upon my departure.

The much-discussed so-called Potsdam Crown Council of July 5th in reality never took place. It is an invention of malevolent persons. Naturally, before my departure, I received, as was my custom, some of the Ministers individually, in order to hear from them reports concerning their departments. Neither was there any council of Ministers and there was no talk about war preparations at a single one of the conferences.

My fleet was cruising in the Norwegian fjords, as usual, while I was on my summer vacation trip. During my stay at Balholm I received only meager news from the Foreign Office and was obliged to rely

principally on the Norwegian newspapers, from which I got the impression that the situation was growing worse. I telegraphed repeatedly to the Chancellor and the Foreign Office that I considered it advisable to return home, but was asked each time not to interrupt my journey.

When I learned that the English fleet had not dispersed after the review at Spithead, but had remained concentrated, I telegraphed again to Berlin that I considered my return necessary. My opinion was not shared there.

But when, after that, I learned from the Norwegian newspapers—not from Berlin—about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and, immediately thereafter, about the Serbian note to Austria, I started without further ado upon my return journey and commanded the fleet to repair to Wilhelmshaven. Upon my departure I learned from a Norwegian source that it was said that a part of the English fleet had left secretly for Norway in order to capture me (though peace still reigned!). It is significant that Sir Edward Goschen, the English Ambassador, was informed on July 26th at the Foreign Office that my return journey, undertaken on my own initiative, was to be regretted, since agitating rumors might be caused by it.

Upon my arrival at Potsdam I found the Chancellor and the Foreign Office in conflict with the Chief of the General Staff, since General von Moltke was of the opinion that war was sure to break out, whereas

the other two stuck firmly to their views that things would not get to such a bad pass, that there would be some way of avoiding war, provided I did not order mobilization. This dispute kept up steadily. Not until General von Moltke announced that the Russians had set fire to their frontier posts, torn up the frontier railway tracks, and posted red mobilization notices did a light break upon the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse and bring about their own collapse and that of their powers of resistance. They had not wished to believe in the war.

This shows plainly how little we had expected—much less prepared for—war in July, 1914. When, in the spring of 1914, Czar Nicholas II was questioned by his Court Marshal as to his spring and summer plans, he replied: “Je resterai chez moi cette année parceque nous aurons la guerre” (“I shall stay at home this year because we shall have war”). (This fact, it is said, was reported to Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann; I heard nothing about it then and learned about it for the first time in November, 1918.) This was the same Czar who gave me, on two separate occasions—at Björkö and Baltisch-Port—entirely without being pressed by me and in a way that surprised me, his word of honor as a sovereign, to which he added weight by a clasp of the hand and an embrace, that he would never draw his sword against the German Emperor—least of all as an ally of England—in case a war should break out in Europe, owing to his gratitude to the German Emperor for his

attitude in the Russo-Japanese War, in which England alone had involved Russia, adding that he hated England, since she had done him and Russia a great wrong by inciting Japan against them.

At the very time that the Czar was announcing his summer war program I was busy at Corfu excavating antiquities; then I went to Wiesbaden, and, finally, to Norway. A monarch who wishes war and prepares it in such a way that he can suddenly fall upon his neighbors—a task requiring long secret mobilization preparations and concentration of troops—does not spend months outside his own country and does not allow his Chief of the General Staff to go to Carlsbad on leave of absence. My enemies, in the meantime, planned their preparations for an attack.

Our entire diplomatic machine failed. The menace of war was not seen because the Foreign Office was so hypnotized with its idea of "*surtout pas d'histoires*" ("above all, no stories"), its belief in peace at any cost, that it had completely eliminated war as a possible instrument of Entente statesmanship from its calculations, and, therefore, did not rightly estimate the importance of the signs of war. . . .

THE GRAND FLEET GOES TO SEA

By Winston Spencer Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty

CHURCHILL, from whose "World Crisis" (Copyright, 1923) this account is taken, by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons, had been First Lord of the Admiralty for three years, when, July 29, 1914, the British Grand Fleet, acting on his sole order, slipped out of Portland Harbor and into the North Sea. Occurring a week before Britain declared war on Germany, it was one of the decisive events of history and served to insure control of the seas to the Allies. As a result, surprise attack was forestalled and the safe transport of the British Expeditionary Forces to France was guaranteed. The Grand Fleet and its adjuncts comprised 200 fighting ships, manned by 70,000 men.

Albert Ballin, who inadvertently (?) warned Churchill of Germany's warlike intentions, was director-general of the Hamburg-American Line and a confidant of the Kaiser. Prince Louis of Battenburg, German-born grandson-in-law of Queen Victoria, but a naturalized Briton, was First Sea Lord at the time.

sentences followed one another impressions of a wholly different character began to form in my mind.

THE Cabinet on Friday afternoon sat long revolving the Irish problem. . . . The discussion had reached its inconclusive end, and the Cabinet was about to separate, when the quiet grave tones of Sir Edward Grey's voice were heard reading a document which had just been brought to him from the Foreign Office. It was the Austrian note to Serbia. He had been reading or speaking for several minutes before I could disengage my mind from the tedious and bewildering debate which had just closed. We were all very tired, but gradually as the phrases and

This note was clearly an ultimatum; but it was an ultimatum such as had never been penned in modern times. As the reading proceeded it seemed absolutely impossible that any State in the world could accept it, or that any acceptance, however abject, would satisfy the aggressor. The parishes of Fermanagh and Tyrone faded back into the mists and squalls of Ireland, and a strange light began immediately, but by perceptible gradations, to fall and grow upon the map of Europe. . . . I went back to the Admiralty apprehending real danger and that it might be war. For the moment, however, there was nothing to do. At no time in all these last three years were we more completely ready.

The test mobilization had been completed, and with the exception of the Immediate Reserve, all the reservists were already paid off and journeying to their homes. But the whole of the 1st and 2nd Fleets were complete in every way for battle and were concentrated at Portland, where they were to remain till Monday morning at 7 o'clock, when the 1st Fleet would disperse by squadrons for various exercises and when the ships of the 2nd Fleet would proceed to their Home Ports to discharge their balance crews. Up till Monday morning therefore, a word instantaneously transmitted from the wireless masts of the Admiralty to the "Iron Duke" would suffice to keep our main force together. If the word were not spoken before that hour, they would begin to separate. During the first twenty-four hours after their separa-

tion they could be reconcentrated in an equal period; but if no word were spoken for forty-eight hours (i.e. by Wednesday morning), then the ships of the 2nd Fleet would have begun dismissing their balance crews to the shore at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham, and the various gunnery and torpedo schools would have recommenced their instruction. If another forty-eight hours had gone before the word was spoken, i.e., by Friday morning, a certain number of vessels would have gone into dock for refit or repairs. . . .

Thursday night (July 24, 1914), at dinner, I had met Herr Ballin. He had just arrived from Germany. We sat next to each other, and I asked him what he thought about the situation. With the first few words he spoke, it became clear that he had not come here [to London] on any mission of pleasure. He said the situation was grave. "I remember," he said, "old Bismarck telling me the year before he died that one day the great European War would come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans." These words, he said, might come true. It all depended on the Czar. What would he do if Austria chastised Serbia? A few years before there would have been no danger, as the Czar was too frightened for his throne, but now again he was feeling himself more secure upon his throne, and the Russian people besides would feel very hardly anything done against Serbia. Then he said, "If Russia marches against Austria, we must march; and if we

march, France must march, and what would England do?" I was not in a position to say more than that it would be a great mistake to assume that England would necessarily do nothing, and I added that she would judge events as they arose. He replied, speaking with very great earnestness, "Suppose we had to go to war with Russia and France, and suppose we defeated France and yet took nothing from her in Europe, not an inch of her territory, only some colonies to indemnify us. Would that make a difference in England's attitude? Suppose we gave a guarantee beforehand." I stuck to my formula that England would judge events as they arose, and that it would be a mistake to assume that we should stand out of it whatever happened.

I reported this conversation to Sir Edward Grey in due course, and early in the following week I repeated it to the Cabinet. On the Wednesday following the exact proposal mooted to me by Herr Ballin, about Germany not taking any territorial conquests in France but seeking indemnities only in the colonies, was officially telegraphed to us from Berlin and immediately rejected. I have no doubt that Herr Ballin was directly charged by the Emperor with the mission to find out what England would do.

Herr Ballin has left on record his impression of his visit to England at this juncture. "Even a moderately skilled German diplomatist," he wrote, "could easily have come to an understanding with England and France, who could have made peace certain and pre-

vented Russia from beginning war." The editor of his memoirs adds: "The people in London were certainly seriously concerned at the Austrian Note, but the extent to which the Cabinet desired the maintenance of peace may be seen (as an example) from the remark which Churchill, almost with tears in his eyes, made to Ballin as they parted: "My dear friend, don't let us go to war."

I had planned to spend the Sunday with my family at Cromer, and I decided not to alter my plans. I arranged to have a special operator placed in the telegraph office so as to ensure a continuous night and day service. On Saturday afternoon the news came in that Serbia had accepted the ultimatum. I went to bed with a feeling things might blow over. We had had so many scares before. Time after time the clouds had loomed up vague, menacing, constantly changing; time after time they had dispersed. We were still a long way, as it seemed, from any danger of war. Serbia had accepted the ultimatum, could Austria demand more? And if war came, could it not be confined to the East of Europe? Could not France and Germany, for instance, stand aside and leave Russia and Austria to settle their quarrel? And then, one step further removed, was our own case. Clearly there would be a chance of a conference, there would be time for Sir Edward Grey to get to work with conciliatory processes such as had proved so effective in the Balkan difficulties the year before. Anyhow, whatever happened, the British Navy had

never been in a better condition or in greater strength. Probably the call would not come, but if it did, it could not come in a better hour. Reassured by these reflections I slept peacefully, and no summons disturbed the silence of the night.

At 9 o'clock the next morning I called up the First Sea Lord [Prince Louis of Battenburg] by telephone. He told me that there was a rumor that Austria was not satisfied with the Serbian acceptance of the ultimatum, but otherwise there were no new developments. . . . At 12 o'clock I spoke to the First Sea Lord again. He told me various items of news that had come in from different capitals, none however of decisive importance, but all tending to a rise of temperature. I asked him whether all the reservists had already been dismissed. He told me they had. I decided to return to London. I told him I would be with him at nine, and that meanwhile he should do whatever was necessary.

Prince Louis awaited me at the Admiralty. The situation was evidently degenerating. Special editions of the Sunday papers showed intense excitement in nearly every European capital. The First Sea Lord told me that in accordance with our conversation he had told the Fleet not to disperse. I took occasion to refer to this four months later in my letter accepting his resignation. I was very glad publicly to testify at that moment of great grief and pain for him that his loyal hand had sent the first order which began our vast naval mobilization.

I then went round to Sir Edward Grey, who had rented my house at 33 Eccleston Square. No one was with him except Sir William Tyrell of the Foreign Office. I told him that we were holding the Fleet together. I learned from him that he viewed the situation very gravely. He said there was a great deal yet to be done before a really dangerous crisis was reached, but that he did not at all like the way in which this business had begun. I asked whether it would be helpful or the reverse if we stated in public that we were keeping the Fleet together. Both he and Tyrell were most insistent that we should proclaim it at the earliest possible moment: it might have the effect of sobering the Central Powers and steadying Europe. I went back to the Admiralty, sent for the First Sea Lord, and drafted the necessary communiqué. . . .

After hearing the discussions at Monday's Cabinet and studying the telegrams, I sent that night to all our Commanders-in-Chief the following very secret warning:—

July 27, 1914.

This is not the "warning telegram," but European political situation makes war between Triple Entente and Triple Alliance Powers by no means impossible. Be prepared to shadow possible hostile men of war and consider dispositions of H. M. ships under your command from this point of view. Measure is purely precautionary. No unnecessary person is to be informed. The utmost secrecy is to be observed.

The official "warning telegram" was despatched from the Admiralty on Wednesday, the 29th. On this same day I obtained from the Cabinet the authority to put into force the "Precautionary Period" regulations. . . . Meanwhile our war arrangements comprised an elaborate scheme for dealing with vessels under construction. The plan of course covered all ships building in Great Britain for foreign Powers. Of these there were two battleships building for Turkey, three flotilla leaders for Chili, four destroyers for Greece, and three monitors for Brazil. There were also other important ships, including a Chilian and a Brazilian battleship and a Dutch cruiser, which would not be ready till much later. The Turkish battleships were vital to us. With a margin of only seven Dreadnoughts we could not afford to do without these two fine ships. Still less could we afford to see them fall into bad hands and possibly be used against us. Had we delivered them to Turkey, they would, as the event turned out, have formed with the "Goeben" a hostile force which would have required a force of not less than five British Dreadnought battleships or battle-cruisers to watch them. Thus the British numbers would have been reduced by three instead of being increased by two. One of the Turkish battleships (the "Reshadieh") which Armstrongs were building on the Tyne when the crisis began, was actually complete. The Turkish crew, over 500 strong, had already arrived to take her over and were

lying in their steamer in the river. There seemed to be a great danger of their coming on board, brushing aside Messrs. Armstrongs' workmen and hoisting the Turkish flag, in which case a very difficult diplomatic situation would have been created. I determined to run no risks, and on the 31st July I sent written instructions that adequate military guards were to be placed on board this vessel and that in no circumstances was she to be boarded by the Turks. It has sometimes been made a ground for reproach against me that the requisition of these ships was one of the causes which brought Turkey into the war three months later. We now know that negotiations were taking place from the 24th of July onwards between the Germans and the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress for an alliance between Germany and Turkey, and that such Alliance was actually signed on August 2.

It is interesting to read in the German Official History what they knew about our preparations at this time.

"At 6.20 p. m. on July 28 the following telegram was received in Berlin from the German Naval Attache: 'Admiralty are not publishing ships' movements. 2nd Fleet remains fully manned. Schools closed in naval bases; preliminary measures taken for recall from leave. According to unconfirmed news 1st Fleet still at Portland, one submarine flotilla left Portsmouth. It is to be assumed

that Admiralty is preparing for mobilization on the quiet.'

"He telegraphed later on the same day as follows: 'As already reported by telegram, the British Fleet is preparing for all eventualities. In broad outline the present distribution is as follows: 1st Fleet is assembled at Portland. The battleship "Bellerophon" which was proceeding to Gibraltar for refit has been recalled. The ships of the 2nd Fleet are at their bases: they are fully manned. The schools on shore have not reopened. Ships of the 2nd Fleet and 3rd Fleet have coaled, completed with ammunition and supplies, and are at their bases. In consequence of the training of reservists, just completed, latter can be manned more quickly than usual and with more or less practised personnel, the "Times" says, within 48 hours. The destroyer and patrol flotillas and the submarines are either at or enroute for their stations. No leave is being granted, officers and men already on leave have been recalled.

'In the naval bases and dockyards great activity reigns; in addition, special measures of precaution have been adopted, all dockyards, magazines, oil tanks, etc., being put under guard. Repairs of ships in dockyard hands are being speeded up. A great deal of night work is being done.

'The Press reports that the Mediterranean squadron had left Alexandria; it is said that it will remain at Malta.

'All ships and squadrons have orders to remain ready for sea.

'Outwardly complete calm is preserved, in order not to cause anxiety by alarming reports about the Fleet.

'Movements of ships, which are generally published daily by the Admiralty, have been withheld since yesterday. . . .

'The above preparations have been made on the Admiralty's independent initiative. The result is the same, whoever gave the orders.' "

The German Naval Attache thus showed himself extremely well-informed. . . . The general warrant to open the letters of certain persons which I had signed three years before as Home Secretary, was dictated by the presence of British, in German pay, in all our naval ports. Had we arrested them, others of whom we might not have known, would have taken their place. We therefore thought it better, having detected them, to leave them at large. In this way one saw regularly from their communications, which we carefully forwarded, what they were saying to their paymasters in Berlin during these years, and we knew exactly how to put our hands upon them at the proper moment. Up to this point we had no objection to the German Government knowing that exceptional precautions were being taken throughout the Navy. Indeed, apart from details, it was desirable that they should know how seriously we viewed the situation. But the moment had now come to draw down the curtain. We no longer forwarded the letters and a few days later, on a word from me to the Home Secretary, all these

petty traitors, who for a few pounds a month were seeking to sell their country, were laid by the heels. Nor was it easy for the Germans to organize on the spur of the moment others in their places.

The most important step remains to be recounted. As early as Tuesday, July 28, I felt that the Fleet should go to its War Station. It must go there at once, and secretly; it must be steaming to the north while every German authority, naval or military, had the greatest possible interest in avoiding a collision with us. If it went thus early it need not go by the Irish Channel and north about. It could go through the Straits of Dover and through the North Sea, and therefore the island would not be uncovered even for a single day. Moreover, it would arrive sooner and with less expenditure of fuel.

At about 10 o'clock, therefore, on the Tuesday morning I proposed this step to the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff and found them wholeheartedly in favor of it. We decided that the Fleet should leave Portland at such an hour on the morning of July 29th [1914] as to pass the Straits of Dover during the hours of darkness, that it should traverse these waters at high speed and without lights, and with the utmost precaution proceed to Scapa Flow. I feared to bring this matter before the Cabinet, lest it should mistakenly be considered a provocative action likely to damage the chances of peace. It would be unusual to bring movements of the British Fleet in Home Waters from one British port to another be

fore the Cabinet. I only therefore informed the Prime Minister, who at once gave his approval. Orders were accordingly sent to Sir George Callaghan, who was told incidentally to send the Fleet up under his second-in-command and to travel himself by land through London in order that we might have an opportunity of consultation with him.

Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief Home Fleets.

July 28, 1914, Sent 5 p. m.

Tomorrow, Wednesday, the First Fleet is to leave Portland for Scapa Flow. Destination is to be kept secret except to flag and commanding officers. As you are required at the Admiralty, Vice-Admiral and Battle Squadron is to take command. Course from Portland is to be shaped to southward, then a middle Channel course to the Straits of Dover. The Squadrons are to pass through the Straits without lights during the night and to pass outside the shoals on their way north. "Agamemnon" is to remain at Portland, where the Second Fleet will assemble.

We may picture this great Fleet, with its flotillas and cruisers, steaming slowly out of Portland Harbor, squadron by squadron, scores of gigantic castles of steel wending their way across the misty, shining sea, like giants bowed in anxious thought. We may picture them again as darkness fell, eighteen miles of warships running at high speed and in absolute blackness through the Narrow Straits, bearing with them

into the broad waters of the North the safeguard of considerable affairs.

Although there seemed to be no conceivable motive, chance, or mischance, which could lead a rational German Admiralty to lay a trap of submarines or mines, or have given them the knowledge and the time to do so, we looked at each other with much satisfaction when, on Thursday morning (the 30th), at our daily Staff Meeting, the Flagship reported herself and the whole Fleet well out in the center of the North Sea. . . .

The German Ambassador lost no time in complaining of the movement of the Fleet to the Foreign Office. According to the German Official Naval History, he reported to his Government on the evening of the 30th that Sir Edward Grey had answered him in the following words:

"The movements of the Fleet are free of all offensive character, and the Fleet will not approach German waters."

"But," adds the German historian, "the strategic concentration of the Fleet had actually been accomplished with its transfer to Scottish ports." This was true. We were now in a position, whatever happened, to control events, and it was not easy to see how this advantage could be taken from us. A surprise torpedo attack before or simultaneous with the declaration of war was at any rate one nightmare gone forever. We could at least see for ten days ahead. If war should come no one would know

where to look for the British Fleet. Somewhere in the enormous waste of waters to the north of our islands, cruising now this way, now that, shrouded in storms and mists, dwelt this mighty organization. Yet from the Admiralty building we could speak to them at any moment if need arose. The king's ships were at sea.

DELIVERY OF THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO BELGIUM

By Alfred de Bassompierre, an Eye-Witness

THE author of this account was a member of the Belgian Government and was present on the evening of August 2, 1914, when the sudden and surprising German ultimatum to Belgium was delivered in Brussels, as here recorded. Preceding this most unexpected challenge, the German Government had been lavish in its assurances to Belgium, repeatedly denying any intention of violating Belgian territory in case of war. It was German policy, during the days of diplomatic strain that followed Sérajevo, to keep Belgium in a state of quiet and trust, while the mobilization centers across the frontiers from Liége were filling with German troops. Then came the revelation, the disillusionment, in this ultimatum that was left at the Belgian Foreign Office by the German Minister, von Below-Saleske, as related.

had not changed. He made no answer for Germany, but gave it as his personal opinion that Belgium had nothing to fear from Germany. That day came news from Petrograd that Germany had declared war on Russia.

ON August 1 France informed Germany that she would respect the neutrality of Belgium, but might find it necessary in her attitude to protect her own interests if that neutrality were violated by "another power." Germany kept silence. The German Ambassador, von Below-Saleske, had been reminded of German promises: that of Bethmann-Hollweg in 1911, that of von Jagow in 1913. The Ambassador had answered that Germany's sentiments

Then came the report of the invasion of Luxemburg. Belgium was stunned. Would Germany dare break over the Belgian frontier? Or was it true that her troops were marching so as to avoid Belgian soil?

"We tried to cling to this hope," says Alfred de Bassompierre, "as drowning men cling to straws. Suddenly an usher opened the door, and said uncereemoniously and excitedly: 'The German Minister has just gone in to see M. Davignon.' It was the night of August 2d-3d, in the Foreign Office.

"We all three understood that the fate of our dear little country was about to be decided at that solemn moment.

"Ten minutes, which seemed hours to us, passed. Then, at 7:30, Herr von Below-Saleske's haughty silhouette appeared on the opposite side of the courtyard, under the glass penthouse in front of the Ministers' anteroom, and the German Emperor's representative passed unmoved into the street, where his motor car was waiting. With one bound we were in M. Davignon's room. It was empty, but at the same moment the Minister, who had gone into the next room to call his chief secretary, Comte le d'Ursel, returned, holding a paper in his hand, and followed by the Count and by M. Costermans, the under-secretary. All three of them seemed to be overwhelmed.

" 'Bad news, very bad news,' said the Minister, who was extremely pale. 'Here is the German note, of which Herr von Below has given me a summary.

70 THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO BELGIUM

They have demanded free passage for the German Army.'

" 'And what answer did your excellency give?'

" 'I took the paper. . . . We have twelve hours for our answer. . . . But I could not restrain my indignation. . . . Germany, who professed to be our devoted friend, proposing our dishonor. Let us translate the note.'

"The whole scene is indelibly printed on my memory—the faces of the listeners, the thoughts that raced through my brain, even the look of the paper on which I wrote down in French the sentences of the ultimatum. I do not think that I can ever forget one of these details.

"We had completed about a third of the German note when the Prime Minister entered. He greeted us rapidly, and sat down by M. Davignon. M. de Broqueville crossed his arms, and remained lost in thought, his chin resting on his hand, until the translation was completed.

"When the work was finished, M. de Broqueville asked me to read the note aloud in French, which I did with profound emotion, though I made an effort to preserve the usual tone of my voice.

"A silence, a long tragic silence of several minutes followed the reading of the document. . . . We had just heard the infamous ultimatum for the first time, and we were thinking. . . . In the mind of each of us, perhaps, the tender memory of our beloved country, in its peace and innocence, was suc-

ceeded by some vague idea of the horrors that were coming upon it; but the one dominant thought in our minds was undoubtedly the determination to be worthy of our ancestors in the great days of trial. It was evident that the German note simply made use of the alleged intention of France to march upon the Meuse as a pretext, and that the ultimatum was, in the plainest words, a summons to sacrifice our neutrality in the interests of the formidable Germany. Those who had drawn it up had not for a moment imagined that Belgium, a country occupying so small a space upon the map of Europe, would have dared not to yield without protest to the will of our all-powerful neighbor. Those who read it, on the other hand, having a different mentality, immediately, spontaneously, without hesitation knew that only one answer was possible:—a peremptory and indignant 'No!'

"The Secretary-General broke the silence. Addressing the Minister of War, Baron van der Elst, he asked him: 'Well, Your Excellency, are we ready?'

"There was a silence, shorter than the first, but not the less impressive. Then M. de Broqueville, very calm, and perfectly master of himself, replied slowly and in measured tones: 'Yes, we are ready!'"

THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM AND THE BELGIAN REPLY

THE ULTIMATUM

IT was this document, delivered at the Belgian Foreign Office in Brussels, August 2, 1914, by German Minister von Below-Saleske, that turned a European diplomatic bickering into a World War. Documentary evidence supports the statement that Germany was resolved from the first to seize Belgium for permanent annexation, and to crush France so swiftly and completely as to make her a German dependency, such as Austria. The assertion that a French patrol had crossed the frontier has been admitted by German authorities to be false. France planned to strike at Germany on the east, not through Belgium.

The Belgian reply to the German ultimatum was handed to the German Minister in Brussels by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 7 a. m., August 3, 1914. Informed that day of Belgium's defiance, the German Secretary of State, von Jagow, in Berlin declared "the passage through Belgium is for Germany a matter of life and death."

is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The Ger-

RELIABLE information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It

man Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in coöperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessities for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

BELOW-SALESKE.

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

THE REPLY

THE German Government stated in their note of the 2nd of August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity

of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1st, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfill her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threatens her constitutes a fla-

grant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

DAVIGNON.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

THE "SCRAP OF PAPER"

Sir Edward Goschen's Official Report

THUS the British Ambassador to Germany reported to his Government the breaking of diplomatic relations between Germany and England and the violation by Germany of the Treaty of 1839, in which Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia guaranteed Belgium as a perpetually neutral state. The British diplomat recounts his ineffectual interview with Secretary of State von Jagow with respect to German troops crossing Belgium, followed by his historic interview, August 4, 1914, with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, who said that "the step taken by His (British) Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree. Just for a word—'neutrality'—a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation. . . ." Subsequently Bethmann-Hollweg admitted having been "excited and aroused" at seeing his cherished dream of a German-British-American coalition come to nothing.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant, I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons

why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be

able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. . . .

This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Gov-

ernment could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor [von Bethmann-Hollweg], as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the steps taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should

keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. . . .

ARTICLE II.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, declare, that the Articles mentioned in the preceding Article, are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties.

ARTICLE VII.

Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I., II., and IV., shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

Palmerston Sylvan van de Weyer

Senfft

H. Sebastiani

Bulow

Pozzo di Borgo

PALMERSTON
British Plenipotentiary
SYLVAN VAN DE WEYER
Belgian Plenipotentiary
SENFFT
Austrian Plenipotentiary
H. SEBASTIANI
French Plenipotentiary
BULOW
Prussian Plenipotentiary
POZZO DI BORGO
Russian Plenipotentiary

FACSIMILE OF SIGNATURES TO THE FAMOUS "SCRAP OF PAPER"
THE TREATY OF 1839 GUARANTEEING BELGIAN NATIONALITY,
WHICH GERMANY VIOLATED

A GERMAN DEFENSE OF BELGIUM

Statement of Dr. William Muehlon, a former Krupp Director

ANGERED by the universal reprobation of Germany for having violated Belgian territory, the German Government attempted to justify its action by declaring that Belgium had forfeited its neutrality by unneutral agreements with England, and that France had already violated that neutrality before the German invasion. Dr. Muehlon, however, in revelations that appeared during the war, admitted that Germany had long planned to invade Belgium.

His admission is supported by the Krupp records, corroborated by those of the Solvay Institute of Brussels, of transactions with the Belgian Government which, as this former Krupp director says, "believed that by giving large orders to the Krupps, rather than to French munition makers, it could keep Germany in good humor; whereas France, whose industry enjoyed little government support, was expected to understand Belgium's reasons for favoring Germany and to be content with general signs of industry.

the time being. Krupp agreed, but not willingly. Such storage is unusual, and it entails many incon-

BEFORE the war Belgium had ordered from the Krupp Company in Essen four large modern guns (twenty-eight centimeters) for the fortifications of Antwerp. At the beginning of 1914 the guns were completed, accepted, paid for in full, and ready for shipment; but the work on the fortifications of Antwerp had not yet been carried so far that the guns could be set up. The debates on this subject in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies will perhaps be recalled. At this point the Belgian Government requested Krupp to keep the guns in storage for

veniences. Krupp repeatedly took steps, both by word of mouth and in writing, to get rid of the guns; the Belgian Government continually repeated its request that Krupp be kind enough to keep them, and was even ready to pay for the accommodation. A *modus vivendi* was repeatedly found, but the attitude of both parties remained unchanged until the war broke out, when the Prussian Ministry of War at once seized these guns in Essen as booty (value four million marks).

From this I draw the following conclusion: Had the Belgian Government had any evil intentions whatsoever against Germany; or had it expected a German attack, it would, at the very latest when war threatened, have secured possession of its expensive guns, instead of insisting that they should remain in Krupp's care. . . .

A few months before the war Belgium established another and particularly important connection between itself and Krupp. For its supply of a new (scarcely tested) ammunition for field artillery it placed itself entirely in the hands of this company. After securing large direct orders, Krupp conceded the privilege of manufacturing this ammunition to the Belgian firm of Cockerill, with the coöperation, of course, of the competent (Belgian) authorities, who saw to it that their own works also secured the same privilege. For Cockerill and the Belgian Ministry of War this arrangement meant active and sustained coöperation with Krupp's representatives, engineers,

etc., and a corresponding dependence on the grantor of the licenses. At that time one of Cockerill's directors paid me frequent visits; and I do not consider it superfluous to note that, at the moment of the outbreak of the war, a letter from Cockerill lay before me, informing me that he was just sending a payment on the license amounting to one million francs.

Consider the close dependency of the war-material business on governmental intentions, and then, on the basis of the occurrences I have here recounted, which are matters of public knowledge, pass judgment on the alleged *mala fides* of the Belgian Government towards Germany.

ENGLAND ON THE BRINK OF WAR

Speech by Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary

GREY, who later was made *First Viscount of Fallodon*, as a tribute to his eminent statesmanship, was English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when he delivered this masterly address in the House of Commons, August 3, 1914. In it he summarizes the story of the negotiations carried on since July 23, in which he earnestly strove to preserve the peace of Europe. Sir Edward is described as having been really "more devoted to fishing than to politics," and that "the transparent honesty of his aims, his entire freedom from artifice . . . gave him a certain isolation and authority unique in European statesmanship."

Great Britain acted swiftly when the purport of this speech was known. It clarified much that was obscure in a very obscure situation. Within a few hours British public opinion had mobilized in favor of war—and the war was on, in spite of Grey's studied efforts to prevent it.

I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all, let me say, very shortly,

LAST week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of his Majesty's Government I would like to clear the ground so that, before I

that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as his Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The coöperation of the great powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labor and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe: because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the great powers generally are concerned is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which powers were most in favor of peace, which were most disposed to risk war or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests,

British honor, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not yet been preserved. . . .

The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. . . . It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria than the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honor cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian alliance. We do not even know the terms of the alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friend-

ship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital British interests, we shall go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a

defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defense of vital British interest ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. French news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium. . . .

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilization was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the

House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments, respectively, were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:

“The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.”

From the German Government the reply was:

“The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.”

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward

Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:

“Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.”

It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definite, up to the last mo-

ment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George:

“Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be

left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war, which is before Europe, the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone. . . .

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And I do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had hap-

pened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we

were to say that all those things matter nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right honorable friend, the First Lord of the Admiralty, have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the Navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in

Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that must be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our minds to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the com-

plications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

[Later in the day Sir Edward added the following words:]

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is in-

formation I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect:

“Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time-limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honor of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is finally resolved to repel aggression by all possible means.”

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which they have received. I make no further comment upon it.

KING ALBERT GOES TO PARLIAMENT

By Brand Whitlock, American Minister to Belgium

WHITLOCK was United States Minister, later Ambassador, to Belgium at the outbreak of the Great War. He was entrusted with the representation of seven of the warring nations, including France and Germany, as recounted in his "Belgium, a Personal Narrative," from which this chapter is taken, by permission of D. Appleton & Company. His skill in dealing with the situation under the German occupation won him an international reputation, enhanced by his handling of Belgian relief work. He was made a citizen by many Belgian towns, and was given the Civic Cross of the First Class and the Grand Cordon of the Order of Leopold by Belgium. It was by his advice that the decision to evacuate Brussels and transfer the capital to Antwerp was taken.

Hugh Gibson, who is mentioned in this account, was secretary of the American Legation at Brussels, 1914-16, and later became Minister to Switzerland.

invaded; the formal declarations of war were all that remained.

And at ten o'clock that morning [August 4, 1914] the King went to Parliament.

THE Belgian Government's reply to the German ultimatum . . . was delivered on Monday evening at seven o'clock. At ten o'clock the King addressed a telegram of appeal to the King of England. Tuesday morning at six o'clock Herr von Below delivered his Government's note saying that Germany could take what she wanted by force. Germany had already declared war on France. The Belgian Government had been notified by both France and England that they would come to her defense if Belgian soil were

It was a day of lovely sunshine; the Belgian flags of black, yellow and red floated from every house, and the people had gathered early about the Park and the Palace and the Parliament buildings to see the King and the royal family go by. The crowds were massed along the sidewalks, on the terre-pleins and the carrefours; people hung out of windows; even the roofs were black. The garde-civique, the chasseurs and the infantry, the gendarmes à cheval and companies of boy-scouts formed a line from the Royal Palace along the Rue Royale to the Parliament House at the other end of the Park. The Queen went by in a landau with the three royal children, preceded by the piqueurs de la cour. The King, booted and spurred, mounted on his big bay, came after with his staff and the Escadron Marie-Henriette in their green tunics and gray busbies as guard of honor. The crowds were wild with enthusiasm.

At ten o'clock Gibson and I drove to the National Palace. Sir Francis Villiers rolled up in his motor just as we arrived, and I entered with him, and we went slowly up the red-carpeted staircase together to the diplomatic gallery, Sir Francis heavy with care. The Salle des Séances presented a scene one would not soon forget. All around the galleries were crowded, the wives of the Ministers in seats opposite us, though none of the ladies of the diplomatic corps were there. Below were the Senators and Deputies, all in formal black—some seated, quietly waiting, others in excited groups, discussing the ultimatum of

last night and the invasion of the land. The Duc d'Ursel was there in the uniform of the Guides. The Ministers, after their sleepless nights, were on their benches—the Baron de Broqueville, Messrs. Davignon, Carton de Wiart, Hymans, the new liberal Ministre d'État, and Vandervelde, the new Socialist Ministre d'État, receiving congratulations. The hall is a hemicycle with columns all around, not unlike the chamber of the Supreme Court, the old Senate at Washington, though larger. The time had not been sufficient to erect the red velvet throne; instead, a red-and-gold fauteuil was placed for the King on the president's dais; overhead under the white statue of Léopold I was the escutcheon of Belgium, a trophy of flags of Belgium and the Congo. The diplomatic tribune was hung with Belgian flags too. Down there on the floor before the president's desk a great green table was set, and at it were seated the doyen and the greffiers. Gold fauteuils were set for the Queen and the royal family.

The colleagues were gathering in these now changed conditions; the last time we were assembled was at Ste.-Gudule, scarcely a fortnight before, at the Te Deum to celebrate the founding of the Belgian dynasty, now so rudely shaken. Herr von Below, of course, was not there, nor the Count Clary, the Austrian Minister. We waited many minutes; then there came through the open windows the strains of a military band: and suddenly a voice cried:

"La Reine!"

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The Deputies sprang to their feet, and against the solid black of their frock-coats there fluttered the white of the handkerchiefs they waved as they shouted:

"Vive la Reine! Vive la Reine!"

And there was her charming Majesty, all in white, wearing a hat with great white plumes, lovely and gracious, just entered the chamber below to our left, acknowledging this loyal salute with sweeping courtesies right and left. She was escorted by a committee of Deputies and had a modest suite—the Countess Hemricourt de Grunne, la Grande Maitresse, in a violet gown, and the two little princes, Léopold the Duke of Brabant, the heir-apparent, and Charles, Count of Flanders, in black satin suits that day instead of the costumes of gray they usually wore, and the elfish little Princess Marie José.

The Queen took the golden chair placed for her on the left of the tribune and the princes took their seats beside her, the little Count of Flanders wriggling up onto his chair in such a boyish manner. The Deputies resumed their seats, and the chamber for an instant was still. And then while we waited, suddenly there was the thunder and tumult of applause outside, a rumble, a roar, and then a huissier shouted:

"Le Roi!"

The word was caught up by many voices, swelling to a hoarse shout:

"Le Roi!"

The Queen, the Ministers, the Deputies, everybody rose; we in the diplomatic gallery never once sat down. The King was just below us, entering the chamber from the right—the side opposite that from which the Queen had entered. The Deputies were waving their hands—no handkerchiefs in them now—and shouting in an united voice, deep, rough, masculine, in a mighty crescendo:

“Vive le Roi! Vive le Roi! Vive le Roi!”

It was as though they could not shout it loudly enough. As they stood there, some in tears, Catholic, Liberal, Socialist, those distinctions faded; it was Belgium acclaiming her King. . . .

And there he is, in the fatigue uniform of a Lieutenant-General, booted and spurred, his saber clanking at his side. He strides along firmly, swiftly, mounts the rostrum, takes off his képi, flings it on the table before him, clicks his heels together, makes a smart military bow, swiftly peels the white glove from his right hand, slaps the glove into the képi and, without waiting, begins at once, in his firm voice and his beautiful French, to read his speech from the notes that he holds in his white-gloved hand.

The Queen, the little princes, the Deputies, resume their seats; the applause that greets His Majesty is quickly hushed by the universal adjuration of silence:

“Sh! Sh!”

The doyen's gavel falls on the green table. The stillness in the chamber is the stillness of poignant, nervous tension. The Ministers in the front benches

with their portfolios know what is coming, no doubt; but the others strain forward—the old Count Woeste, for instance, with his hand behind his deaf ear—to hear the fateful words.

The King is somewhat short-sighted; he puts on his pince-nez, holds the narrow little strips of paper rather close to his eyes, and begins to read:

“Quand je vois cette assemblée frémissante dans laquelle il n’y a plus qu’un seul parti. . . .”

The emotions break, cries ring forth; then:

“Sh! Sh!” again, and silence.

And the King goes on:

“. . . celui de la Patrie, où tous les coeurs battent en ce moment à l’unisson, mes souvenirs se reportent au Congrès de 1830, et je vous demande, Messieurs: Êtes vous décidés inébranlablement à maintenir intact le patrimoine sacré de nos ancêtres?”

The Deputies spring to their feet, raise their hands as though swearing to an oath, and cry:

“Oui! Oui! Oui!”

The King continues; he strikes out emphatic gestures with his free hand. . . . Below him the little Duke of Brabant looks up intently into his father’s face, never takes his eyes off him. What are the thoughts in that boy’s mind? Will that scene come back to him in after years? And how? when? under what circumstances?

The silence is intense, too intense to be borne, and now and then exclamations break forth, to be smothered immediately by that imperative “Sh! Sh!”

The King heeds not but reads on, finishes with that moving phrase:

"J'ai foi dans nos destinées. Un pays qui se défend s'impose au respect de tous; ce pays ne périt pas. Dieu sera avec nous dans cette cause juste! Vive la Belgique independante!"

The mad, passionate applause breaks, all unrestrained now; handkerchiefs are waved, then pressed to weeping eyes. . . . The King seizes his képi, the Queen and the little princes rise, and the King stalks out, sword clanking; away on stern business now!

And I find myself leaning over the balcony rail, a catch in my throat, my eyes moist.

Then that stillness again in the chamber, intense, vibrant with emotion, the thrill of patriotism, the sense of tragedy, the consciousness of assisting at an historic scene. The Deputies remain standing, and the Queen makes her sweeping courtesies again, right and left, then, with the royal children and her suite, retires.

There is an universal inhalation in the chamber, a long breath. Contrary to their custom, when the King reads a speech from the throne, the Senate and Chamber of Deputies do not separate but remain in joint session. Baron de Broqueville, the Minister of War and Premier, is opening his portfolio, taking out the notes of his speech, standing up.

"A la tribune! A la tribune!" the Senators and Deputies cry.

And he marches down, climbs up into the tribune, stands there, looks about him, bows. A handsome man, M. de Broqueville, a striking figure there in the tribune in that moment—tall, svelte, distinguished, in black-frock coat, slightly waving hair, smart mustache, the ribbon of the Order of Léopold in his boutonnière. He speaks dramatically, reading the German ultimatum, the Belgian reply; asks almost peremptorily for a vote of supplies; and, at the end, smiting the tribune, his seal-ring striking sharply on the hard wood, he concludes with:

“La parole est aux armes!”

The session is over, though the Senators and Deputies are to hold formal sessions to ratify the Government's acts and to vote supplies. But the dramatic tableau is done and we turn to speak to one another—and then drift out of the gallery. And as we go the Prince Koudacheff comes up to me, takes me aside, and asks me to take over his Legation in case he had to go away. I tell him that I shall be honored to do so, of course. . . .

On our way out the word went about that the Papal Nuncio wished us to remain and meet him a moment in an anteroom—Monseigneur Tacci, the Nuncio, as the only Ambassador at the Belgian Court, was the doyen of the corps, though the Count Clary, who had been at Brussels longer than any of us, usually acted in that capacity. We gathered about him, then, in one of the ante-chambers, and he stood there in the midst of us in his violet robes, very distinguished with

his dark aristocratic features, as finely cut as a cameo, and his delicate hands that were so expressive, speaking to us in his soft Italian voice that lent its accent to his French. He hinted at the possibility of the Court and Government going to Antwerp, and said that in such an eventuality we should have to accompany them.

Then the sunshine once more, and the motors rolling up into the paved court before the Parliament buildings, and the colleagues lifting their tall hats to each other and then rolling away in the crowded, agitated, brilliant streets.

When I got back to the Legation I found a telegram from Washington authorizing me to take over the French interests, providing such action would not prevent my taking over any other legations, the chiefs of which might ask me to do so. And on the heels of this word came from Herr von Below that he was leaving in the afternoon and would ask me to accept the representation of German interests.

At two o'clock, then, Herr von Strum, the secretary of the German Legation, came, very much excited, and formally delivered Herr von Below's request.

"But I've agreed to act for the French interests," I said.

Herr von Strum looked at me an instant, as though he could not believe me. I asked him to tell Herr von Below of that fact, supposing that in such a case Herr von Below would not wish me to act for German interests. Herr von Strum was nervous, agi-

tated, and unstrung; I suppose that he, too, had been without sleep for nights on end. Tears were continually welling into his eyes, and suddenly he covered his face with his hands, leaned forward, his elbows on his knees, an attitude of despair. Presently he looked up.

"Oh, these poor, stupid Belgians!" he said. "Why don't they get out of the way! Why don't they get out of the way! I know what it will be. I know the German army. It will be like laying a baby on the track before a locomotive!"

He bent over, stretching his hands towards the floor as though to illustrate the cruel deed.

"I know the German army," he repeated. "It will go across Belgium like a steam-roller; like a steam-roller!"

He liked the phrase, which he must have picked up in America—he had an American wife—and kept on repeating it.

He went away and late in the afternoon came back, saying that Herr von Below asked me as a special favor to him to take over his Legation, and I consented. I sent word that I should go to the German Legation at five o'clock, and asked Maitre de Leval meanwhile to draw very carefully a *procès-verbal*. The German Legation is across the street from the American, in the Rue Belliard, and at the hour appointed we went over there—Gibson, de Leval and I.

We found Herr von Below alone in his chancery, stretched out in a low chair, a cup of tea on the

little tabouret at his side. He was smoking a cigarette—his short mission at Brussels ended. When I had seen him last, the night of his formal dinner, he had been so happily looking forward to a peaceful, idle summer. At sight of me he flung up his hands, shrugged his shoulders and made a little moue, as though he too remembered, as though words were unnecessary—or inadequate. Herr von Below had had a *procès-verbal* already prepared, but I preferred mine, and we signed and sealed that. Then in that room of gloomy oak, the two white-haired German functionaries—the old Grabowsky, *conseiller au-lique*, and another, bureaucratic and formal, bearing a tall white candle and a long stick of red sealing-wax, proceeded slowly and solemnly around the room, sealing the oaken cupboards where the archives were. We stood about in silence while this was being done. Then the strained farewells; Herr von Below was leaving at seven o'clock for Berlin, via Holland.

Half an hour later *Maitre de Leval* and I drove over to the Foreign Office. In the *Rue de la Loi* we met a line of automobiles, half a dozen of them, spinning at high speed toward the *Cinquantenaire*. They were filled with officers, in the *bonnets de police* that the Belgian soldiers wear in memory of the Revolution of 1830, and they gave a gala air to the scene.

"Le Roi!" said de Leval.

It was he and his staff, going to the front.

KING ALBERT'S SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT

THE enthusiasm with which this royal utterance was received by the Belgian Parliament and people forespoke the heroism displayed by Belgium in challenging the German invader. After the King had withdrawn from the Legislative Chamber, Prime Minister de Broqueville read a note which the German Minister, von Below-Saleske, had forwarded that morning of August 4, 1914, to the Belgian Government, in which Germany declared her determination to cross Belgium by force of arms. This was war!

"We shall defend ourselves," concluded M. de Broqueville, "and even if we are defeated we shall never be conquered." Immediately the Belgian Parliament voted a credit of 200 million francs with which to meet the first expenses of the war.

But if our hopes are betrayed, if we are forced to resist the invasion of our soil, and to defend our threatened homes, this duty, however hard it may be, will find us armed and resolved upon the greatest sacrifices.

Even now, in readiness for any eventuality, our valiant youth is up in arms, firmly resolved, with the

NEVER, since 1830, has a more solemn hour struck for Belgium: the integrity of our territory is threatened.

The very force of our righteous cause, the sympathy which Belgium, proud of her free institutions and her moral victories, has always received from other nations, and the necessity of our autonomous existence in respect of the equilibrium of Europe, makes us still hopeful that the dreaded emergency will not be realized.

traditional tenacity and composure of the Belgians, to defend our threatened country.

In the name of the nation, I give it a brotherly greeting. Everywhere in Flanders and Wallonia, in the towns and in the countryside, one single feeling binds all hearts together: the sense of patriotism. One single vision fills all minds: that of our independence endangered. One single duty imposes itself upon our wills: the duty of stubborn resistance.

In these solemn circumstances two virtues are indispensable: a calm but unshaken courage, and the close union of all Belgians.

Both virtues have already asserted themselves, in a brilliant fashion, before the eyes of a nation full of enthusiasm.

The irreproachable mobilization of our army, the multitude of voluntary enlistments, the devotion of the civil population, the abnegation of our soldiers' families, have revealed in an unquestionable manner the reassuring courage which inspires the Belgian people.

It is the moment for action.

I have called you together, gentlemen, in order to enable the Legislative Chambers to associate themselves with the impulse of the people in one and the same sentiment of sacrifice.

You will understand, gentlemen, how to take all those immediate measures which the situation requires, in respect both of the war and of public order.

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No one in this country will fail in his duty.

If the foreigner, in defiance of that neutrality whose demands we have always scrupulously observed, violates our territory, he will find all the Belgians gathered about their sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath, and their Government, invested with the absolute confidence of the entire nation.

I have faith in our destinies; a country which is defending itself conquers the respect of all; such a country does not perish!

CLEMENCEAU CALLS FRANCE TO ARMS

His Speech at the Outbreak of the War

GEORGES Benjamin Eugène Clémenceau made this speech in Paris, August 5, 1914, the day Russian troops began the invasion of East Prussia and Germany invaded Belgium. Two days before Germany had declared war on France, in the manner here described.

At the beginning of the Great War, Clémenceau, although seventy-three years of age, was chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of the Army. His early criticisms of the French conduct of the war caused his newspapers, "*L'Homme Libre*" (*The Free Man*) and "*L'Homme Enchaîné*" (*The Man in Chains*), to be periodically suppressed. Nevertheless he kept up his attacks, as and when he thought them justified, and in 1917 he caused the fall of the Painlevé Ministry and was himself called to the French Premiership. Urging the nation to a more energetic prosecution of the war, his ruthlessness in overriding opposition earned for him the sobriquet of "*The Tiger*."

minutes later to repair a slight omission. He had forgotten to deliver to the Minister a declaration of war. One cannot think of everything at once. . . .

WILLIAM II has willed it. The cannon must speak. The German Ambassador has decided to depart, tired of waiting in Paris for acts of violence which do not occur. Do you know the official reasons for his departure? It is that a French aviator is alleged to have thrown bombs on Nuremberg. In courteous language M. Viviani replied that this was an untruth, although it was only too true that a German troop had come into our territory and killed a French soldier; and the Ambassador, finding nothing to say, slipped away only to return a few

England, be it said to her honor, did not hesitate. Germany has had many friends, even in important places, in the British Government, and she has not recoiled before any method of impressing public opinion in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the statesmen of England, and the English people themselves, have too clear a vision of their own interests, coinciding at every point with those of European civilization, for them to entertain the thought of taking miserable refuge in a waiting policy. This whole nation is composed of men who possess peculiarly that superior quality of knowing their own wills and of acting when once they have spoken. They do not give themselves up to enthusiasms, as sometimes happens to us, but they advance carefully step by step and they are easier to kill than to drive back. Moreover it was impossible for them to do, in so little time, more than they have done in the time since all dissimulation disappeared from Germany's intentions.

With a prudence for which no one can reproach them they painfully exhausted the last chances of peace, without ever letting themselves be entrapped by the fallacious proposals of the German Ambassador. They carefully guarded their liberty of action in case of developments of which no one can calculate the consequences. But Germany has not left them the chance to preserve this liberty long, and they have quickly shown that their decision, once it was necessary, would not be delayed. . . .

Italy has issued her formal declaration of neutrality. By the way in which French opinion received it, our brothers beyond Piedmont can see that the absurd quarrels of governments insufficiently authoritative have left no trace in our hearts. They have often told us that the Triple Alliance could not act together, in whatever concerned the Italians, unless we were the aggressors, and that they refused to believe that such would ever be the case, since our policy was wholly defensive. They have shown that they were wholly sincere. We cannot but be thankful to them for it.

It is for the Latin cause, for the independence of nationalities in Europe, that we are going to fight, for the greatest ideas that have honored the thought of mankind, ideas that have come to us from Athens and Rome and of which we have made the crowning work of that civilization which the Germany of Arminius pretends to monopolize, like those barbarians who melted into ingots the marvels of ancient art after the pillaging of Rome in order to make savage ornaments out of them.

Anticipating the time which possibly is near, I proclaim to the men who have revived Italy and who have had the glory to bring Rome back to her destiny that they have themselves marked out their place in this great struggle. I am not afraid to say that, without them, we shall conquer, because we are resolved to dare and endure anything, because a peace resulting from our defeat could not be made except over the corpses of all the men worthy of the name of French.

But what supreme joy would overflow our hearts if the name of the great Italy of history should be associated with ours in a heroic adventure in which the greatest men of Rome would have been proud to claim an important part. Whenever their sons wish it we shall be able to make a place of honor for them at our side. Behold Belgium in action, Holland with arms in hand, Russia pregnant with new purpose to revive our fatigued hopes, the peoples of the Balkans being born anew, the American republics, with the greatest in the lead, incapable by tradition of seconding a brutal attack upon liberty, all Europe indignant at monstrous treachery, and even Asia, in astonishment, speaking of lending her redoubtable legions to the cause.

Against what is this revolt of all, this rebellion of human conscience, this insurrection of ideas? Against a Teutonism delirious in megalomania, ambitious to realize what Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon could not accomplish: to impose upon a world that desires to be free the supremacy of steel. It is not a thing for our age; men have too much suffered from it. The modern idea is the right of all, and victory for us could not mean oppression, even for those who fought against us, since Germany has valiantly conquered, like so many other states, her rightful place in the world, and since, if we are fighting the arrogance of tyranny, it is not in order to embrace it in our turn.

And now to arms, all of us! I have seen weeping among those who cannot go first. Everyone's turn will come. There will not be a child of our land who will not have a part in the enormous struggle. To die is nothing. We must win. And for that we need all men's power. The weakest will have his share of glory. There come times, in the lives of peoples, when there passes over them a tempest of heroic action.

GERMAN ADMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITY

By Prince Lichnowsky

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY was the German Ambassador in London from 1912 to the outbreak of the war. He then retired to his estate in Germany and devoted himself to the preparation of an elaborate "Memorandum," from which the accompanying passage is taken.

In this famous document are many observations of a highly sensational character.

Only two copies of it were prepared, but one of them got into print by accident or design, and soon many thousand copies were struck off and circulated extensively throughout the civilized world. A movement was started in the Prussian Upper House to expel Prince Lichnowsky from membership in that body, and irate demands for his punishment came from German militarists, but ultimately the matter was hushed up. Count Berchtold, who figures as one of the authors of the war, was the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister at the time.

SIR EDWARD GREY [the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs] begged us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted on war. . . . The impression grew continually stronger that we desired war under any circumstances. In no other way was it possible to interpret our attitude. . . .

Then, on July 29 [1914], Sir Edward decided to give his famous warning. I replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the Minister said

to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.

Soon after this events were precipitated. Until this time, following the directions he received from Berlin, Count Berchtold had played the part of the strong man. When at last he decided to change his course, and after Russia had negotiated and waited a whole week in vain, we answered the Russian mobilization with the ultimatum and the declaration of war. . . .

It is shown by all official publications and is not disproved by our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its contents and to its omissions, constitutes a grave indictment against ourselves, that:

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved and the danger of a World War must have been known to us. Whether we were acquainted with the wording of the ultimatum is completely immaterial.

2. During the period between the 23rd and the 30th of July, 1914, when M. Sazonof emphatically declared that he could not tolerate an attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points at issue could easily have been reached and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply.

3. On the 30th of July, when Count Berchtold showed a disposition to change his course, we sent an ultimatum to St. Petersburg merely because of the

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Russian mobilization and though Austria had not been attacked; and on the 31st of July we declared war against the Russians, although the Czar pledged his word that he would not permit a single man to march as long as negotiations were still going on. Thus we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these incontestable facts, it is no wonder that the whole civilized world outside of Germany places the sole responsibility for the World War upon our shoulders.

THE CRUISE AND DESTRUCTION OF THE "EMDEN"

By Lieutenant Hellmuth von Mücke

BETWEEN August 2 and November 9, 1914, when the "Emden" was sunk by the Australian cruiser "Sydney" and grounded on Keeling Island, South Seas, this German sea-raider had succeeded in sinking 24 enemy ships with cargoes valued at millions. Lieutenant von Mücke, author of this opening account of the cruise, was first officer of the "Emden," but was in charge of a landing party detailed to destroy the wireless and cable station on Keeling Island while the warships were in battle.

In this commerce-destroying cruise, Captain Karl von Müller, of the "Emden," distinguished himself no less for chivalry than for resourcefulness. Hearty tribute has been paid him by contemporary historians, even including the English historian, Sir Henry Newbolt, who, regretting the destruction of commerce, honors the "sportsmanship of an adversary, so much in contrast to other German naval officers."

in war with Russia and France. . . . Commerce destruction is our principal rôle. To the best of our knowledge, the Russian and French men-of-war are

ABOUT 2 p.m., August 2, 1914, while cruising in the middle of the Yellow Sea, Commander von Müller appeared on the poop, holding in his hand a telegram such as we used for radio reports. Six hundred eyes eagerly watched the lips of the captain, as he began: "A radio has been received from Tsingtau as follows: 'His Majesty, the Kaiser, has, on August 1, ordered the mobilization of the entire Army and Navy. Following an invasion of German territory by Russian troops, the Empire now finds itself embroiled

gathered near Vladivostok. Therefore, it is quite likely that we may fall in with them. In that case, I know I can safely rely on my entire crew."

"Three cheers for H. M. the Kaiser," resounded over the broad surface of the Yellow Sea. . . . And so we were at war. . . .

At 15 knots we steamed toward Tsushima Straits. War watches were set on the "Emden" as darkness approached. . . . At 4 a.m. the port watch, which I commanded, was relieved. The captain took charge. Day began to break. I had hardly reached my room and prepared to get some sleep when I was awakened by the shrill calls of the alarm bells and the loud stamping of many running feet. "Clear ship for action," was passed from one compartment to another. And now everybody was ready at his battle station. Were we really lucky enough to meet a Russian or a Frenchman on the first day, as our dispatches indicated them to be in the neighborhood of Vladivostok?

In the gray daylight we saw, dead ahead, a large vessel, lights out, that appeared to be a man-of-war. The captain was approaching her at full speed. The ship had hardly seen us when she came about in short order and headed away from us. Heavy black clouds issued from her smokepipes, a sign that her engines were working at full power. The pursued vessel immediately set a course for the Japanese Islands, about 15 sea-miles away. A heavy smoke cloud hung close to the water and soon enveloped us entirely. As we could see only the mast heads, we had no means as

yet of recognizing the ship. But her actions clearly showed that she was not a neutral vessel. Of this, however, more later.

Meantime it became light. The signal, "Stop at once," flew from our foremast. As the order did not, after a certain time, produce results, it was followed by a blank shot; and, as even this did no good, we fired a few shells at her. There was now no more use of the steamer's trying to reach neutral Japanese waters. When our shell fell close aboard her, she stopped, turned around and hoisted the Russian flag at all mast heads. And so, in the first night of the war, we took our first prize. It was foreseen, on the whole, that this would be the first German prize. She was the Russian volunteer steamer "Rjesan." During peace she plied the passenger trade between Shanghai and Vladivostok. During war she would be armed and used as an auxiliary cruiser. She was a brand new, speedy ship, built at the German works of Schichau. . . .

The Russian captain made two strong protests against our taking her. She was a peaceful merchantman and it was therefore unjust to divert her. Above all he did not understand this. His knowledge of the rights of the sea was pretty weak. Our question as to why he had attempted to run away from us he allowed to remain unanswered. The captain had him informed that his fate would be decided in Tsingtau. . . .

We arrived at Tsingtau without having been annoyed. . . .

Our captain received orders there from our squadron commander, Count von Spee. This squadron, consisting of the armored cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" and the small cruiser "Nürnberg," was in the South Sea steaming northward. The "Emden" was directed to intercept the squadron at a predetermined rendezvous in the South Sea. . . .

Calm, clear weather prevailed as the "Emden" slowly steamed out of the inner harbor. Our band played "The Watch on the Rhine." . . .

The "Emden" proceeded cautiously through the openings in the mine fields . . . and very early in the morning of September 11, a few hours after our squadron had received its first addition, with the rising of the sun, a large steamer appeared dead ahead who, thinking we were an English man-of-war, was so overjoyed at our presence that she hoisted a huge British flag while still at a great distance. I do not know what kind of expression came over her captain's face when we hoisted our flag and invited him most graciously to tarry with us awhile. The steamer had left Calcutta and, having been detailed for transport duty between Colombo and France, was fitted out in fine style. Especially were we touched by the fact that she did not disown the English desire for cleanliness and therefore had taken such a big cargo of soap that our small crew, itself in the greatest need of this most necessary assistant to Kultur, would have enough to last a whole year. We also found a beautiful race-

horse aboard. A bullet behind the ear saved the animal the agonies of a death by drowning. We had less compassion for the numerous built-in, beautifully numbered, horse stalls and gun mounts aboard the ship. A half hour later the sharks could, at closer quarters, occupy their attention with these.

The crew of the ship was transported to our "lucky bag." The "lucky bag" was always one of the captured ships which was either empty or in ballast and therefore of little value, or which contained neutral cargo and could therefore not be sunk without a loss. At the end of the war, all neutral cargo destroyed must be paid for. The "lucky bag" always followed along behind the "Emden" until she was finally filled up with people taken from the captured vessels. Then she was detached and sent into the nearest harbor. Under these circumstances, the "Pontoporros" was detailed to the rôle of "lucky bag."

A seaman always has a peculiar feeling when he sees a ship sinking. Even we, accustomed to helping vessels in distress, were affected not a little by the sight of sinking vessels, even those that we had to destroy. The destruction was usually done in the following way: We went into the engine-room and removed the bonnet of a main overboard discharge valve. The water immediately came into the engine-room in a stream twice a man's height and more than a man's thickness. The watertight doors to the adjoining fire-room were opened and secured against closing, so that at least two large compartments of the

ship would certainly fill up with water. In addition, two smaller compartments were also filled, either by exploding bombs—this at night—or by firing shells into them. . . . Then the "Emden" would go ahead to meet the next oncoming mast head. . . .

At sunrise on the morning of November 9th the "Emden" was close to the entrance to Port Refuge, the anchorage of the island of Keeling. The difficult channel through the reefs was found and a landing was effected by several boats, without resistance. After about two hours the work ashore was completed. The landing force was making ready to reëmbark when the "Emden" sent a signal by searchlight, "Expedite work." Shortly thereafter the "Emden" blew her siren. That meant danger. The landing force saw the "Emden" quickly hoist her anchor, turn around and leave the harbor. The attempt to cut across the reefs and thereby catch up with the ship failed. In a few minutes the "Emden" hoisted her battleflags and opened fire on an opponent that could not be seen from the boats. Its presence, however, was denoted by the high splashes caused by shells striking near the "Emden." It proved to be the English-Australian cruiser "Sydney," one and a half times larger, five years younger, equipped with side-armor, and carrying a battery with the same number of guns per broadside as the "Emden," but each gun one and a half times larger. Having the superior speed, the result of this engagement was never in doubt. . . .

Soon the ships engaged in a running fight at a range of about four to five thousand meters. Broad-sides were exchanged. At first it seemed as if the enemy had suffered heavily. Then a heavy salvo landed on the "Emden's" stern. The heavy shells easily penetrated her unarmored sides, causing extraordinary damage. Fire broke out under the poop. For about 15 minutes flames shot 20 to 25 meters in the air out of the after end of the ship. The gray clouds were streaked with white steam, indicating that a steam pipe on the starboard side must have been pierced. These serious injuries did not, however, prevent the "Emden" from continuing her energetic attack on the enemy. She turned with full rudder and went after him.

The stream of projectiles from her bow guns never ceased. A few minutes after the "Emden" turned toward him the enemy cruiser also turned away to starboard and drew away from our ship. As we had meanwhile noticed that he had been hit several times, we, on shore, silently hoped that he had received some fatal injuries. Evidently this was not the case. He headed away at full speed, but shortly after he came about again. No doubt he was trying to increase the range in order to use his more powerful guns and still keep outside the effective range of the "Emden's" lighter battery.

Meanwhile the "Emden" received more serious injuries. While turning toward the enemy, a shell knocked the forward smokepipe down. This huge,

bulky mass lay athwart the forecastle. Almost at the same time another shell carried the foremast by the board. When I saw this I knew that at least one of my comrades lived no more—the control officer in the foretop.

The fire aboard the "Emden" continued to rage, seeming gradually to suffocate them all. Instead of flames we now saw clouds of smoke evidently caused by their attempting to put the fire out. Running along side by side, firing heavily all the time, the two engaged cruisers disappeared over the horizon.

The fight started shortly after 8.30 a.m. . . . At sunset the "Sydney" broke off the engagement and steered in a northwesterly direction. The "Emden" was heading easterly. Gradually the ships drew outside of the range of their guns. The firing ceases. The sun sets. It is getting dark. Like a shroud, night draws over both ships. . . .

HOW THE GERMAN RAIDER WAS DESTROYED

Report of Captain John C. T. Glossop, of the "Sydney"

I HAVE the honor to report that while on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H. M. A. S. "Melbourne," at 6:30 a.m., on Monday, November 9, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the

entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7 a.m., and proceeded thither. I worked up to 20 knots, and at 9.15 a.m., sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship which proved to be H. I. G. M. S. "Emden," coming out toward me at a great speed. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast and she was badly on fire aft; then the second funnel went and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action. . . .

Returning to the "Emden," she still had her colors up at mainmast head. I inquired by signal, international code, "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse "What signal?" "No signal books." I then made in Morse, "Do you surrender?" and subsequently, "Have you received my signal?" to neither of which did I get an answer. The German officers on board gave me to understand that the captain would never surrender, and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35 p.m., as she showed white flags and hauled down her ensign by sending a man aloft. . . .

I lay on and off all night and communicated with Direction Island at 8 a.m., November 10, to find that the "Emden's" party, which had landed on Keeling Island, consisting of 3 officers and 40 men, 1 launch and 2 cutters, had seized and provisioned a 70-ton schooner, the "Ayesha," having 4 Maxims with 2 belts to each. They left the previous night at six o'clock. The wireless station was entirely destroyed, 1 cable cut, 1 damaged, and 1 intact. I borrowed a doctor and two assistants and proceeded as fast as possible to the "Emden's" assistance.

I sent an officer on board to see the captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of accommodation, etc., in his ship, and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I would receive his officers and men and all wounded, then as for such time as they remained in the "Sydney" they would cause no interference with ship or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship's discipline. I, therefore, set to work at once to tranship them—a most difficult operation, the ship being on the weather side of the island and the sand alongside very heavy. The conditions in the "Emden" was indescribable. I received the last word from her at 5 p.m., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up 30 more men who had managed to get ashore from the ship. . . .

THE FALL OF LIEGE

By General Leman

THIS account of the heroic Belgian defense of Liège, before which the German army appeared on August 4, 1914, and whose last fort (Loncin) fell eleven days later, is taken from the diary of the Belgian General Leman, written while a prisoner of war at Magdeburg.

The military value of this check to the first great German onrush toward France is disputed, but of its high moral effect there is no question. Even the Germans were moved to admiration at the bravery of the garrisons. Of the 500 defenders of Fort Loncin, here mentioned in particular, 350 were killed and more than 100 severely wounded. Such heroism thrilled the world. Independence was shown to be treasured still, and honor more than an empty word. The first shining event of the war was that the little Belgian army at Liège resisted "to the uttermost." The French conferred the Legion of Honor upon Liège.

ON the 11th the Germans started bombarding us with 7- and 10-centimeter cannon. On the 12th and 13th they brought their 21-centimeter guns into action. But it was not until the 14th that they opened their heaviest fire and began their destruction of the outer works. On that day, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, a German officer approached to within 200 yards of the fort with a signaling flag in his hand; and shortly afterwards, the siege gunners, having adjusted their range, began a fearful firing, that lasted a couple

of hours. The battery on the left slope was destroyed, the enemy keeping on pounding away exclusively with their 21-centimeter cannons.

The third phase of the bombardment began at 5 o'clock in the morning of the 15th, firing being kept up without a break until two in the afternoon. A grenade wrecked the arcade under which the general staff were sheltering. All light was extinguished by the force of the explosion, and the officers ran the risk of asphyxiation by the horrible gases emitted from the shell. When firing ceased, I ventured out on a tour of inspection on the external slopes, which I found had been reduced to a rubble heap. A few minutes later, the bombardment was resumed. It seemed as though all the German batteries were together firing salvoes. Nobody will ever be able to form any adequate idea of what the reality was like. I have only learned since that when the big siege mortars entered into action they hurled against us shells weighing 1,000 kilos (nearly a ton), the explosive force of which surpasses anything known hitherto. Their approach was to be heard in an acute buzzing; and they burst with a thunderous roar, raising clouds of missiles, stones and dust.

After some time passed amid these horrors, I wished to return to my observation tower; but I had hardly advanced a few feet into the gallery when a great blast passed by, and I was thrown violently to the ground. I managed to rise, and continued on my way, only to be stopped by a choking cloud of poisonous gas. It was a mixture of the gas from an explosion and the smoke of a fire in the troop quarters. We were driven back, half-suffocated. Looking out

of a peep-hole, I saw to my horror that the fort had fallen, slopes and counter-slopes being a chaos of rubbish, while huge tongues of flame were shooting forth from the throat of the fortress. My first and last thought was to try and save the remnant of the garrison. I rushed out to give orders, and saw some soldiers, whom I mistook for Belgian gendarmes. I called them, then fell again. Poisonous gases seemed to grip my throat as in a vise.

On recovering consciousness, I found my aide-de-camp, Captain Colland, standing over me, also a German officer, who offered me a glass of water. They told me I had swooned, and that the soldiery I had taken for Belgian gendarmes were, in fact, the first band of German troops who had set foot inside the forts. In recognition of our courage, the Germans allowed me to retain my sword.

GENERAL LEMAN'S LETTER TO ALBERT, KING OF THE
BELGIANS

Sir:—After honorable engagements on August 4th, 5th and 6th, I considered that the forts of Liège could only play the "rôle" of "forts d'arret." I nevertheless maintained military government in order to coördinate the defense as much as possible, and to exercise moral influence upon the garrison.

Your Majesty is not ignorant that I was at Fort Loncin on August 6th at noon. You will learn with grief that the fort was blown up yesterday at 5.20

p.m., the greater part of the garrison being buried under the ruins. That I did not lose my life in that catastrophe is due to the fact that my escort, Commandant Collard, a sub-officer of infantry who unfortunately perished, the gendarme, Thevenim, and my two orderlies, Vanden Bossche and Jos Lecocq, drew me from a position of danger, where I was being asphyxiated by gas from the exploded powder. I was carried into a trench, where a German captain named Guson gave me a drink, after which I was made prisoner and taken to Liège in an ambulance. I am convinced that the honor of our arms has been sustained. I have not surrendered either the fortress or the forts. Deign, Sire, to pardon my defects in this letter. I am physically shattered by the explosion of Loncin. In Germany, whither I am proceeding, my thoughts will be, as they have ever been, of Belgium and the King. I would willingly have given my life the better to serve them, but death was denied me.

JAPAN JOINS THE ALLIES

The Japanese Ultimatum to Germany

THIS Japanese ultimatum was delivered in the Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin, August 15, 1914. It demanded the surrender of the fortified port of Tsing-tau, the center of the district of Kiao-chau, from which the Germans had ruled most of the Chinese province of Shantung. It was under the command of Captain Meyer-Waldeck, and had been wrested from China by the Germans as compensation for the murder of two German missionaries somewhere in the Chinese hinterland.

Tsing-tau had been developed into a great fortress well able to withstand a siege. After a spirited resistance it was occupied by British and Japanese troops on November 7, and the defenders were accorded the honors of war. During the siege no less than a thousand mines were swept from the sea approaches. Over 4,000 German prisoners were interned in Japan, and large quantities of war material were confiscated.

Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

(1) Withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German men-o'-war and armed

WE consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in the Far East, and to safeguard general interests as contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain.

In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give advice to the

vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of its not receiving, by noon on August 23rd, an answer from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation.

THE GERMANS ENTER BRUSSELS

By Richard Harding Davis

ON August 20, 1914, the vanguard of the German army marched into Brussels, which had capitulated after a siege of twelve days. Richard Harding Davis, the famous novelist and war correspondent, was in the Belgian capital at the time and thus described the historic event in a memorable dispatch to the New York "Tribune."

Experienced as he was in reporting wars, Davis confesses that the spectacle of the mighty German military "steam-roller" crunching over Belgium was awe-inspiring. For three days and nights the German hosts were on the march. Clad in gray-green uniforms, the apparently interminable columns were like "a fog that melted into the stones, blended with the ancient house fronts, that shifted and drifted . . . and became a river of steel flowing onward gray and ghost-like." On the day preceding the entrance of the German army into Brussels, the seat of the Belgian Government had been transferred to Antwerp.

THE entrance of the German army into Brussels has lost the human quality. It was lost as soon as the three soldiers who led the army bicycled into the Boulevard du Régent and asked the way to the Gare du Nord. When they passed, the human note passed with them.

What came after them, and twenty-four hours later is still coming, is not men marching, but a force of nature like a tidal wave, an avalanche or a river flooding its banks. At this minute it is rolling through Brussels as the swollen waters of the Conemaugh Valley swept through Johnstown.

At the sight of the first few regiments of the enemy we were thrilled with interest. After they had passed

for three hours in one unbroken steel-gray column we were bored. But when hour after hour passed and there was no halt, no breathing time, no open spaces in the ranks, the thing became uncanny, inhuman. You returned to watch it, fascinated. It held the mystery and menace of fog rolling toward you across the sea.

The gray of the uniforms worn by both officers and men helped this air of mystery. Only the sharpest eye could detect among the thousands that passed the slightest difference. All moved under a cloak of invisibility. Only after the most numerous and severe tests, with all materials and combinations of color that give forth no color, could this gray have been discovered. That it was selected to clothe and disguise the German when he fights is typical of the German Staff in striving for efficiency to leave nothing to chance, to neglect no detail.

After you have seen this service uniform under conditions entirely opposite you are convinced that for the German soldier it is his strongest weapon. Even the most expert marksman cannot hit the target unless he can see. It is a gray-green, not the blue-gray of our Confederates. It is the gray of the hour just before daybreak, the gray of unpolished steel, of mist among green trees.

I saw it first in the Grand Place in front of the Hotel de Ville. It was impossible to tell if in that noble square there was a regiment or a brigade. You saw only a fog that melted into the stones, blended with

the ancient house fronts, that shifted and drifted, but left you nothing at which you could point.

Later, as the army passed below my window, under the trees of the Botanical Park, it merged and was lost against the green leaves. It is no exaggeration to say that at a hundred yards you can see the horses on which the Uhlans ride, but cannot see the men who ride them.

If I appear to overemphasize this disguising uniform it is because of all the details of the German outfit it appealed to me as one of the most remarkable. The other day, when I was with the rear guard of the French Dragoons and Cuirassiers and they threw out pickets, we could distinguish them against the yellow wheat or green gorse at half a mile, while these men passing in the street, when they have reached the next crossing, become merged into the gray of the paving stones and the earth swallows them. In comparison the yellow khaki of our own American Army is about as invisible as the flag of Spain.

Yesterday Major General von Jarotsky, the German Military Governor of Brussels, assured Burgomaster Max that the German army would not occupy the city, but would pass through it. It is still passing. I have followed in campaigns six armies, but excepting not even our own, the Japanese or the British, I have not seen one so thoroughly equipped. I am not speaking of the fighting qualities of any army, only of the equipment and organization. The German army moved into this city as smoothly and as com-

pactly as an Empire State Express. There were no halts, no open place, no stragglers.

This army has been on active service three weeks, and so far there is not apparently a chin-strap or a horseshoe missing. It came in with the smoke pouring from cookstoves on wheels, and in an hour had set up postoffice wagons, from which mounted messengers galloped along the line of column distributing letters and at which soldiers posted picture post-cards.

The infantry came in in files of five, two hundred men to each company; the lancers in columns of four, with not a pennant missing. The quick-firing guns and field pieces were one hour at a time in passing, each gun with its caisson and ammunition wagon taking twenty seconds in which to pass.

The men of the infantry sang "Fatherland, My Fatherland." Between each line of song they took three steps. At times two thousand men were singing together in absolute rhythm and beat. When the melody gave way the silence was broken only by the stamp of ironshod boots, and then again the song rose. When the singing ceased the bands played marches. They were followed by the rumbles of siege guns, the creaking of wheels and of chains clanking against the cobble-stones and the sharp bell-like voices of the bugles.

For seven hours the army passed in such solid column that not once might a taxicab or trolley car pass through the city. Like a river of steel it flowed, gray and ghostlike. Then, as dusk came and as thousands

of horses' hoofs and thousands of iron boots continued to tramp forward, they struck tiny sparks from the stones, but the horses and men who beat out the sparks were invisible.

At midnight pack wagons and siege guns were still passing. At seven this morning I was awakened by the tramp of men and bands playing jauntily. Whether they marched all day or not I do not know; but for twenty-six hours the gray army rumbled with the mystery of fog and the pertinacity of a steam roller.

MONS—THE FIRST BRITISH BATTLE

By Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

SHORTLY before this first contact between the British and Germans, August 23, 1914, the Kaiser issued his celebrated order from his Aix-la-Chapelle headquarters: "It is my Royal and Imperial command that you concentrate your energies, for the immediate present, upon one single purpose, and that is that you address all your skill and all the valor of my soldiers to exterminate first the treacherous English and walk over General French's contemptible little army." The British seized the phrase "contemptible little army" and used it as a badge of honor.

The British Expeditionary Forces had landed in France only one week before this engagement. While the Germans were driving the French and British backward in Belgium, the Russians, under Rennenkampf, were defeating the Germans at Gumbinnen. This account is taken from Doyle's "History of the British Campaign in France and Flanders," George H. Doran Co.

drawn up in concealed positions within half a mile of the line of battle. All was now ready, and officers could be seen on every elevation peering northwards through their glasses for the first sign of the enemy.

HAVING reached their ground, the troops, with no realization of immediate danger, proceeded to make shallow trenches. Their bands had not been brought to the front, but the universal singing from one end of the line to the other showed that the men were in excellent spirits. Cheering news had come in from the cavalry, detachments of which had ridden out as far as Soignies, meeting advance patrols of the enemy and coming back with prisoners and trophies. The guns were

. . . Thrilling with anticipation, the men waited for their own first entrance upon the stupendous drama. They were already weary and footsore, for they had all done at least two days of forced marching, and the burden of the pack, the rifle, and the hundred and fifty rounds per man was no light one. They lay snugly in their trenches under the warm August sun and waited. . . .

A hovering aeroplane had just slid down with the news that the roads from the north were alive with the advancing Germans, but the estimate of the aviator placed them at two corps and a division of cavalry. This coincided roughly with the accounts brought in by the scouts and, what was more important, with the forecast of General Joffre. Secure in the belief that he was flanked upon one side by the 5th French Army, and on the other by a screen of French cavalry, whilst his front was approached by a force not appreciably larger than his own, General French had no cause for uneasiness. Had his airmen taken a wider sweep to the north and west, or had the French commander among his many pressing preoccupations been able to give an earlier warning to his British colleague, the trenches would, no doubt, have been abandoned before a gray coat had appeared, and the whole army brought swiftly to a position of strategical safety. Even now, as they waited expectantly for the enemy, a vast steel trap was closing up for their destruction. . . .

It was after ten o'clock when scouting cavalry were observed falling back. Then the distant sound of a gun was heard, and a few seconds later a shell burst some hundreds of yards behind the British lines. The British guns one by one roared into action. A cloud of smoke rose along the line of the woods in front from the bursting shrapnel, but nothing could be seen of the German gunners. The defending guns were also well concealed. Here and there, from observation points upon buildings and slagheaps, the controllers of the batteries were able to indicate targets and register hits unseen by the gunners themselves. The fire grew warmer and warmer as fresh batteries dashed up and unlimbered on either side. The noise was horrible, but no enemy had been seen by the infantry, and little damage done.

But now an ill-omened bird flew over the British lines. Far aloft across the deep blue sky skimmed the dark Taube, curved, turned, and sailed northwards again. It had marked the shells bursting beyond the trenches. In an instant, by some devilish cantrip of signal or wireless, it had set the range right. A rain of shells roared and crashed along the lines of the shallow trenches. . . . The minutes seemed very long, and still the shells came raining down. The men shoved the five-fold clips down into their magazines and waited with weary patience. A senior officer peering over the end of a trench leaned tensely forward and rested his glasses upon the grassy edge. "They're coming!" he whispered to his neighbor. It

ran from lip to lip along the line of crouching men. Heads were poked up here and there above the line of broken earth. Soon, in spite of the crashing shells overhead, there was a fringe of peering faces. And there at last in front of them was the German enemy. After all the centuries, Briton and Teuton faced each other at last for the test of battle. . . .

The men, still fingering their triggers, gazed expectantly at their officers, who measured intently the distance of the approaching swarms. The Germans had already begun to fire in a desultory fashion. Shrapnel was bursting thickly along the head of their columns but they were coming steadily onwards. Suddenly a rolling wave of independent firing broke out from the British position. At some portions of the line the enemy were at eight hundred, at others at one thousand yards. The men, happy in having something definite to do, snuggled down earnestly to their work and fired swiftly but deliberately into the approaching mass. Rifles, machine-guns, and field-pieces were all roaring together, while the incessant crash of the shells overhead added to the infernal uproar. Men lost all sense of time as they thrust clip after clip into their rifles. The German swarms staggered on bravely under that leaden sleet. Then they halted, vacillated, and finally thinned, shredded out, and drifted backwards like a gray fog torn by a gale. The woods absorbed them once again; whilst the rain of shells upon the British trenches became thicker and more deadly.

There was a lull in the infantry attack, and the British, peering from their shelters, surveyed with a grim satisfaction the patches and smudges of gray which showed the effect of their fire. But the rest was not a long one. With fine courage the German battalions reformed under the shelter of the trees, while fresh troops from the rear pushed forward to stiffen the shaken lines. "Hold your fire!" was the order that ran down the ranks. With the confidence bred of experience, the men waited and still waited, till the very features of the Germans could be distinguished. Then once more the deadly fire rippled down the line, the masses shredded and dissolved, and the fugitives hurried to the woods. Then came the pause under shell fire, and then once again the emergence of the infantry, the attack, the check, and the recoil. . . .

A rush of German troops came between eleven and twelve o'clock across the Aubourg Station Bridge. It was so screened up to the moment of the advance that neither the rifles nor the machine-guns of the Middlesex could stop it. It is an undoubted fact that this rush was preceded by a great crowd of women and children, through which the leading files of the Germans could hardly be seen. At the same time, or very shortly afterwards, the other two bridges were forced in a similar manner, but the Germans in all three cases as they reached the farther side were unable to make any rapid headway against the British fire, though they made the position untenable for the troops in trenches between the bridges. . . .

By the late afternoon the general position was grave, but not critical. The enemy had lost very heavily, while the men in the trenches were, in comparison, unscathed. Here and there, as we have seen, the Germans had obtained a lodgment in the British position, especially at the salient which had always appeared to be impossible to hold, but, on the other hand, the great part of the Army, including the whole First Corps, had not yet been seriously engaged, and there were reserve troops in the immediate rear of the fighting line who could be trusted to make good any gap in the ranks before them. The German artillery fire was heavy and well-directed, but the British batteries had held their own. Such was the position when, about 5 p.m., a telegram from General Joffre was put into Sir John French's hand, which must have brought a pang to his heart. From it he learned that all his work had been in vain, and that far from contending for victory, he would be fortunate if he saved himself from utter defeat.

There were two pieces of information in this fatal message, and each was disastrous. The first announced that instead of the two German corps whom he had reason to think were in front of him, there were four—the Third, Fourth, Seventh and Fourth Reserve Corps—forming, with the second and fourth cavalry divisions, a force of nearly 200,000 men, while the Second Corps were bringing another 40,000 round his left flank from the direction of Tournai. The second item was even more serious. Instead of

being buttressed up with French troops on either side of him, he learned that the Germans had burst the line of the Sambre, and that the French armies on his right were already in full retreat, while nothing substantial lay upon his left. It was a most perilous position. The British force lay exposed and unsupported amid converging foes who far outnumbered it in men and guns. . . .

But it is no easy matter to disengage so large an army which is actually in action and hard-pressed by a numerous and enterprising enemy. The front was extensive and the lines of retreat were limited. That the operation was carried out in an orderly fashion is a testimony to the skill of the General, the talents of the commanders, and the discipline of the units. If it had been done at once and simultaneously it would certainly have been the signal for a vigorous German advance and a possible disaster. The positions were therefore held, though no efforts were made to retake those points where the enemy had effected a lodgment. There was no possible use in wasting troops in regaining positions which would in no case be held. As dusk fell, a dusk which was lightened by the glare of burning villages, some of the regiments began slowly to draw off to the rear. In the early morning of the 24th the definite order to retire was conveyed to the corps commanders, whilst immediate measures were taken to clear the roads. . . .

After a night of flames and of uproar the day dawned, a day of great anxiety to the British com-

manders and of considerable pressure upon a portion of the troops. Sir John French had given instructions that the First Corps, which had been only slightly engaged the day before, should pretend to assume the offensive upon the extreme right wing in the direction of Binche, whilst the Second Corps began its retirement. The enemy was following up rapidly, however, along the whole length of the British line, both flanks of which were exposed. Shortly after dawn the evacuated positions had been occupied, and Mons itself was in the hands of the Germans. The Second Corps began its retreat, helped by the feint which was carried out by General Haig upon the right, and by the bulk of the batteries of both corps, but the pursuit was vigorous and the shell-fire incessant. . . .

As the army fell back, the border fortress of Maubeuge with its heavy guns offered a tempting haven of rest for the weary and overmatched troops, but not in vain had France lost her army in Metz. Sir John French would have no such protection, however violently the Germans might push him towards it. "The British army invested in Maubeuge" was not destined to furnish the head-line of a Berlin special edition. The fortress was left to the eastward, and the tired troops snatched a few hours of rest near Bavaye, still pursued by the guns and the searchlights of the persistent foe. Early on the 25th the columns were again on the march for the south, and for safety.

THE BURNING OF LOUVAIN

By Richard Harding Davis

A SHUDDER ran through the civilized world when the news came that the Germans had put the torch to the historic Belgian city of Louvain, with its priceless treasures of architecture and learning. It had been occupied by the German soldiery on August 19, and a week later was in smoking ruins. As a veteran war correspondent, who had reported every war since the 1897 conflict between Greece and Turkey, Davis was in Louvain and witnessed the scenes here described in a news dispatch. It was later incorporated in a volume, "*With the Allies*," copyrighted by Charles Scribner's Sons.

Shortly after penning this vivid picture of Teutonic "frightfulness," Davis was captured by the Germans and narrowly escaped being shot as a spy. A high type of American journalism is exhibited in his war correspondence, concluding with his report of the withdrawal of the Franco-British forces from Serbia.

thoroughness they left Louvain an empty, blackened shell. The reason for this appeal to the torch and the execution of non-combatants, as given to Mr. Whit-

AT seven o'clock in the evening we arrived at what for six hundred years had been the city of Louvain. The Germans were burning it, and to hide their work kept us locked in the railroad carriages. But the story was written against the sky, was told to us by German soldiers incoherent with excesses; and we could read it in the faces of women and children being led to concentration camps and of citizens on their way to be shot.

The day before the Germans had sentenced Louvain to become a wilderness, and with German system and love of

lock and myself on the morning I left Brussels by General von Lutwitz, the military governor, was this: The day before, while the German military commander of the troops in Louvain was at the Hôtel de Ville talking to the burgomaster, a son of the burgomaster, with an automatic pistol, shot the chief of staff and German staff surgeons.

Lutwitz claimed this was the signal for the civil guard, in civilian clothes on the roofs, to fire upon the German soldiers in the open square below. He also said the Belgians had quick-firing guns, brought from Antwerp. As for a week the Germans had occupied Louvain and closely guarded all approaches, the story that there was any gun-running is absurd.

"Fifty Germans were killed and wounded," said Lutwitz, "and for that Louvain must be wiped out—so!" In pantomime with his fist he swept the papers across his table.

"The Hôtel de Ville," he added, "was a beautiful building; it is a pity it must be destroyed."

Were he telling us his soldiers had destroyed a kitchen-garden, his tone could not have expressed less regret.

Ten days before I had been in Louvain, when it was occupied by Belgian troops and King Albert and his staff. The city dates from the eleventh century, and the population was forty-two thousand. The citizens were brewers, lace-makers and manufacturers of ornaments for churches. The university once was

the most celebrated in European cities and was the headquarters of the Jesuits.

In the Louvain College many priests now in America have been educated, and ten days before, over the great yellow walls of the college, I had seen hanging two American flags. I had found the city clean, sleepy and pretty, with narrow twisting streets and smart shops and cafés. Set in flower gardens were the houses, with red roofs, green shutters and white walls.

Over those that faced south had been trained pear-trees, their branches heavy with fruit, spread out against the walls like branches of candelabra. The town hall was an example of Gothic architecture in detail and design more celebrated even than the town hall of Bruges or Brussels. It was five hundred years old and lately had been repaired with taste and at great cost.

Opposite was the church of St. Pierre, dating from the fifteenth century, a very noble building, with many chapels filled with carvings of the time of the Renaissance in wood, stone and iron. In the university were one hundred and fifty thousand volumes. . . .

On the night of the 27th these buildings were empty, exploded cartridges. Statues, pictures, carvings, parchments, archives—all these were gone.

No one defends the sniper. But because ignorant Mexicans, when their city was invaded, fired upon our sailors, we did not destroy Vera Cruz. Even

had we bombarded Vera Cruz, money could have restored that city. Money can never restore Louvain. Great architects and artists, dead these six hundred years, made it beautiful, and their handiwork belonged to the world. With torch and dynamite the Germans turned those masterpieces into ashes, and all the Kaiser's horses and all his men cannot bring them back again.

When our troop train reached Louvain, the entire heart of the city was destroyed, and the fire had reached the Boulevard Tirlemont, which faces the railroad station. The night was windless, and the sparks rose in steady, leisurely pillars, falling back into the furnace from which they sprang. In their work the soldiers were moving from the heart of the city to the outskirts, street by street, from house to house.

In each building they began at the first floor and, when that was burning steadily, passed to the one next. There were no exceptions—whether it was a store, chapel, or private residence, it was destroyed. The occupants had been warned to go, and in each deserted shop or house the furniture was piled, the torch was stuck under it, and into the air went the savings of years, souvenirs of children, of parents, heirlooms that had passed from generation to generation.

The people had time only to fill a pillow case and fly. Some were not so fortunate, and by thousands, like flocks of sheep, they were rounded up and marched through the night to concentration camps.

We were not allowed to speak to any citizen of Louvain, but the Germans crowded the windows of the train, boastful, gloating, eager to interpret. . . .

In the two hours during which the train circled the burning city war was before us in its most hateful aspect.

In other wars I have watched men on one hilltop, without haste, without heat, fire at men on another hill, and in consequence on both sides good men were wasted. But in those fights there were no women or children, and the shells struck only vacant stretches of veldt or uninhabited mountain sides.

At Louvain it was war upon the defenseless, war upon churches, colleges, shops of milliners and lace-makers; war brought to the bedside and the fireside; against women harvesting in the fields, against children in wooden shoes at play in the streets.

At Louvain that night the Germans were like men after an orgy.

There were fifty English prisoners, erect and soldierly. In the ocean of gray the little patch of khaki looked pitifully lonely, but they regarded the men who had outnumbered but not defeated them with calm uncurious eyes. In one way I was glad to see them there. Later they will bear witness. They will tell how the enemy makes a wilderness and calls it war. . . .

Outside the station in the public square the people of Louvain passed in an unending procession, women bareheaded, weeping, men carrying the children

asleep on their shoulders, all hemmed in by the shadowy army of gray wolves. Once they were halted, and among them were marched a line of men. These were on their way to be shot. And, better to point the moral, an officer halted both processions, and, climbing to a cart, explained why the men were to die. He warned others not to bring down upon themselves a like vengeance.

As those being led to spend the night in the fields looked across to those marked for death they saw old friends, neighbors of long standing, men of their own household. The officers bellowing at them from the cart was illuminated by the headlights of an automobile. He looked like an actor in a spotlight on a darkened stage.

It was all like a scene upon the stage, unreal, inhuman. You felt it could not be true. You felt that the curtain of fire, purring and crackling and sending up hot sparks to meet the kind, calm stars, was only a painted backdrop, that the reports of rifles from the dark ruins came from blank cartridges, and that these trembling shopkeepers and peasants ringed in bayonets would not in a few minutes really die, but they themselves and their homes would be restored to their wives and children.

You felt it as only a nightmare, cruel and uncivilized. And then you remembered that the German Emperor has told us what it is. It is his Holy War.

SEA FIGHTING OFF HELIGOLAND

Admiral Sir David Beatty's Report

WHAT is known as the Battle of Heligoland Bight, fought August 28, 1914, was the first and last time that any British squadron operated at close quarters with the German naval bases. The actual fighting took place about seven miles north of Heligoland. Under Admiral Beatty, who made this report from his flagship "Lion," September 1, were some 60 British craft, only four of which were hit. The Germans lost three cruisers and two destroyers, while other vessels were damaged. The British casualties were 32 killed and 52 wounded; about 700 Germans perished, and 300 were rescued and taken prisoners.

The brunt of this engagement was borne by the British light cruiser "Arethusa," which narrowly escaped destruction, but which later distinguished herself again in the action off Dogger Bank. The killing of the captain of the German cruiser "Ariadne" by a shell from the "Fearless" prompted the German ships to withdraw.

At 8.10 a.m. I received a signal from the Commodore (T), informing me that the flotilla was in action

I HAVE the honor to report that on Thursday, August 27, at 5 a. m., I proceeded with the First Battle Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser Squadron in company, to rendezvous with the Rear Admiral, "Invincible."

At 4 a. m., August 28, the movements of the flotillas commenced, as previously arranged, the Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron supporting. The Rear Admiral, "Invincible," with "New Zealand" and four destroyers, having joined my flag, the squadron passed through the prearranged rendezvous.

with the enemy. This was presumably in the vicinity of their prearranged rendezvous. From this time until 11 a. m. I remained about the vicinity ready to support as necessary, intercepting various signals, which contained no information on which I could act.

At 11 a. m. the squadron was attacked by three submarines. The attack was frustrated by rapid maneuvering, and the four destroyers were ordered to attack them. Shortly after 11 a. m. various signals having been received indicating that the Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) were both in need of assistance, I ordered the Light Cruiser Squadron to support the torpedo flotillas.

Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T), stating that he was being attacked by a large cruiser, and a further signal informing me that he was being hard pressed, and asking for assistance. The Captain (D), First Flotilla, also signaled that he was in need of help.

From the foregoing the situation appeared to me critical. The flotillas had advanced only two miles since 8 a. m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy bases on their flank and rear respectively. Commodore Goodenough had detached two of his light cruisers to assist some destroyers earlier in the day, and these had not yet rejoined. (They joined at 2.30 p.m.) As the reports indicated the presence of many enemy ships—one a large cruiser—I considered that his force might not be strong enough to deal

with the situation sufficiently rapidly, so at 11.30 a. m. the battle cruisers turned to east-southeast and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to be of any value the support must be overwhelming, and carried out at the highest speed possible.

I had not lost sight of the risk of submarines, and possible sortie in force from the enemy's base, especially in view of the mist to the southeast.

Our high speed, however, made submarine attack difficult, and the smoothness of the sea made their detection comparatively easy. I considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sorties except by a battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided our stroke was sufficiently rapid.

At 12.15 p.m. "Fearless" and First Flotilla were sighted retiring west. At the same time the Light Cruiser Squadron was observed to be engaging an enemy ship ahead. They appeared to have her beat.

I then steered northeast to sounds of firing ahead, and at 12.30 p.m. sighted "Arethusa" and Third Flotilla retiring to the westward engaging a cruiser of the "Kolberg" class on our port bow. I steered to cut her off from Heligoland, and at 12.37 p.m. opened fire. At 12.42 the enemy turned to northeast, and we chased at 27 knots.

At 12.56 p.m. sighted and engaged a two-funneled cruiser ahead. "Lion" fired two salvos at her, which took effect, and she disappeared into the mist, burning furiously and in a sinking condition. In view

of the mist and that she was steering at high speed at right angles to "Lion," who was herself steaming at 28 knots, the "Lion's" firing was very creditable.

Our destroyers had reported the presence of floating mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a withdrawal. The battle cruisers turned north and circled to port to complete the destruction of the vessel first engaged. She was sighted again at 1.25 p.m. steaming southeast, with colors still flying. "Lion" opened fire with two turrets, and at 1.35 p.m., after receiving two salvos, she sank.

The four attacked destroyers were sent to pick up survivors, but I deeply regret that they subsequently reported that they searched the area but found none.

At 1.40 p.m. the battle cruisers turned to the northward, and "Queen Mary" was again attacked by a submarine. The attack was avoided by the use of the helm. "Lowestoft" was also unsuccessfully attacked. The battle cruisers covered the retirement until nightfall. By 6 p. m., the retirement having been well executed and all destroyers accounted for, I altered course, spread the light cruisers, and swept northwards in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's orders. At 7.45 p.m. I detached "Liverpool" to Rosyth with German prisoners, seven officers and 79 men, survivors from "Mainz." No further incident occurred.

FROM THE FRONTIERS TO THE MARNE

Official French Review by Marshal Joseph Joffre

THIS official report of the French Commander-in-Chief concerns the strategic retreat of the Allies, ending with the stand taken on the Oise and Marne, September 5, 1914. So vast and complex was this campaign, like some mighty chess game between chosen masters of the military art, that it may be best comprehended in the words of Marshal Joffre, the ultimate victor in the game.

The German commanders issued no such formal report, although the first huge clash of the armies was decisively in their favor. Joffre realized that the only hope of saving Paris lay in concentrating his armies, leading his adversary to a field of his own selection, and there giving battle. This he did, by sacrificing Belgium and that part of France north of the line from Paris to Verdun. Liège and Namur had taught the French to mistrust fortresses as death-traps.

This report is open to criticism for exonerating the commanders of the retiring armies.

THE first month of the campaign began with successes and finished with defeats for the French troops. Under what circumstances did these come about? Our plan of concentration had foreseen the possibility of two principal actions, one on the right between the Vosges and the Moselle, the other on the left to the north of Verdun-Toul line, this double possibility involving the eventual variation of our transport. On August 2nd, owing to the Germans passing through Belgium, our concentration was substantially

modified by Marshal Joffre in order that our principal effort might be directed to the north.

From the first week in August it was apparent that the length of time required for the British army to begin to move would delay our action in connection with it. This delay is one of the reasons which explain our failures at the end of August.

Awaiting the moment when the operations in the north could begin, and to prepare for it by retaining in Alsace the greatest possible number of German forces, the Commander-in-Chief ordered our troops to occupy Mulhouse, to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Huningue and below, and then to flank the attack of our troops, operating in Lorraine.

The purpose of the operations in Alsace was to retain a large part of the enemy's forces far from the northern theater of operations. Our offensive in Lorraine was to pursue the same purpose still more directly by holding before it the German army corps operating to the south of Metz.

This offensive began brilliantly on August 14th. On the 19th we had reached the region of Saarburg and that of the Étangs (lakes), and we held Dieuze, Morhange, Delme and Château Salins.

On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the strong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy's artillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and, finally, in the default of certain units.

On the 22nd, in spite of the splendid behavior of several of our army corps, notably that of Nancy, our troops were brought back on the Grand Couronné,

while on the 23rd and 24th the Germans concentrated reënforcements—three army corps, at least—in the region of Lunéville and forced us to retire to the south.

This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after two vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from west to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time a sort of balance was established on this terrain between the Germans and ourselves. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterward, as will be seen, modified to our advantage.

There remained the principal business, the battle of the north—postponed owing to the necessity of waiting for the British army. On August 20th the concentration of our lines was finished and the Commander-in-Chief gave orders for our center and our left to take the offensive. Our center comprised two armies. Our left consisted of a third army, reënforced to the extent of two army corps, a corps of cavalry, the reserve divisions, the British army, and the Belgian army, which had already been engaged for the previous three weeks at Liége, Namur and Louvain.

The German plan on that date was as follows: From seven to eight army corps and four cavalry divisions were endeavoring to pass between Givet and Brussels, and even to prolong their movements more to the west. Our object was, therefore, in the first place, to hold and dispose of the enemy's center and afterward to throw ourselves with all available forces

on the left flank of the German grouping of troops in the north.

On August 21st our offensive in the center began with ten army corps. On August 22nd it failed, and this reverse appeared serious.

The reasons for it are complex. There were in this affair individual and collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy, divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments, precipitate retreats, a premature waste of men and, finally, the inadequacy of certain of our troops and their leaders, both as regards the use of infantry and artillery.

In consequences of these lapses the enemy, turning to account the difficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the advantages which the superiority of his subaltern complements gave him.

In spite of this defeat our maneuver had still a chance of success, if our left and the British army obtained a decisive result. This was unfortunately not the case. On August 22nd, at the cost of great losses, the enemy succeeded in crossing the Sambre and our left army fell back on the 24th upon Beaumont-Givet, being perturbed by the belief that the enemy was threatening its right.

On the same day (the 24th), the British army fell back after a German attack upon the Maubeuge-Valenciennes line. On the 25th and 26th its retreat became more hurried. After Landrecies and Le Cateau it fell back southward by forced marches. It

could not from this time keep its hold until after crossing the Marne.

The rapid retreat of the English, coinciding with the defeat sustained in Belgian Luxemburg (at the Sambre), allowed the enemy to cross the Meuse and to accelerate, by fortifying it, the action of his right.

The situation at this moment may be thus summed up: Either our frontier had to be defended on the spot under conditions which the British retreat rendered extremely perilous, or we had to execute a strategic retirement which, while delivering up to the enemy a part of the national soil, would permit us, on the other hand, to resume the offensive at our own time with a favorable disposition of troops, still intact, which we had at our command. The Commander-in-Chief determined on the second alternative.

Henceforward the French command devoted its efforts to preparing the offensive. To this end three conditions had to be fulfilled:

1. The retreat had to be carried out in order under a succession of counter-attacks which would keep the enemy busy.

2. The extreme point of this retreat must be fixed in such a way that the different armies should reach it simultaneously, ready at the moment of occupying it to resume the offensive all together.

3. Every circumstance permitting of a resumption of the offensive before this point should be reached

must be utilized by the whole of our forces and the British forces.

The counter-attacks, executed during the retreat, were brilliant and often fruitful. On August 26th we successfully attacked St. Quentin to disengage the British army. Two other corps and a reserve division engaged the Prussian Guard and the Tenth German Army Corps, which was debouching from Guise. By the end of the day, after various fluctuations, the enemy was thrown back on the Oise and the British front was freed.

On August 27th we also succeeded in throwing back upon the Meuse the enemy, who was endeavoring to gain a foothold on the left bank. Our successes continued on the 28th in the woods of Marfee and of Jaulnay. Thanks to them we were able, in accordance with the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, to fall back on the Buzancy-Le Chesne-Bouvellemont line.

Further to the right another army took part in the same movement and carried out successful attacks on August 25th on the Othian and in the region of Spin-court.

On the 26th these different units recrossed the Meuse without being disturbed and were able to join in the action of our center. Our armies were, therefore, again intact and available for the offensive.

On August 26th a new army composed of two army corps, five reserve divisions, and a Moorish

brigade was constituted. This army was to assemble in the region of Amiens between August 27th and September 1st and take the offensive against the German right, uniting its action with that of the British army, operating on the line of Ham-Bray-sur-Somme.

The hope of resuming the offensive was at this moment rendered vain by the rapidity of the march of the German right wing. This rapidity had two consequences, which we had to parry before thinking of advancing. On the one hand, our new army had not time to complete its detraining, and, on the other hand, the British army, forced back farther by the enemy, uncovered on August 31st our left flank. Our line, thus modified, contained waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to the offensive.

To understand this it is sufficient to consider the situation created by the quick advance of the enemy on the evening of September 2nd.

A corps of cavalry had crossed the Oise and advanced as far as Château-Thierry. The First German army (General von Kluck), comprising four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne.

The Second German army (General von Bulow), with three active army corps and two reserve corps, was reaching the Laon region.

The Third German army (General von Hausen), with two active army corps and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne between the Château Porcien and Attigny.

More to the east, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh German armies, namely twelve army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous Ersatz formations, were in contact with our troops, the Fourth and Fifth Armies between Vouziers and Verdun and the others in the positions which have been indicated above, from Verdun to the Vosges.

It will, therefore, be seen that our left, if we accepted battle, might be in great peril through the British forces and the new French army, operating more to the westward, having given way.

A defeat in these conditions would have cut off our armies from Paris and from the British forces and at the same time from the new army which had been constituted to the left of the English. We should thus be running the risk of losing by a single stroke the advantage of the assistance which Russia later on was to furnish.

General Joffre chose resolutely for the solution which disposed of these risks, that is to say, for postponing the offensive and the continuance of the retreat. In this way he remained on the ground which he had chosen. He waited only until he could engage in better conditions.

In consequence, on September 1st, he fixed as an extreme limit for the movement of retreat, which was still going on, the line of Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and the region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if the troops were compelled to go back so

far. They would attack before reaching it, as soon as there was a possibility of bringing about an offensive disposition, permitting the coöperation of the whole of our forces.

On September 5th it appeared that this desired situation existed.

The first German army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued its endeavor to envelop our left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reached the region of Chaugry, to the south of Rebaix and of Esternay. It aimed then at cutting our armies off from Paris, in order to begin the investment of the capital.

The Second German army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergères and Vertus.

The Third and Fourth German armies reached to Châlons-sur-Marne and Bussy-le-Repos. The Fifth German army was advancing on one side and the other from the Argonne as far as Triacourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. The Sixth and Seventh German armies were attacking more to the east.

But—and here is a capital difference between the situation of September 5th and that of September 2nd—the envelopment of our left was no longer possible.

In the first place, our left army had been able to occupy the line of Sezanne, Viller-St. Georges and Courchamps. Furthermore, the British forces, gathered between the Seine and the Marne, flanked on

their left by the newly created army, were closely connected with the rest of our forces.

This was precisely the disposition which the Commander-in-Chief had wished to see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it, and ordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from his right two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisions of cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his center.

On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies a message ordering them to attack.

"The hour has come," he wrote, "to advance at all costs, and to die where you stand rather than give way."

THE ABANDONMENT OF PARIS

Official Proclamations

ACTING on the advice of General Joffre, on September 3, 1914, President Poincaré and his Ministers vacated Paris and established the French seat of government at Bordeaux. In the first of the accompanying documents, General Gallieni briefly informs the army and inhabitants of Paris that, as commandant of the French capital, he will resolutely defend it.

Following his proclamation is that of the French Government, signed by all the civil and military authorities, including Gallieni, and addressed to the "People of France." Both then and later Gallieni achieved merited fame as one of the ablest and most courageous defenders of France. A not over-sympathetic English eye-witness of the official evacuation does not believe that "any human society in time of peril could display in a higher degree than Paris was doing the virtues of calmness, courage, loyalty and endurance."

soldiers has won for them, at several points, marked advantages; but in the north the pressure of the German forces has compelled us to fall back.

This situation has compelled the President of the Republic and the Government to take a painful decision.

THE members of the Government of the Republic have left Paris to give a fresh impulse to national defense.

I have been intrusted with the task of defending Paris against the invader.

That task I will fulfill to the end.—GALLIENI, Commandant of the Army of Paris.

PEOPLE OF FRANCE!

For several weeks relentless battles have engaged our heroic troops and the army of the enemy. The valor of our

In order to watch over the national welfare, it is the duty of the public powers to remove themselves temporarily from the city of Paris.

Under the command of an eminent Chief, a French army, full of courage and zeal, will defend the capital and its patriotic population against the invader.

But the war must be carried on at the same time on the rest of its territory.

Without peace or truce, without cessation or faltering, the struggle for the honor of the nation and the reparation of violated rights must continue.

None of our armies is impaired. If some of them have sustained very considerable losses, the gaps have immediately been filled up from the reserves, and the appeal for recruits assures us of new reserves in men and energy tomorrow.

Endure and fight! Such must be the motto of the Allied British, Russian, Belgian and French armies.

Endure and fight, while at sea the British aid us, cutting the communication of our enemy with the world.

Endure and fight, while the Russians continue to advance to strike the decisive blow at the heart of the German Empire.

It is the duty of the Government of the Republic to direct this stubborn resistance.

Everywhere Frenchmen will rise for their independence; but, to insure the utmost spirit and efficacy in the formidable fight, it is indispensable that the Government shall remain free to act.

At the request of the military authorities, the Government is therefore temporarily transferring its headquarters to a place where it can remain in constant touch with the whole country.

It requests members of Parliament not to remain away from it, in order that they may form, with their colleagues, a bond of national unity.

The Government leaves Paris only after having assured the defense of the city and of the entrenched camp by every means in its power.

It knows that it does not need to recommend to the admirable population of Paris that calm, resolution, and coolness which it is showing every day, and which is on a level with its highest traditions.

People of France, let us all be worthy of these tragic circumstances. We shall gain the final victory; we shall gain it by unflagging will, endurance, and tenacity.

A nation which refuses to perish, and which, in order to live, does not flinch either from suffering or sacrifice, is sure of victory.

HOW THE "TAXICAB ARMY" SAVED PARIS

By General Clergerie

THIS contest, known officially as the Battle of the Ourcq, September 5-8, 1914, was a prelude to the Battle of the Marne that saved France. Its most picturesque incident, as here related, was the sudden launching into the fray of several thousand Paris troops borne to the front in taxicabs. In this feature of the engagement originated the phrase "the taxicab army that saved Paris." Hence is given this authoritative account by General Clergerie, one of the men who devised it. He was the chief-of-staff of General Gallieni, commander of Paris. Following his account is an interesting review of the engagement by the contemporary French historian, Madelin. In conclusion is given General Joffre's proclamation to Maunoury's heroic army.

FROM August 26, 1914, the German armies had been descending upon Paris by forced marches. On September 1st they were only three days' march from the advanced line of the intrenched camp, which the garrison were laboring desperately to put into condition for defense. It was necessary to cover with trenches a circuit of 110 miles, install siege guns, assure the coming of supplies for them over narrow-gauge railways,

assemble the food and provisions of all kinds necessary for a city of 4,000,000 inhabitants.

But on September 3rd the intelligence service, which was working perfectly, stated, about the middle of the day, that the German columns, after heading straight for Paris, were swerving toward the south-east and seemed to wish to avoid the fortified camp.

General Galliéni and I then had one of those long conferences which denoted grave events: they usually lasted from two to five minutes at most. The fact is that the military Government of Paris did little talking—it acted. The conference reached this conclusion: "If they do not come to us, we will go to them with all the force we can muster." Nothing remained but to make the necessary preparations. The first thing to do was not to give the alarm to the enemy. General Maunoury's army immediately received orders to lie low and avoid any engagement that was not absolutely necessary.

In the night of September 3rd, knowing that the enemy would have to leave only a rear guard on one bank of the Ourcq, General Galliéni decided to march against that rear guard, to drive it back with all the weight of the Maunoury army, to cut the enemy's communications, and take full advantage of his hazardous situation. Immediately the following order was addressed to General Maunoury:

"Because of the movement of the German armies, which seem to be slipping in before our front to the southeast, I intend to send your army to attack them in the flank, that is to say, in an easterly direction. I will indicate your line of march as soon as I learn that of the British army. But make your arrangements now so that your troops shall be ready to march this afternoon and to begin a general movement east of the intrenched camp to-morrow."

General Joffre gave permission to attack and announced that he would himself take the offensive on the 6th. On the 5th, at noon, the army from Paris fired the first shot; the battle of the Ourcq, a preface to the Marne, had begun.

General von der Marwitz, cavalry commander of the German First Army, made intemperate use of the wireless telegraph and did not even take the trouble to put into cipher his dispatches, of which the Eiffel Tower made a careful collection. In the evening of September 9th, an officer of the intelligence corps brought me a dispatch from this same Marwitz couched in something like these terms: "Tell me exactly where you are and what you are doing. Hurry up, because XXX."

The officer was greatly embarrassed to interpret those three Xs. Adopting the language of the poilu, I said to him: "Translate it, 'I am going to bolt.' " True enough, next day we found on the site of the German batteries, which had been precipitately evacuated, stacks of munitions; while by the roadside we came upon motors abandoned for the slightest breakdown, and near Betz almost the entire outfit of a field bakery, with a great store of flour and dough half-kneaded. Paris and France were saved. Von Kluck could not get over his astonishment. He has tried to explain it by saying he was unlucky, for out of a hundred Governors not one would have acted as Galliéni did, throwing his whole available force nearly forty miles from his stronghold.

WHERE VON KLUCK FAILED

By Louis Madelin

ON August 30th Von Kluck was nearing Paris, he was at Chantilly, only twenty-two and a half miles distant. The great town, encouraged and comforted by Galliéni's words, which will become historic, but abandoned by the Government, awaited the barbarous hordes with outward calm,—just as in former days, Geneviève de Nanterre had calmed the people of Lutetia menaced by Attila's Huns.

But already on September 3rd it seemed as if Von Kluck, heading towards Meaux and Coulommiers, was turning away from Paris—for the time being. It is said that he was applying Moltke's doctrine: "Defeat and throw back the French beyond the Marne, the Yonne and the Loire, and only then march upon Paris." Was this posthumous order necessary? Had Von Kluck attempted to enter the capital without fighting, it would have been a great risk—Maunoury would have barred the way and Galliéni was there behind Maunoury, what magnificent strength wasted just when it was going to be proved that the entire German army massed together could not withstand the French army! Of what worth would Von Kluck's troops have been, hampered as they were by conquest, and drunk with something that did not resemble pride, before our armies so easily victorious?

Nevertheless, Von Kluck pushed on towards the Marne, possessed with the idea that he would attack our left, the British army and d'Espérey's, and enveloping it, turn the entire French army. The maneuver was an obvious one and imposed itself on strategy, it would have succeeded had not Maunoury been on Von Kluck's right flank. But, curiously enough, and most inexplicable, the German general who prided himself on his knowledge of everything seems to have ignored the existence of a French army on his right, or if he knew of it, he underestimated its strength and continued marching south, while Maunoury let him get encircled and spread out his own forces fan-wise from north to south, facing east.

The mistake was all the graver since Von Kluck, and the other German generals, were going to encounter an army no longer in retreat, but an army which by order of its chief was ready to hold and determined to attack.

The mistake rested mainly with Von Kluck and was due in a measure to his misconception of the opponent and to his unbounded audacity. Galliéni had warned Joffre on the 4th of Von Kluck's daring advance, and everything since had confirmed the news received from Paris. In agreement with the Governor of the city, our Generalissimo clearly saw what steps the event immediately necessitated. He wants the battle fought on our left. Kluck hopes to envelop Sir John French and d'Espérey, but it is Maunoury, dis-

regarded by Kluck, who will attempt to envelop Von Kluck with the help of Sir John and d'Espérey.

The mission of the armies on the left is thus already defined by General Joffre's order of the 4th:

"1st. It is expedient to take advantage of the foolhardy position of the 1st German Army and hurl against it the strength of our left flank. All steps will be taken on the 5th for an attack on the 6th."

The first days are more especially Maunoury's. The latter has scarcely moved, threatening to envelop and crush the 40,000 men of Schwerin's corps, when the Prussian general, alarmed, calls for help. Von Kluck, at the very moment when he engages the four-fifths of his army against Sir John French and d'Espérey, learns that a recently formed army is menacing his left flank. With a promptitude that enhances his reputation as a strategist, he does not hesitate to abandon his plan in order to break the attack prepared against him. He turns round and faces Maunoury, certain that after having crushed him, he can turn again south and finish off Sir John French and d'Espérey.

Everything will therefore depend on Maunoury's resistance. If he is able to hold, Sir John French and d'Espérey can repulse the troops left against them and in their turn menace Von Kluck, not on his right, but on his left flank. And menaced he was on the third day, obliged to admit he is vanquished and beat a retreat for fear of being caught between Maunoury, French and d'Espérey.

This battle is the Battle of the Ourcq. By losing it and retreating prudently, Von Kluck laid Von Bülow's front bare and weakened the entire German front, which could not be strengthened owing to Foch's violent attacks elsewhere. That is why the Battle of the Ourcq has been termed the decisive factor in the victory of the Marne. . . . The German High Command, we have proof of it today, knew then that the game was up. The Emperor, abandoning France, had gone to Luxemburg; on every hand Von Kluck's mistake aroused the fiercest anger.

"With a heavy heart," says a German account, "he gave the order for a general retreat northwards." He and his many thousand soldiers were vanquished and so as to avoid imminent and terrible disaster, this general, who had the greatest reputation for strategy in the German army, fell back defeated to the north. From every side, mournfully, German columns are pouring forth; some in bad array having suffered heavily and all now experiencing a fatigue not felt the day before when they hoped to carry all before them. No more cries of "Nach Paris," but everywhere stupefying silence. They were unable to pick up their wounded or bury their dead, for they had to give way as they went. The earth was strewn with dead. To quote one instance: The Magdeburg regiment was torn almost to shreds in a desperate struggle near d'Acy-en-Multien.

Maunoury helps to clear up the field; he sends from right to left wing the necessary reënforcements to

dislodge the German detachments from Nanteuil. He presses closely on the rear of the retiring columns, following both banks of the Ourcq, while the Germans retreat hastily towards the forest of Villers-Cotterets, whence they are obliged to push on towards Soissons the next day.

The 6th Army, having forced Von Kluck to abandon abruptly his offensive against the British and the 5th Army, had in this way attracted the attention of the greater bulk of the powerful German army and for four days had offered a firm front to a formidable attack. Finally, helped by the menacing advance of the armies of the Marne, it forced the "incomparable" army and its eminent chief to beat a hasty retreat in order to avoid utter ruin.

GENERAL JOFFRE'S PROCLAMATION TO MAUNOURY'S ARMY

THE 6th Army has just sustained, during five entire days, without interruption or rest, an engagement against a numerous enemy whose previous successes had raised their morale to a high pitch. The struggle has been a severe one, and the losses from fire, as well as from fatigue due to want of sleep, and occasionally of provisions, have surpassed any that have been hitherto imagined; you have supported all this with a valor, a firmness, and an endurance to which no words can possibly give adequate expression.

Comrades! Your General asked you, for the sake of your country, to do more than your plain duty;

your answer has exceeded his most sanguine expectations. Thanks to you, victory has crowned our colors. Now that you have realized the glorious satisfaction of victory, you will in future never let it fall from your grasp.

As for myself, if I have been able to help I have been fully compensated by the greatest honor of my long career, namely, to have commanded troops such as you are. For all you have done I thank you with sincerest emotion, because to you I owe that to which all my efforts and energy for the last forty-four years have been directed—Revenge for 1870! My thanks to you; honor to all the combatants of the 6th Army!

THE MARNE

By Louis Madelin, Contemporary French Historian

HAVING checked the Germans on the Ourcq, the next step of the Allies—the breaking of the German line—was achieved at its very center on September 9, 1914, by the Ninth French Army under General Foch, as recounted by Madelin, an eye-witness of many of the events here recorded. By September 11, the retreat of the Germans to a new line of defense was begun all along the front. Weary but victorious, the Allies were unable to accomplish the rout and ruin of the enemy.

Here ended the first stage of the war. The great drive for Paris was foiled. A new war began, with new plans and strategies—trench warfare on an unprecedented scale. Engaged in the Battle of the Marne were 41 German divisions (about 1,000,000 men) opposed by 46 incomplete Allied divisions, all told.

Following this account is the terse commentary of Marshal Joffre and the pronouncement of the victory by President Poincaré.

ON the morning of September 9th the situation is extremely critical. The enemy obviously aimed at taking the higher ground which, with the marshes, separates the Petit-Morin valley from the plain of the Aube. Had our line been forced back on the Aube, the results would have been incalculable, probably obliging d'Espérey, who was advancing north, to fall back and exposing de Langle de Cary who continued to hold on desperately in the valley of the Saulx and Ornain. That is why the struggle for Saint-Prix was so

fierce; during the first four days of the battle it was taken and retaken five times, so was the Castle of Mondement, which, according to a witness attached to General Humbert who commanded the Morocco

division, was lost, retaken, lost and retaken again and again. The 10th corps of the 5th Army came to the help of the 9th Army on the morning of September 9th, but in vain; the Prussian Guards intending to keep up their reputation hurl themselves on Fère-Champenoise, our line gives way under the assault: Fère-Champenoise is lost. General Foch shows no discouragement. Fère is lost, but Fère will be recaptured. "The situation is excellent," he writes on the 9th. Excellent! what faith there is in such optimism! And he adds: "I command that the offensive be resumed."

In truth, such optimism was not only on the surface. With his quick eye the Commander of the 9th Army had just perceived a break in the German line. Von Bülow, influenced by Von Kluck, had to his great disappointment been forced to fall back in this maneuver, and, as happens sometimes in improvised retrograde movements, a gap occurred between Hausen and himself. Foch in his turn thought of driving a wedge into the weak spot.

The first thing was to reconstitute our line. The 42nd division attack and carry Fère-Champenoise. Then Mondement becomes the center of a deadly struggle. General Humbert has butted himself against it. This old castle, torn by our shells, and the enemy's, becomes for a moment the center of the battle. "Forward, boys," cries Colonel Lestoquoi, to his men who are storming for the third time; "and we shall succeed." And we did succeed. General Hum-

bert once again took up his post of observation in the old tower, now a mass of ruins, while 3,000 German corpses strewed the avenue of the park.

"One last effort and we shall succeed!" General Foch might have used Colonel Lestoquoi's cheering words to his entire army. The high ground above the marshes is now ours, the enemy is giving way, the valley is open to us and we rush through it. . . .

By the evening of the 10th he held the marshes, and thanks to the energy with which he had transformed his difficult defensive movement into a victorious offensive, the troops advanced northwards and at a blow carried the line Vertus-Vatry. Foch took up his headquarters in La Fère-Champenoise, occupied a few hours previously by the Prussian Guard, who gorged themselves and drank to the certain destruction of the French army. "Let the troops eat the bread made for the enemy," wrote Napoleon to Murat; "that bread will taste better to them than cake." Our soldiers not only found bread baked by the enemy, but thousands of empty bottles, the sight of which made them smile and explained certain shortcomings. Many drunken soldiers belonging to the Guard and other corps, the victims of champagne, were taken prisoner that day. . . .

While Maunoury on the Ourcq was making a "bulge" and the armies of Sir John French and d'Espérey threatening to envelop Von Kluck, so contributed to his retreat, d'Espérey's right wing seconded the valiant 9th Army which repulsed the great

piercing movement attempted against our center. The two armies on the right meanwhile fulfilled their mission, which was to protect the "pivot" by hurling the enemy back from the triangle formed by the heights of Verdun, Bar and Vitry. . . .

On the 10th, the Imperial Crown Prince was obliged to relinquish his great dream. Sarrail had shaken his army and was pushing it to the north of Verdun.

But with what confidence in his own powers had the Crown Prince attacked! Bearing down in the neighborhood of Revigny, he intended to seize the bridges of the Ornain as far as Bar and enter the little ducal town in a few hours. It is reported that on the 6th, an officer informed an inhabitant of Vaubecourt that "To-morrow we shall burn Poincaré's town." And in fact the XVI corps intended to occupy, if not destroy Bar, while the IV cavalry corps, no doubts being entertained as to victory, would move south, towards Saint-Dizier, Langres, and la Bourgogne.

A great danger had threatened Sarrail's flank; it caused the last incident in the huge battle. German forces were reported to be massing near Woëvre and preparing to attack Saint-Mihiel. This is very serious news, for if the Germans should succeed in piercing through to Saint-Mihiel and cross the Meuse there, Verdun would be cut off from the 3rd Army and the latter would be turned. Once again our pivot is threatened. The danger does not, however, divert the Commander of the 3rd Army from his first duty; at

daybreak on the 8th, he sends forward troops who dislodge the German corps from the valley of the Or-nain and push them on to Vassincourt, Villers-aux-Vents, Triaucourt, while the 6th artillery corps crushes the XV corps at Aire. The menace is, however, increasing on the Heights of the Meuse, the enemy glides towards Saint-Mihiel; at 1 p. m. he has begun to bombard Fort Troyon. In the meantime, General Sarrail, in order to protect his right flank, gives the order to destroy the bridges at Saint-Mihiel. This, though it did not paralyze the attack of the 3rd Army, made things harder. The repulse, on the 9th, of the enemy's advance on every side had to suffice for the time being. The situation becomes worse in the rear; after Troyon, Génicourt is bombarded, and the guns at Troyon now seem silent. General Coutanceau, who had just sent an urgent appeal to the 2nd Army (under Castelnau), telegraphs to the Commander of the fort: "General situation of our armies excellent. It is of consequence that the fall of Troyon should not open a way to the Germans. Hold indefinitely." But the German columns continue to advance on Saint-Mihiel. On the 10th Sarrail's army holds the whole day through, the battle rages and spreads destruction among the enemy (7,000 casualties) from Revigny to Vaubécourt. The situation is extremely critical, a defeat in the Saint-Mihiel direction may jeopardize everything at a moment when things are turning in our favor from the Ourcq to the Ornain.

No faltering, however, occurred. Troyon shelled, and half in ruins, repels the attack, the enemy is unable to cross the Meuse; General Castelnau sends the 73rd division and the 2nd cavalry division, detached from the 2nd Army, to support the threatened forts which in their turn menace the assailant. On the 11th, the German cannon suddenly ceases firing. "The calm was impressive," said an officer. For the Crown Prince has just been informed that the German armies, defeated on the Ourcq and thrown back on the Marne, are beating a retreat. Even he wavers now. Sarraill pushes forward his offensive, the 5th corps captures Laimont and Villotte, while on his left, the 15th corps advances beyond the Marne au Rhin canal. The 6th corps and the reserve divisions on our right, try to take part in this forward movement in spite of the German howitzers covering the Prince's retreat. By the end of the day, the 15th corps has occupied Rancourt and Revigny, and has advanced to Brabant-le-Roi, making enormous captures of light and heavy artillery taken from the XVI corps in retreat. Our 6th corps meets with fierce opposition from the XVI corps southwest of Souilly. The Germans attempt one last bombardment of Troyon: the fort stands firm. All is over! Defeated all along the line, the enemy is unable to play his trump card at Saint-Mihiel. Our pivot has held and we are saved. The enemy owns himself vanquished on every side, for his retreat becomes more and more marked and so rapid that in certain places it looks

very like flight. It is, at any rate, a formal admission of defeat.

ORDER OF THE DAY BY GENERAL JOFFRE

THE battle which we have been fighting for the last five days has ended in an undoubted victory. The retreat of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd German Armies before our left and center becomes more and more marked. The enemy's 4th Army in its turn has begun to withdraw to the north of Vitry and Sermaise.

Everywhere the enemy has left on the field numerous wounded and a quantity of munitions. Everywhere we have made prisoners while gaining ground. Our troops bear witness to the intensity of the fight, and the means employed by the Germans in their endeavors to resist our élan. The vigorous resumption of the offensive has determined our success.

Officers, non-commissioned officers and men! You have all responded to my appeal; you have all deserved well of your country.

JOFFRE.

September 11th.

REPORT FROM GENERAL JOFFRE TO THE MINISTER OF WAR

THE completeness of our victory becomes more and more apparent. Everywhere the enemy is in retreat. The Germans are abandoning prisoners, wounded, and material in all directions. After the heroic efforts displayed by our troops during this

formidable battle, which has lasted from the 5th to the 12th of September, all our armies, exhilarated by success, are carrying out a pursuit which is without parallel in its extension.

On our left we have crossed the Aisne below Soissons, thus gaining more than 100 kilometers in six days of battle. In the center our armies are already to the north of the Marne. Our armies of Lorraine and the Vosges are reaching the frontier. Our troops, as well as those of our Allies, are admirable in morale, endurance and ardor. The pursuit will be continued with all our energy. The Government of the Republic may be proud of the army which it has prepared.

JOFFRE.

September 13th.

OFFICIAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT POINCARÉ TO THE
MINISTER OF WAR

OUR valiant armies have, during the last four days' fighting, again given striking proofs of their bravery and high spirit.

The strategic idea, conceived with so much clear-sightedness by the Commander-in-Chief and realized with so much coolness, method and resolution, has been carried out in recent operations by faultless tactics.

Far from being fatigued by long weeks of marching and unceasing battle, our troops have shown more endurance and keenness than ever. With the vigor-

ous assistance of our English Allies they have forced back the enemy to the east of Paris, and the brilliant successes they have gained and the magnificent qualities they have shown are sure guarantees of decisive victories.

I beg you, my dear Minister, to be good enough to transmit to the General Commanding-in-Chief, to the officers and the rank and file, the congratulations and good wishes of the Government of the Republic, and with them the personal expression of my own deep admiration.

RAYMOND POINCARE.

Bordeaux, September 11th.

TRENCH WARFARE BEGINS ON THE AISNE

By Colonel (later Major-General) Edward D. Swinton, D.S.O.

RETIRING to prepared elevated positions north of the River Aisne, closely pursued by the Franco-British Army, the Germans made a determined stand and under cover of terrific artillery fire, September 12-20, 1914, firmly entrenched themselves. Swinton, on the staff of Field Marshal French, here recounts the frenzied opening week of the engagement, which became ultimately a perpetual trench battle. His day by day narrative of the movements of the British Army was at first issued anonymously, under the pen-name of "Eye-Witness." It was considered the clearest, most honest and most valuable of all the records kept by the Allies.

Repeatedly the British endeavored to cross the Aisne River and drive the enemy farther north toward the frontier. But the heavier Teutonic artillery soon taught them the impossibility of advance against modern gunfire and barbed-wire entrenchments, as were here originated.

SEPTEMBER 14th, the Germans were making a determined resistance along the River Aisne. Opposition, which it was at first thought might possibly be of a rear-guard nature, not entailing material delay to our progress, developed and proved to be more serious than was anticipated.

The action, now being fought by the Germans along their line, may, it is true, have been undertaken in order to gain time for some strategic operation or move, and may not be their main stand. But, if this is so,

the fighting is naturally on a scale which as to extent of ground covered and duration of resistance, makes it undistinguishable in its progress from what is known as a "pitched battle," though the enemy cer-

tainly showed signs of considerable disorganization during the earlier days of their retirement phase.

Whether it was originally intended by them to defend the position they took up as strenuously as they have done, or whether the delay, gained for them during the 12th and 13th by their artillery, has enabled them to develop their resistance and force their line to an extent not originally contemplated cannot be said.

So far as we are concerned the action still being contested is the Battle of the Aisne. The foe we are fighting is just across the river along the whole of our front to the east and west. The struggle is not confined to the valley of that river, though it will probably bear its name.

The progress of our operations and the French armies nearest us for the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th will now be described:

On Monday, the 14th, those of our troops which had on the previous day crossed the Aisne, after driving in the German rear guards on that evening, found portions of the enemy's forces in prepared defensive positions on the right bank and could do little more than secure a footing north of the river. This, however, they maintained in spite of two counter-attacks delivered at dusk and 10 p. m., in which the fighting was severe.

During the 14th, strong reënforcements of our troops were passed to the north bank, the troops crossing by ferry, by pontoon bridges, and by the remains

of permanent bridges. Close coöperation with the French forces was maintained and the general progress made was good, although the opposition was vigorous and the state of the roads, after the heavy rains, made movements slow. One division alone failed to secure the ground it expected to.

The First Army Corps, after repulsing repeated attacks, captured 600 prisoners and twelve guns. The cavalry also took a number of prisoners. Many of the Germans taken belong to the reserve and Landwehr formations, which fact appears to indicate that the enemy is compelled to draw on other classes of soldiers to fill the gaps in his ranks.

There was a heavy rain throughout the night of September 14th-15th, and during the 15th. The situation of the British forces underwent no essential change. But it became more and more evident that the defensive preparations made by the enemy were more extensive than was at first apparent.

In order to counterbalance these, measures were taken by us to economize our troops and to secure protection from the hostile artillery fire, which was very fierce; and our men continued to improve their own intrenchments. The Germans bombarded our lines nearly all day, using heavy guns, brought, no doubt, from before Maubeuge, as well as those with the corps.

All their counter-attacks, however, failed, although in some places they were repeated six times. One

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made on the Fourth Guard Brigade was repulsed with heavy slaughter.

An attempt to advance slightly, made by part of our line, was unsuccessful as regards gain of ground, but led to the withdrawal of part of the enemy's infantry and artillery.

Further counter-attacks made during the night were beaten off. Rain came on toward evening and continued intermittently until 9 a.m. on the 16th. Besides adding to the discomfort of the soldiers holding the line, the wet weather to some extent hampered the motor transport service, which was also hindered by broken bridges.

On Wednesday, the 16th, there was little change in the situation opposite the British. The efforts made by the enemy were less active than on the previous day, although their bombardment continued throughout the morning and evening. Our artillery fire drove the defenders off one of the salients of their position, but they returned in the evening. Forty prisoners were taken by the Third Division.

On Thursday, the 17th, the situation still remained unchanged in its essentials. The German heavy artillery fire was more active than on the previous day. The only infantry attacks made by the enemy were on the extreme right of our position, and, as had happened before, were repulsed with heavy loss, chiefly, on this occasion, by our field artillery.

In order to convey some idea of the nature of the fighting it may be said that along the greater part of

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our front the Germans have been driven back from the forward slopes on the north of the river. Their infantry are holding strong lines of trenches among and along the edge of the numerous woods which crown the slopes. These trenches are elaborately constructed and cleverly concealed. In many places there are wire entanglements and lengths of rabbit fencing.

Both woods and open are carefully aligned, so that they can be swept by rifle fire and machine guns, which are invisible from our side of the valley. The ground in front of the infantry trenches is also, as a rule, under crossfire from the field artillery placed on neighboring features and under high-angle fire from pieces placed well back behind the woods on top of the plateau.

A feature of this action, as of the previous fighting, is the use by the enemy of their numerous heavy howitzers, with which they are able to direct long-range fire all over the valley and right across it. Upon these they evidently place great reliance. . . .

So far as the British are concerned, the greater part of this week has been passed in bombardment, in gaining ground by degrees, and in beating back severe counter-attacks with heavy slaughter. Our casualties have been severe, but it is probable that those of the enemy are heavier.

On our right and left the French have been fighting fiercely, and have also been gradually gaining ground. One village has already during this battle

been captured and recaptured twice by each side, and at the time of writing remains in the hands of the Germans.

The fighting has been at close quarters and of the most desperate nature, and the streets of the village are filled with dead on both sides.

The Germans are a formidable enemy, well trained, long prepared, and brave. Their soldiers are carrying on the contest with skill and valor. Nevertheless they are fighting to win anyhow, regardless of all the rules of fair play, and there is evidence that they do not hesitate at anything in order to gain victory.

A large number of the tales of their misbehaviors are exaggeration and some of the stringent precautions they have taken to guard themselves against the inhabitants of the areas traversed are possibly justifiable measures of war. But, at the same time, it has been definitely established that they have committed atrocities on many occasions.

Among the minor happenings of interest is the following: During a counter-attack by the German Fifty-third Regiment on positions of the Northampton and Queen's Regiments on Thursday, the 17th, a force of some 400 of the enemy were allowed to approach right up to the trench occupied by a platoon of the former regiment, owing to the fact that they had held up their hands and made gestures that were interpreted as signs that they wished to surrender. When they were actually on the parapet of the trench

held by the Northhamptons they opened fire on our men at point-blank range.

Unluckily for the enemy, however, flanking them and only some 400 yards away, there happened to be a machine gun manned by a detachment of the Queen's. This at once opened fire, cutting a lane through their mass, and they fell back to their own trench with great loss. Shortly afterward they were driven further back, with additional loss, by a battalion of Guards which came up in support.

The following special order has been issued to the troops:

"September 17, 1914.

"Once more I have to express my deep appreciation of the splendid behavior of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the army under my command throughout the great Battle of the Aisne, which has been in progress since the evening of the 12th inst., and the Battle of the Marne, which lasted from the morning of the 6th to the evening of the 10th, and finally ended in the precipitate flight of the enemy.

"When we were brought face to face with a position of extraordinary strength, carefully intrenched and prepared for defense by an army and staff which are thorough adepts in such work, throughout the 13th and 14th, that position was most gallantly attacked by the British forces and the passage of the Aisne effected. This is the third day the troops have been gallantly holding the position they have gained

against most desperate counter-attacks and the hail of heavy artillery.

"I am unable to find adequate words in which to express the admiration I feel for their magnificent conduct.

"The French armies on our right and left are making good progress, and I feel sure that we have only to hold on with tenacity to the ground we have won for a very short time longer when the Allies will be again in full pursuit of a beaten enemy.

"The self-sacrificing devotion and splendid spirit of the British army in France will carry all before it.

"J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal,
"Commander in Chief of the British Army in the Field."

The enemy is still maintaining himself along the whole front, and, in order to do so, is throwing into the fight detachments composed of units from different formations, the active army, reserve, and Landwehr, as is shown by the uniforms of the prisoners recently captured.

Our progress, although slow on account of the strength of the defensive positions against which we are pressing, has in certain directions been continuous; but the present battle may well last for some days more before a decision is reached, since it now approximates somewhat to siege warfare.

The Germans are making use of searchlights. This fact, coupled with their great strength in heavy artillery, leads to the supposition that they are em-

ploying material which may have been collected for the siege of Paris.

A buried store of the enemy's munitions of war was also found, not far from the Aisne, ten wagon loads of live shell and two wagon loads of cable being dug up. Traces were discovered of large quantities of stores having been burned—all tending to show that as far back as the Aisne the German retirement was hurried.

On Sunday, the 20th, nothing of importance occurred until the afternoon, when there was a break in the clouds and an interval of feeble sunshine, which was hardly powerful enough to warm the soaking troops. The Germans took advantage of this brief spell of fine weather to make several counter-attacks against different points. These were all repulsed with loss to the enemy, but the casualties incurred by us were by no means light.

The offensive against one or two points was renewed at dusk, with no greater success. The brunt of the resistance has naturally fallen upon the infantry. In spite of the fact that they have been drenched to the skin for some days and their trenches have been deep in mud and water, and in spite of the incessant night alarms and the almost continuous bombardment to which they have been subjected, they have on every occasion been ready for the enemy's infantry when the latter attempted to assault, and they have beaten them back with great loss.

General Headquarters, September 18, 1914.

THE FIRST SUBMARINE BLOW IS STRUCK

By Lieutenant Otto Weddigen, Commander of the "U-9"

[I *t is significant that this first triumph of the German submarine, in which three British warships, "Aboukir," "Hogue" and "Cressy," were sunk, September 22, 1914, by the "U-9," as related by her commander, was never repeated in the duel between submarines and warships. It was a "stroke of luck," and its repetition was prevented by the development on the part of the Allies of new tactics to meet new weapons.*

As the U-boat commander states, sea and weather favored the attack, the British cruisers being unaccompanied by torpedo destroyers, and when the first cruiser was torpedoed and sunk, the other two, instead of fleeing, as their own safety demanded, remained to rescue the survivors and were helpless targets.

Weddigen and his crew were decorated by the Kaiser. Later he himself perished when commanding a less lucky submarine, the "U-29," which was destroyed at sea.

I *t was ten minutes after 6 on the morning of last Tuesday when I caught sight of one of the big cruisers of the enemy. I was then eighteen sea miles northwest of the Hook of Holland. I had then traveled considerably more than 200 miles from my base. My boat was one of an old type, but she had been built on honor, and she was behaving beautifully. I had been going ahead partly submerged, with about five feet of my periscope showing. Almost immediately I caught sight of the first cruiser and two others. I sub-*

merged completely and laid my course so as to bring up in the center of the trio, which held a sort of triangular formation. I could see their gray-black sides riding high over the water.

When I first sighted them they were near enough for torpedo work, but I wanted to make my aim sure, so I went down and in on them. I had taken the position of the three ships before submerging, and I succeeded in getting another flash through my periscope before I began action. I soon reached what I regarded as a good shooting point.

Then I loosed one of my torpedoes at the middle ship. I was then about twelve feet under water, and got the shot off in good shape, my men handling the boat as if she had been a skiff. I climbed to the surface to get a sight through my tube of the effect, and discovered that the shot had gone straight and true, striking the ship, which I later learned was the "Aboukir," under one of her magazines, which in exploding helped the torpedo's work of destruction.

There were a fountain of water, a burst of smoke, a flash of fire, and part of the cruiser rose in the air. Then I heard a roar and felt reverberations sent through the water by the detonation. She had been broken apart, and sank in a few minutes. The "Aboukir" had been stricken in a vital spot and by an unseen force; that made the blow all the greater.

Her crew were brave, and even with death staring them in the face kept to their posts, ready to handle their useless guns, for I submerged at once. But I had stayed on top long enough to see the other cruisers, which I learned were the "Cressy" and the "Hogue," turn and steam full speed to their dying

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sister, whose plight they could not understand, unless it had been due to an accident.

The ships came on a mission of inquiry and rescue, for many of the "Aboukir's" crew were now in the water, the order having been given, "Each man for himself."

But soon the other two English cruisers learned what had brought about the destruction so suddenly.

As I reached my torpedo depth I sent a second charge at the nearest of the oncoming vessels, which was the "Hogue." The English were playing my game, for I had scarcely to move out of my position, which was a great aid, since it helped to keep me from detection.

On board my little boat the spirit of the German Navy was to be seen in its best form. With enthusiasm every man held himself in check and gave attention to the work in hand.

The attack on the "Hogue" went true. But this time I did not have the advantageous aid of having the torpedo detonate under the magazine, so for twenty minutes the "Hogue" lay wounded and helpless on the surface before she heaved, half turned over and sank.

But this time, the third cruiser knew of course that the enemy was upon her and she sought as best she could to defend herself. She loosed her torpedo defense batteries on boats, starboard and port, and stood her ground as if more anxious to help the many sailors who were in the water than to save herself. In

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common with the method of defending herself against a submarine attack, she steamed in a zigzag course, and this made it necessary for me to hold my torpedoes until I could lay a true course for them, which also made it necessary for me to get nearer to the "Cressy." I had come to the surface for a view and saw how wildly the fire was being sent from the ship. Small wonder that was when they did not know where to shoot, although one shot went unpleasantly near us.

When I got within suitable range I sent away my third attack. This time I sent a second torpedo after the first to make the strike doubly certain. My crew were aiming like sharpshooters and both torpedoes went to their bull's-eye. My luck was with me again, for the enemy was made useless and at once began sinking by her head. Then she careened far over, but all the while her men stayed at the guns looking for their invisible foe. They were brave and true to their country's sea traditions. Then she eventually suffered a boiler explosion and completely turned turtle. With her keel uppermost she floated until the air got out from under her and then she sank with a loud sound, as if from a creature in pain.

The whole affair had taken less than one hour from the time of shooting off the first torpedo until the "Cressy" went to the bottom. Not one of the three had been able to use any of its big guns. I knew the wireless of the three cruisers had been calling for aid. I was still quite able to defend myself, but I knew that

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news of the disaster would call many English submarines and torpedo boat destroyers, so, having done my appointed work, I set my course for home.

My surmise was right, for before I got very far some British cruisers and destroyers were on the spot, and the destroyers took up the chase. I kept under water most of the way, but managed to get off a wireless to the German fleet that I was heading homeward and being pursued. I hoped to entice the enemy, by allowing them now and then a glimpse of me, into the zone in which they might be exposed to capture or destruction by German warships, but, although their destroyers saw me plainly at dusk on the 22d and made a final effort to stop me, they abandoned the attempt, as it was taking them too far from safety and needlessly exposing them to attack from our fleet and submarines.

How much they feared our submarines and how wide was the agitation caused by good little "U-9" is shown by the English reports that a whole flotilla of German submarines had attacked the cruisers and that this flotilla had approached under cover of the flag of Holland.

These reports were absolutely untrue. "U-9" was the only submarine on deck, and she flew the flag she still flies—the German naval ensign. . . . The Kaiser conferred upon each of my coworkers the Iron Cross of the second class and upon me the Iron Cross of the first and second classes.

ANTWERP CAPITULATES

By Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

ANTWERP was taken by the Germans, October 8, 1914, after a defense of twelve days, as described by Doyle, in his popular *"History of the British Campaign in France and Flanders,"* from which this account is taken by permission of George H. Doran Company. Antwerp, famous for its fortifications, had been regarded as "impregnable."

This distinguished novelist-historian here criticizes Winston Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, for having accompanied a strong force of British marines to assist in the defense of Antwerp, to which Churchill is on record as saying that "in holding Antwerp for the five days preceding its fall, the Anglo-Belgian forces rendered important service to the French and British left wing by keeping from the main battle to the south more than five German divisions."

Antwerp lost, the Belgians retired to the Yser, and the British to Ypres. From now on Belgium, in German hands, was the chief military and naval base of operations against the Allies in the west.

THE Belgians, after the evacuation of Brussels in August, had withdrawn their army into the widespread fortress of Antwerp, from which they made frequent sallies upon the Germans who were garrisoning their country. Great activity was shown and several small successes were gained, which had the useful effect of detaining two corps which might have been employed upon the Aisne. Eventually, towards the end of September, the Germans turned their attention seriously to the reduction of the city, with a well-founded confidence that no modern forts could resist the

impact of their enormous artillery. They drove the garrison within the lines, and early in October opened

a bombardment upon the outer forts with such results that it was evidently only a matter of days before they would fall and the fine old city be faced with the alternative of surrender or destruction. The Spanish fury of Parma's pikemen would be a small thing compared to the furor Teutonicus working its evil deliberate will upon town-hall or cathedral, with the aid of fire-disc, petrol-spray, or other products of Kultur.

The main problem before the Allies, if the town could not be saved, was to insure that the Belgian army should be extricated and that nothing of military value which could be destroyed should be left to the invaders. No troops were available for a rescue, for the French and British old formations were already engaged, while the new ones were not yet ready for action. . . .

The Marine Brigade of the Naval Division under General Paris was dispatched from England in the early morning and reached Antwerp during the night of October 3. They were about 2,000 in number. Early next morning they were out in the trenches, relieving some weary Belgians. The Germans were already within the outer enceinte and drawing close to the inner. For forty-eight hours they held the line in the face of heavy shelling. The cover was good and the losses were not heavy. At the end of that time the Belgian troops, who had been a good deal worn by their heroic exertions, were unable to sustain the German pressure, and evacuated the

trenches on the flank of the British line. The brigade then fell back to a reserve position in front of the town.

On the night of the 5th the two other brigades of the division, numbering some 5,000 amateur sailors, arrived in Antwerp, and the whole force assembled on the new line of defense. Mr. Winston Churchill showed his gallantry as a man, and his indiscretion as a high official [First Lord of the British Admiralty], whose life was of great value to his country by accompanying the force from England.

The bombardment was now very heavy, and the town was on fire in several places. The equipment of the British left much to be desired, and their trenches were as indifferent as their training. None the less they played the man and lived up to the traditions of that great service upon whose threshold they stood. For three days these men, who a few weeks before had been anything from schoolmasters to tram-conductors, held their perilous post. They were very raw, but they possessed a great asset in their officers, who were usually men of long service. But neither the lads of the naval brigades nor the war-worn and much enduring Belgians could stop the mouths of those inexorable guns. On the 8th it was clear that the forts could no longer be held. The British task had been to maintain the trenches which connected the forts with each other, but if the forts went it was clear that the trenches must be outflanked and untenable. The situation, therefore, was

hopeless, and all that remained was to save the garrison and leave as little as possible for the victors.

Some thirty or forty German merchant ships in the harbor were sunk and the great petrol tanks were set on fire. By the light of the flames the Belgians and British forces made their way successfully out of the town, and the good service rendered later by our Allies upon the Yser and elsewhere is the best justification of the policy which made us strain every nerve in order to do every thing which could have a moral or material effect upon them in their darkest hour. Had the British been able to get away unscathed, the whole operation might have been reviewed with equanimity if not with satisfaction, but, unhappily, a grave misfortune, arising rather from bad luck than from the opposition of the enemy, came upon the retreating brigades, so that very many of our young sailors after their one week of crowded life came to the end of their active service for the war.

On leaving Antwerp it had been necessary to strike to the north in order to avoid a large detachment of the enemy who were said to be upon the line of the retreat. The boundary between Holland and Belgium is at this point very intricate, with no clear line of demarcation, and a long column of British somnambulists, staggering along in the dark after so many days in which they had for the most part never enjoyed two consecutive hours of sleep, wandered over the fatal line and found themselves in firm but

kindly Dutch custody for the rest of the war. Some fell into the hands of the enemy, but the great majority were interned. These men belonged chiefly to three battalions of the 1st Brigade. The 2nd Brigade, with one battalion of the 1st, and the greater part of the Marines, made their way to the trains at St. Gilles-Waes, and were able to reach Ostend in safety. The remaining battalion of Marines, with a number of stragglers of the other brigades, were cut off at Morbede by the Germans, and about half of them were taken, while the rest fought their way through in the darkness and joined their comrades. The total losses of the British in the whole misadventure from first to last were about 2,500 men—a high price, and yet not too high when weighed against the results of their presence at Antwerp. On October 10th the Germans under General Von Beseler occupied the city. Mr. Powell, who was present, testifies that 60,000 marched into the town, and that they were all troops of the active army.

THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES

By John Buchan

COMING to the Battle of Ypres (October 31 to November 17, 1914), Field Marshal French, the British commander, says bluntly that the stake was the very existence of the British Empire. Possession of the Channel ports would have provided the Germans with such submarine bases as would have "nullified all efforts of the British Navy to guard against an invasion of England." The desperate character of the fighting is indicated in the statement that "scarcely a house famous in England's stormy history but mourned a son."

In his "History of the Great War," from which this account is taken, by permission of Houghton, Mifflin & Company, Buchan, who was on the Headquarters Staff of the British Army, dramatizes the eventful November 11th, when the Prussian Guard pierced the British front, being subsequently dislodged and driven back to their own lines. Trench warfare followed.

BETWEEN two and three o'clock on Saturday, the 31st, was the most critical hour in the whole battle. The 1st Division had fallen back from Gheluvelt to a line resting on the junction of the Frezenberg road with the Ypres-Menin highway. It had suffered terribly, and its general had been sorely wounded. On its right the 7th Division had been bent back to the Klein Zillebeke ridge, while Bulfin's two brigades were just holding on, as was Moussy on their right. Allenby's cavalry were fighting an apparently hopeless battle on a long line, and it seemed as if the slightest forward pressure would crumble the Ypres defense. The enemy was beginning to pour through the Ghelu-

vult gap, and at the same time pressed hard on the whole arc of the salient.

There were no reserves except an odd battalion or two and some regiments of cavalry, all of which had already been sorely tried during the past days. French sent an urgent message to Foch for reënforcements, and was refused. At the end of the battle he learned the reason. Foch had none to send, and his own losses had been greater than ours. Between 2 and 2.30 Haig was on the Menin road, grappling with the crisis. It seemed impossible to stop the gap, though on its northern side some South Wales Borderers were gallantly holding a sunken road and galling the flank of the German advance. He gave orders to retire to a line a little west of Hooge and stand there, though he well knew that no stand, however heroic, could save the town. He foresaw a retirement west of Ypres, and French, who had joined him, agreed.

And then suddenly out of the void came a strange story. A white-faced staff officer reported that something odd was happening north of the Menin road. The enemy advance had halted! Then came the word that the 1st Division was reforming. The anxious generals could scarcely believe their ears, for it sounded a sheer miracle. But presently came the proof, though it was not for months that the full tale was known. Brigadier-General Fitz-Clarence, commanding the 1st (Guards) Brigade in the 1st Division, had sent in his last reserves and failed to stop the

gap. He then rode off to the headquarters of the division to explain how desperate was the position. But on the way, at the southwest corner of the Polygon Wood, he stumbled upon a battalion waiting in support. It was the 2nd Worcesters, who were part of the right brigade of the 2nd Division. Fitz-Clarence saw in them his last chance. They belonged to another division, but it was no time to stand on ceremony, and the officer in command at once put them at his disposal. The Worcesters, under very heavy artillery fire, advanced in a series of rushes for about a thousand yards between the right of the South Wales Borderers and the northern edge of Gheluvelt. Like Cole's fusiliers at Albuera, they came suddenly and unexpectedly upon the foe. There they dug themselves in, broke up the German advance into bunches, enfiladed it heavily, and brought it to a standstill. This allowed the 7th Division to get back to its old line, and the 6th Cavalry Brigade to fill the gap between the 7th and the 1st Divisions. Before night fell the German advance west of Gheluvelt was stayed, and the British front was out of immediate danger.

On Sunday, 1st November, the wearied British line received reënforcements. Divisions from the French 16th and 20th Corps arrived to take over part of the line held by Allenby's cavalry. With them came Conneau's 2nd Cavalry Corps, transferred from its place between the 2nd and 3rd British Corps. That day was remarkable for the hard shelling of our front,

and two isolated attacks, one against Bulfin's 2nd and 4th Brigades at Klein Zillebeke, and the other against Allenby on the Messines Ridge. The first was beaten back with the assistance of Byng's cavalry, who continued for the next few days to act as a general reserve and support to the Gheluvelt salient. But the assault on Allenby was a serious matter. During the night the Germans, breaking through on the left flank of the 1st Cavalry Division, reached the edge of Wytschaete, on the Ypres-Armentières road. In spite of a most gallant defense by the French the Bavarians carried the village before the evening. Messines, too, had been since early morning in German hands, making an ugly dent in our line, which now ran from Le Gheir to the west of Messines, west of Wytschaete, by St. Eloi and Klein Zillebeke to west of Gheluvelt.

For five days the battle slackened into an artillery duel, and our weary men had a breathing space. On 5th November the line was readjusted, and some relief was given to the 7th Division, which was now reduced from 12,000 men and 400 officers to a little over 3,000. Fourteen battalions from the 2nd Corps, two Territorial battalions, and two regiments of Yeomanry now took their share of the line. The enemy also rearranged his plans. The Fabeck group had failed in its main purpose, and must be strengthened both with guns and troops. The two minor groups under Gerok and Urach on the Messines Ridge had also exhausted their impetus. Accordingly a new group was formed under Linsingen, consisting

of the 15th Corps and a corps under Baron von Plattenberg, which included a composite division of the Prussian Guard. This group was to attack on the 11th north of the Ypres-Comines canal. Meantime, on Friday the 6th, a sudden assault was made on the Klein Zillebeke position, held by Bulfin's 2nd and 4th Brigades and Moussy's French division. In the afternoon the French on the right towards the canal were driven in, and Cavan's 4th Brigade was left in the air. The only reserve available was Byng's cavalry north of the Zillebeke-Klein Zillebeke road. Kavanagh deployed the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, with the Blues in reserve behind the center, and his advance assisted the French to resume their trenches.

But the German attack was being pressed in force, and the French came back again upon the Household Cavalry, a couple of whose squadrons were doubled across the road to stem the rush. For a moment there was wild confusion—French, British and the oncoming Germans being mingled together in the village street. Major the Hon. Hugh Dawnay, who had come from the Headquarters Staff to command the 2nd Life Guards, led his men to the charge, and inflicted heavy losses upon the foe. Two hundred years before, the French *Maison du Roi* had charged desperately in Flemish fields, the splendid Gants glacés, with their lace and steel, their plumed hats and mettled horses. Very different was the attack of the British Household Cavalry—mud-splashed men in drab charging on foot with the bayonet. In this ac-

tion Hugh Dawnay fell, but not before his advance had saved the position. In him Britain lost one of the most brilliant of her younger soldiers, most masterful both in character and in brain, who, had he lived, would without doubt have risen to the highest place. He would wish no better epitaph than Napier's words: "No man died that night with more glory—yet many died, and there was much glory."

Once more came a period of ominous quietness. It lasted through the 8th, 9th, and 10th, when nothing happened but a little shelling. Then on Wednesday, the 11th, came the supreme effort. As Napoleon had used his Guards for the final attack at Waterloo, so the Emperor used his for the culminating stroke at Ypres. The 1st and 4th Brigades of the Prussian Guard were launched on both sides of the Menin road. At first they used their parade march, and our men, rubbing their eyes in the darkness of the small hours, could scarcely credit the portent. Long before they reached the shock our fire had taken toll of them, but so mighty is discipline that their impact told. The 1st Brigade and the left brigade of the 3rd Division bore the brunt of the charge, and at several points the enemy pierced our front and won the woods to the west. Thence he was presently driven out with heavy losses, and his 1st Regiment, which had got beyond the Nonne Bosch Wood, was checked and routed by the 2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry. A line of strong-points prepared by Haig's engineers was the high-water mark of the attack. On that day fell

Brigadier-General Charles Fitz-Clarence, V.C., commanding the 1st Brigade, the hero of October 31st, a soldier whose military skill was not less conspicuous than his courage.

With the failure of the Prussian Guard the enemy seemed to have exhausted his vitality. His tide of men had failed to swamp the thin Allied lines, and, wearied out, and with terrible losses, he slackened his efforts and fell back upon the routine of trench warfare. To complete the tale we must glance at what had been happening on the extreme left of the Ypres salient, where the bulk of Dubois' 9th Corps held the line from Zonnebeke to Bixschoote, and linked up with the battle on the Yser. He had with him to complete his front Bidon's Territorial divisions and most of Mitry's 1st Cavalry Corps, and against him came, as we have seen, the bulk of the new German formations. The enemy tried to press beyond the ruins of Bixschoote to the canal, the winning of which would have turned the Ypres position on the north—and objective much the same as the corner of the Ypres-Comines canal at Klein Zillebeke. In spite of desperate efforts he failed to advance at that critical point, and Langemarck remained untaken. By 15th November the vigor of the assault was ebbing, as it had ebbed four days before at the point of the Ypres bastion.

On 12th November and the following days a spasmodic assault was made on the Klein Zillebeke positions, and along the whole line towards Messines. On

the 16th an attempt was made on the southern re-entrant, which failed, and the shelling of Ypres continued, till its Cloth Hall and its great Church of St. Martin were in ruins. On the 17th the German 15th Corps made a desperate effort at the same point, but was repulsed. Presently further French reënforcements came up, and the sorely tried British troops were relieved from the trenches which they had held for four stubborn weeks. The weather had changed to high winds and snow blizzards, and in a tempest the First Battle of Ypres died away.

THE SEA FIGHT OFF CORONEL, CHILE

Vice Admiral Graf von Spee's Report

MYSTERY still surrounds this naval engagement between German and British squadrons off the coast of Chile, November 2, 1914, owing to the sinking of the British flagship, "Good Hope," together with Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock and crew of 800 men. His fighting force was, as he knew, much inferior to that of the Germans under von Spee who, in addition, displayed superior strategy. The battle was fought at nightfall in a heavy sea, and, in addition to the flagship, the British cruiser "Monmouth" was sunk.

Following von Spee's report is that of Captain Luce, of H. M. S. "Glasgow," which had a narrow and lucky escape under cover of darkness. There were no casualties on the German side, and von Spee reports but two men slightly wounded.

yards, I turned one point toward the enemy, and at 6.34 opened fire at a distance of 11,260 yards. The guns of both our armored cruisers were effective, and by 6.39 already we could note the first hit on the "Good Hope." I at once resumed a parallel course instead of bearing slightly toward the enemy.

WIND and swell were head on and the vessels had heavy going, especially the small cruisers on both sides. Observation and distance estimation were under a severe handicap because of the seas which washed over the bridges. The swell was so great that it obscured the aim of the gunners at the six-inch guns on the middle deck, who could not see the sterns of the enemy ships at all and the bows but seldom. At 6.20 p.m., at a distance of 13,400

The English opened their fire at this time. I assume that the heavy sea made more trouble for them than it did for us. Their two armored cruisers remained covered by our fire, while they, so far as could be determined, hit the "Scharnhorst" but twice and the "Gneisenau" only four times.

At 6.53, when 6,500 yards apart, I ordered a course one point away from the enemy. They were firing more slowly at this time, while we were able to count numerous hits. We could see, among other things, that the top of the "Monmouth's" forward turret had been shot away and that a violent fire was burning in the turret. The "Scharnhorst," it is thought, hit the "Good Hope" about thirty-five times.

In spite of our altered course the English changed theirs sufficiently so that the distance between us shrunk to 5,300 yards. There was reason to suspect that the enemy despaired of using his artillery effectively and was maneuvering for a torpedo attack. The position of the moon, which had risen at 6 o'clock, was favorable to this move. Accordingly, I gradually opened up further distances between the squadrons by another deflection of the leading ship at 7.45. In the meantime it had grown dark. The range-finders on the "Scharnhorst" used the fire on the "Monmouth" as a guide for a time, though eventually all range-finding, aiming, and observation became so inexact that firing was stopped at 7.26.

At 7.23 a column of fire from an explosion was noticed between the stacks of the "Good Hope." The "Monmouth" apparently stopped firing at 7.20. The small cruisers, including the "Nürnberg," received by wireless at 7.30 the order to follow the enemy and to attack his ships with torpedoes. Vision was somewhat obscured at this time by a rain squall. The light cruisers were not able to find the "Good Hope," but the "Nürnberg" encountered the "Monmouth," and at 8.58 was able by shots at closest range to capsize her without a single shot being fired in return. Rescue work in the heavy sea was not to be thought of, especially as the "Nürnberg" immediately afterward believed she had sighted the smoke of another ship and had to prepare for a new attack.

The small cruisers had neither losses nor damage in the battle. On the "Gneisenau" there were two men slightly wounded. The crews of the ships went into the fight with enthusiasm, every one did his duty and played his part in the victory.

THE REPORT OF CAPTAIN JOHN LUCE, OF THE "GLASGOW"

GLASGOW" left Coronel 9 a.m. on November 1 to rejoin "Good Hope" (flagship), "Monmouth" and "Otranto" at rendezvous. At 2 p.m. flagship signaled that apparently from wireless calls there was an enemy ship to northward. Orders were

given for squadron to spread N.E. by E. in the following order: "Good Hope," "Monmouth," "Otranto," and "Glasgow," speed to be worked up to 15 knots. 4.20 p.m., saw smoke; proved to be enemy ships, one small cruiser and two armored cruisers. "Glasgow" reported to admiral, ships in sight were warned, and all concentrated on "Good Hope." At 5 p.m. "Good Hope" was sighted.

5.47 p.m. squadron formed in line-ahead in following order: "Good Hope," "Monmouth," "Glasgow," "Otranto." Enemy, who had turned south, were now in single line-ahead 12 miles off, "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" leading. 6.18 p.m., speed ordered to 17 knots, and flagship signaled "Canopus," "I am going to attack enemy now." Enemy were now 15,000 yards away, and maintained this range, at the same time jamming wireless signals.

By this time sun was setting immediately behind us from enemy position, and while it remained above horizon we had advantage in light, but range too great. 6.55 p.m., sun set, and visibility conditions altered, our ships being silhouetted against afterglow, and failing light made enemy difficult to see.

7.3 p.m., enemy opened fire 12,000 yards, followed in quick succession by "Good Hope," "Monmouth," "Glasgow." Two squadrons were now converging, and each ship engaged opposite number in the line. Growing darkness and heavy spray of head sea made firing difficult, particularly for main deck guns of "Good Hope" and "Monmouth." Enemy firing sal-

vos got range quickly, and their third salvo caused fire to break out on fore part of both ships, which were constantly on fire till 7.45 p.m. 7.50 p.m., immense explosion occurred on "Good Hope" amidships, flames reaching 200 feet high. Total destruction must have followed. It was now quite dark.

Both sides continued firing at flashes of opposing guns. "Monmouth" was badly down by the bow, and turned away to get stern to sea, signaling to "Glasgow" to that effect. 8.30 p.m., "Glasgow" signaled to "Monmouth": "Enemy following us," but received no reply. Under rising moon enemy's ships were now seen approaching, and as "Glasgow" could render "Monmouth" no assistance, she proceeded at full speed to avoid destruction. 8.50 p.m., lost sight of enemy. 9.20 p.m., observed 75 flashes of fire, which was no doubt final attack on "Monmouth."

Nothing could have been more admirable than conduct of officers and men throughout. Though it was most trying to receive great volume of fire without chance of returning it adequately, all kept perfectly cool, there was no wild firing, and discipline was the same as at battle practice. When target ceased to be visible, gunlayers spontaneously ceased fire. The serious reverse sustained has entirely failed to impair the spirit of officers and ship's company, and it is our unanimous wish to meet the enemy again as soon as possible.

THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS

Vice Admiral Sturdee's Official Report

WHEREAS the German Admiral, von Spee, had displayed superior strategy to the British in the engagement off Coronel, Chile, the reverse was the case on December 8, 1914, when he encountered another British squadron under Admiral Sturdee in the Battle of the Falklands. It had been a race on the part of the British ships to reach the Falkland Islands ahead of the German squadron, and von Spee played into the hands of Sturdee by arriving a day late and being caught completely off guard. This time, however, the Britons excelled the Germans in speed and gun-power, as well as strategy.

In the memorable battle as here reported to the British Admiralty, the British lost 6 killed and had 16 wounded. Of the 5 German warships engaged, all were sunk except the "Dresden," which escaped and became a sea raider. Only 180 German officers and men were saved from a total complement of 2,200.

day, the 7th December, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron the next evening, the 8th December.

THE following dispatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton-Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting the action off the Falkland Islands on Tuesday, the 8th of December, 1914:—

The squadron, consisting of H. M. ships "Invincible," flying my flag; "Inflexible," "Carnarvon," flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart; "Cornwall," "Kent," "Glasgow," "Bristol," and "Macedonia," arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Island, at 10.30 a.m. on Mon-

At 8 a.m. on Tuesday, the 8th December, a signal was received from the signal station on shore: "A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards."

At this time the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows: "Macedonia": At anchor as look-out ship. "Kent" (guard ship): At anchor in Port William. "Invincible" and "Inflexible": In Port William. "Carnarvon": In Port William. "Cornwall": In Port William. "Glasgow": In Port Stanley. "Bristol": In Port Stanley.

The "Kent" was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed.

At 8.20 a.m. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8.43 a.m. the "Kent" passed down the harbor and took up a station at the entrance.

The "Canopus" reported at 8.47 a.m. that the first two ships were 8 miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8.20 a.m. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about 20 miles off.

At 8.50 a.m. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward.

The "Macedonia" was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders.

At 9.20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy ("Gneisenau" and "Nürnberg"), with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the "Canopus," who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once

hoisted their colors and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the "Invincible" at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the "Kent" at the entrance to the harbor, but about this time it seems that the "Invincible" and "Inflexible" were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

The "Glasgow" weighed and proceeded at 9.40 a.m. with orders to join the "Kent" and observe the enemy's movements.

At 8.40 a.m. the squadron—less the "Bristol"—weighed, and proceeded out of harbor in the following order:—"Carnarvon," "Inflexible," "Invisible," and "Cornwall." On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the southeast, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the northwest.

At 10.20 a.m. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the "Carnarvon" and overtook the "Kent." The "Glasgow" was ordered to keep two miles from the "Invincible," and the "Inflexible" was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to 20 knots at 11.15 a.m. to enable the other cruisers to get into station.

At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.

Information was received from the "Bristol" at 11.27 a.m. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The "Bristol" was therefore directed to take the "Macedonia" under his orders and destroy transports.

The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12.20 p.m., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the "Glasgow."

At 12.47 p.m. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made.

The "Inflexible" opened fire at 12.55 p.m. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the "Invincible" opened fire at the same ship.

The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1.20 p.m. she (the "Leipzig") turned away, with the "Nürnberg" and "Dresden" to the southwest. These light cruisers were at once followed by the "Kent," "Glasgow" and "Cornwall," in accordance with my instructions.

The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.

The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau." The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1.25 p.m., with the

"Scharnhorst" leading, they turned about 7 points to port in succession into line ahead and opened fire at 1.30 p.m. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to 24 knots, and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the "Invincible" leading.

The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased, until, at 2 p.m., it had reached 16,450 yards.

The enemy then (2.10 p.m.) turned away about 10 points to starboard and a second chase ensued, until, at 2.45 p.m., the battle cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2.53 p.m., to turn into line ahead to port and open fire at 2.55 p.m.

The "Scharnhorst" caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the "Gneisenau" was badly hit by the "Inflexible."

At 3.30 p.m., the "Scharnhorst" led round about 10 points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the "Scharnhorst" became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam; at times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4.10 p.m. the "Scharnhorst," whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute

it became clear that she was a doomed ship; for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4.17 p.m. she disappeared.

The "Gneisenau" passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers.

At 5.8 p.m. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.

At 5.15 p.m. one of the "Gneisenau's" shells struck the "Invincible"; this was her last effective effort.

At 5.30 p.m. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire," but before it was hoisted the "Gneisenau" opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun.

At 5.40 p.m. the three ships closed in on the "Gneisenau," and, at this time, the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.

At 5.50 p.m. "Cease fire" was made.

At 6 p.m. the "Gneisenau" heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking.

The prisoners of war from the "Gneisenau" report that, by the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water.

When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.

Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a small proportion could be rescued. The "Invincible" alone rescued 108 men, 14 of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military honors.

At about 1 p.m., when the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" turned to port to engage the "Invincible" and "Inflexible," the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the "Dresden" was leading and the "Nürnberg" and "Leipzig" followed on each quarter.

In accordance with my instructions, the "Glasgow," "Kent," and "Cornwall" at once went in chase of these ships; the "Carnarvon," whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers.

The "Glasgow" drew well ahead of the "Cornwall" and "Kent," and at 3 p.m. shots were exchanged

with the "Leipzig" at 12,000 yards. The "Glasgow's" object was to endeavor to outrange the "Leipzig" with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the "Cornwall" and "Kent" a chance of coming into action.

At 4.17 p.m. the "Cornwall" opened fire, also on the "Leipzig."

At 7.17 p.m. the "Leipzig" was on fire fore and aft, and the "Cornwall" and "Glasgow" ceased fire.

The "Leipzig" turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 p.m. Seven officers and eleven men were saved.

At 3.36 p.m. the "Cornwall" ordered the "Kent" to engage the "Nürnberg," the nearest cruiser to her.

Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room department, the "Kent" was able to get within range of the "Nürnberg" at 5 p.m. At 6.35 p.m. the "Nürnberg" was on fire forward and ceased firing. The "Kent" also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colors were still observed to be flying in the "Nürnberg," the "Kent" opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colors being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The "Nürnberg" sank at 7.27 p.m., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.

The "Kent" had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell.

During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the "Nürnberg" and "Leipzig," the "Dresden," who was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The "Glasgow" was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the "Leipzig" for over an hour before either the "Cornwall" or "Kent" could come up and get within range. During this time the "Dresden" was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.

The weather changed after 4 p.m., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the "Dresden" to get away unobserved.

A report was received at 11.27 a.m. from H.M.S. "Bristol" that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The "Bristol" was ordered to take the "Macedonia" under his orders and destroy the transports.

H.M.S. "Macedonia" reports that only two ships, steamships "Baden" and "Santa Isabel," were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crew.

I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the engineer officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed.

ROOSEVELT ANXIOUSLY WARNS ENGLAND

His Illuminating Letter to Sir Edward Grey.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT thus wrote the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, January 22, 1915, nearly two years before the United States declared war on Germany. Their acquaintance had begun in 1910, when Roosevelt visited London en route to America after a hunting trip in East Africa, and their correspondence over a period of years is incorporated in Grey's "Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916," published by Frederick A. Stokes Company.

This letter is interesting as a reflection of public opinion in America at that time. Teuton ruthlessness in Belgium at first had dampened German sentiment in this country, and it was further dampened by the Zeppelin raids on England.

In beseeching the British Foreign Secretary not to risk antagonizing the United States, Roosevelt cites a letter from John Bright to Sumner, Lincoln's Secretary of State, pleading with the Federal Government not to become embroiled with England during the Civil War.

what he can for justice and decency as regards mankind at large and who therefore feels obliged to

TO me the crux of the situation has been Belgium. If England or France had acted toward Belgium as Germany has acted I should have opposed them, exactly as I now oppose Germany. I have emphatically approved your action as a model for what should be done by those who believe that treaties should be observed in good faith and that there is such a thing as international morality. I take this position as an American who is no more an Englishman than he is a German, who endeavors loyally to serve the interests of his own country, but who also endeavors to do

judge all other nations by their conduct on any given occasion.

I do not think you need to have me show a precedent for writing you; but, if you do, I shall ask you to turn to young Trevelyan's "Life of John Bright," pages 314 to 316. Bright was writing to Sumner at the time, when the bulk of the leading English politicians, from Palmerston and Derby to Gladstone and the editor of "The Times," were more or less openly hostile to the cause of the American Union and the freeing of the slaves. Bright's letters were written to Sumner in order that they could be read aloud by Lincoln to his Cabinet, which was actually done. He was afraid the United States would drift into war with England. His letters run in part as follows:

"You know that I write to you with as much earnest wish for your national welfare as if I were a native and resident of your country. I need not tell you, who are much better acquainted with modern history than I am, that nations drift into wars. I fervently hope that you may act firmly and courteously (towards England). Any moderate course you may take will meet with great support here. I have no doubt you will be able to produce strong cases from English practice in support of your actions, but I doubt if any number of these will change opinion here. You must put the matter in such a shape as to save your honor and to put our Government in the wrong if they refuse your propositions.

"At all hazards you must not let this matter grow to a war with England, even if you are right and we are wrong. War will be fatal to your idea of restoring the Union. I am not now considering its effects here; but I am looking alone to your great country, and I implore you, not on any feeling that nothing can be conceded and that England is arrogant and seeking a quarrel, not to play the game of every enemy of your country. Nations in great crises and difficulties have often done that which in their prosperous and powerful hour they would not have often done; and they have done it without humiliation and disgrace. You may disappoint your enemies by the moderation and reasonableness of your conduct; and every honest and good man in England will applaud your wisdom. If you are resolved to succeed against the South, have no war with England. Make every concession that can be made. Do not hesitate to tell the world that you will even consider what two years ago no power would have asked of you rather than give another nation a pretence for assisting your enemies. It is your interest to baffle your enemies even by any concession which is not disgraceful."

America then acted along the lines John Bright advised. I do not know whether his advice carried any weight. I have not the slightest idea whether you may not resent my giving advice; but I assure you that it is given with as much friendliness and disinterestedness as fifty odd years ago John Bright gave his to Sumner and Lincoln, and with as sincere a purpose

to serve what I believe to be the cause of justice and morality; and with reversal of names the advice I am giving is the same as John Bright gave; and my reasons are the same.

There have been fluctuations in American opinion about the war. The actions of the German Zeppelins have revived the feeling in favor of the Allies. But I believe that for a couple of months preceding this action there had been a distinct lessening of the feeling for the Allies and a growth of pro-German feeling. I do not think that this was the case among the people who are best informed; but I do think that it was the case among the mass of not very well informed people, who have little to go upon except what they read in the newspapers or see at cinematograph shows. There were several causes for this change. There has been a very striking contrast between the lavish attentions showered on American war correspondents by the German military authorities and the blank refusal to have anything whatever to do with them by the British and French Governments. . . . The only real war news written by Americans who are known to and trusted by the American public comes from the German side; as a result of this, the sympathizers with the cause of the Allies can hear nothing whatever about the trials and achievements of the British and French armies. . . . It may be that your people do not believe that American public opinion is of sufficient value to be taken into account; but, if you think that it should be taken into account, then it is

worth your while considering whether much of your censorship work and much of your refusal to allow correspondents at the front has been damaging to your cause from the standpoint of the effect on public opinion without any corresponding military gains. I realize perfectly that it would be criminal to permit correspondents to act as they acted as late as our own Spanish War; but, as a layman, I feel sure that there has been a good deal of work of the kind of which I have spoken in the way of censorship and refusing the correspondents permission to go to the front which has not been of the slightest military service to you and which has had a very real effect in preventing any rallying of public opinion to you. . . .

Now, as to the question of contraband. You know that I am as little in sympathy with President Wilson and Secretary Bryan as regards their attitude in international matters as John Bright was in sympathy with Lords Palmerston and Derby and Mr. Gladstone in their attitude toward the American Republic when it was at war fifty years ago. But they speak for the country; and I have no influence whatever in shaping public action, and, as I have reason to believe, very little influence indeed in shaping public opinion. My advice, therefore, must be taken or rejected by you purely with reference to what you think it is worth.

President Wilson is certainly not desirous of war with anybody. But he is very obstinate, and he takes the professorial view of international matters. I need not point out to you that it is often pacifists

who, halting and stumbling and not knowing whither they are going, finally drift helplessly into a war, which they have rendered inevitable, without the slightest idea that they were doing so. A century ago this was what happened to the United States under Presidents Jefferson and Madison—although at that time the attitude of both England and France rendered war with one of them, and ought to have rendered war with both of them, inevitable on our part. . . .

I regard the proposed purchase by the Administration of German ships as entirely improper. I am supporting the Republicans in their opposition to the measure. I regard some of the actions of the Administration in, for instance, refusing to make public the manifests in advance and the like as improper. I think Great Britain is now showing great courtesy and forbearance. I believe that she has done things to our ships that ought not to have been done, but I am not aware that she is now doing them. I am not discussing this question from the standpoint of right. I am discussing it from the standpoint of expediency. . . . Our trade, under existing circumstances, is of vastly more service to you and France than to Germany. I think I underestimate the case when I say it is ten times as valuable to the Allies as to Germany. There are circumstances under which it might become not merely valuable but vital. I am not a naval man, I do not know what the possibilities of the submarine are. But they have accomplished some notable feats, and if they should now begin to destroy ships carry-

ing foodstuffs to Great Britain, the effect might be not merely serious but appalling. Under such conditions, it would be of the utmost consequence to England to have accepted the most extreme view the United States could advance as to her right to ship cargoes unmolested. Even although this possibility, which I do not regard as more than a very remote possibility, is in reality wholly impossible, it yet remains true that the trade in contraband is overwhelmingly to the advantage of England, France, and Russia, because of your command of the seas. You assume that this command gives you the right to make the advantage still more overwhelming. I ask you merely to take careful thought, so that you shall not excite our Government, even wrongfully, to act in such a way that it would diminish or altogether abolish the great advantage you now have. . . . Exactly how far you can go in any given case, I cannot say. But where it is so very important for you that there should be no American hostility, I hope you will not only avoid doubtful action but will not insist on your rights, even when these rights are clear, unless you are convinced that the gain to you will more than offset causing an irritation in this country which might have effects that I will not even contemplate, because they would cause me real horror. . . .

THE BATTLE OF DOGGER BANK

Described by two British Man-of-War's Men and a German Survivor

NEWS ACCOUNT BY A GUNNER OF THE "ARETHUSA"

A GERMAN squadron, under Rear-Admiral von Hipper, consisting of three battle cruisers "Derfflinger," "Seydlitz," "Moltke" and the protected cruiser "Blucher," together with light cruisers and destroyers, was encountered in the North Sea, January 24, 1915, by the British battle cruisers "Lion," "Tiger," "Princess Royal," "New Zealand" and "Indomitable," under Vice-Admiral Beatty, in company with four light cruisers, including the famous "Arethusa," one of whose gunners gives this introductory account of the battle. In a running fight, the "Blücher" was torpedoed and sunk in the tragic manner described here by one of her crew. The description is preceded by the account of an officer on the British destroyer "Sandfly," which was published in the London "Times" a few days after the action.

This was the first action of the war between big battleships.

aged our port aerial. I then began to think that the next would find the range, but fortunately it passed just astern. We had a very warm time for a

I MIGHT mention that we were well within range of the Germans during this time, who apparently could not spare one of their 11-inch guns for us, which was a good thing, as one from them would not leave much of the "Arethusa," I think. Their shells were beginning to fall a little too near us for safety, and we really thought we were in for it as first one big one fell just short—this was my side (port). The next came with a horrible, shrieking noise and passed over the ship just abaft the mast and dam-

while, as you must understand that the "Arethusa" is quite unprotected, and we have no protection but only light shields at our guns—in fact, the shield of my gun has twice been burst in by the seas.

The German ships appeared to be on fire more than once, and at last there was no doubt about one of them—the "Blücher." It was then that our turn came, and as her fire slackened we quickly came up with her and started with our bow six-inch with lyddite. This is a terribly destructive shell, and when our big ships were firing, their shells on exploding caused clouds of yellow smoke. Our starboard battery of four-inch also came into play, but unfortunately all this time I had to stand idly by with a shell in my arms, as none of the guns on our side got a chance; this was rather trying.

The "Blücher" was now out of action, and the "Arethusa" gave the coup de grâce by slipping in two torpedoes at her just as we slewed around. These caused frightful havoc, one bursting in the engine-room and the other just below the fore turret, and rapidly caused her to capsize. She was before this a battered wreck on deck, practically all her gun crews were killed, and her officers drove the men from the stoke-hole at their sword-points to reman the guns. This was told us by the German prisoners aboard, and one or two of them have wounds which they said had been caused by their own officers' swords. . . .

The "Blücher," which had capsized, was lying awash, with her side just out of the water and men

standing on it, while all around there seemed hundreds swimming and drifting in cork jackets toward us. We were very close; in fact, it seemed dangerously so. I shall never forget the sight, nor what followed later. I think it was more affecting than anything. Anyway, we started to drag them in up the ship's side, and in this way and by the boats we got 123 on board, while the destroyers also saved a lot. Some were badly burned. We got six officers in the above.

Shortly after we got our boats a terrible sight came along, which was a lot of Germans being swept along in the water and who had evidently drifted off in another direction when we picked the others up. In this case they were sweeping by the ship, and we could only save one or two—several drowned before our eyes, although having life-belts on. Then the destroyers came up and picked up a lot. By this time our battle cruisers had disappeared after the Germans, and we turned about and started to go for all we were worth back to the "Lion," the "Indomitable" having already gone back. There was, of course, great danger to her from submarines, and it was a very anxious time from Sunday night until we got to Rosyth about 4 a.m. on Tuesday.

BY AN OFFICER OF THE "SANDFLY"

WE had a beastly night on Saturday; you could not see a thing except at intervals and you had to look out as best you could. Our next ahead's stern

light went out and it was an awful job to keep touch with the flotilla. We joined up with the flotilla at 6.50 and at 7 a.m. we sighted some craft in the demi-light on our starboard bow. As the light got better we made out the enemy battle cruisers making our way, and none of us felt very happy as we appeared to be up against a strong force of battle and light cruisers and torpedo craft. I was wet through, having come up quickly without an oil-skin, which I won't do again even though I am a bit late on the fore-castle; also suffering a bit from seasickness. I suppose at a pinch one can fight well even though it's on an empty stomach and no sleep and wet through, but I am blowned if you can if you are feeling seasick.

A bit later we made out some heavy ships on our port side (we were steaming north). These might have been Germans for all we knew in the "Sandfly." The German ships came on for a bit as we were screening the big ships, being between them and the enemy, but as soon as they caught sight of the "Lion" and that lot they altered course 16 points and made off towards the Fatherland as quick as they could. We could not get at their flotilla, so we had to form astern of our battle cruisers and leave it to them. After this we were only spectators of the fight.

About 9 a.m. our leading ships fired ranging shots from the fore turrets, but they fell short; about 9.30 it seemed that the enemy were within range, and at 9.45 the "Tiger" and "Lion" seemed to be firing their

whole broadsides regularly, and about 10 a.m. the "Lion," "Tiger," "New Zealand," and "Princess Royal" were all in action. It was very hard to see much from where we were, as our bridge was washing down, and one could not keep binoculars dry. As far as we could see our shots were straddling them all right, and theirs seemed to be all around our two leading ships, especially the "Tiger." We could not make out the hits, though we knew some shots must be hitting. The light was very good indeed and just suited us, as we could use the superior range of our guns.

I can't say I was very impressed with the action, as it looked just the same as any squadron firing one has ever seen in peace time. I have no doubt it was quite exciting enough, though, in the battle cruisers or to anyone who had not seen ships engaged before. At 11.50 we sighted a Zepp. Our ships seemed to have edged in and headed them off to the northwards a bit. All this time we had been following up astern and only able to look on and watch the flashes and fall of shot. About the progress of the action and damage each side was doing we could tell very little, except that their shooting seemed jolly good.

At 11.10 we came up to the "Lion," who had fallen out of the line and was listing a good deal to port. Otherwise she seemed perfectly all right. However, she was obviously out of action, and it did not cheer us up at all as, for all we knew, our other three might be getting the worst of it. The first flo-

tilla boats formed a screen round the "Lion" and after this we were out of the fighting altogether, and much to our annoyance we had to let the whole concern drift away to the eastward, spitting out flame and smoke at each other quite in the approved style. Our main care was now guarding the "Lion" from torpedo attack, and we steamed slowly northwest. No one tried to attack us though, as I fancy after Heligoland they are a bit chary of our destroyers. Certainly our new boats are beautiful boats, with three 4-inch guns. The admiral shifted his flag to the "Acheron." At 2 p.m. the remainder of our ships appeared astern of us and overhauled us, and the "Acheron" as she passed signaled that the "Blücher" was sunk, which bucked us up. Later the "Indomitable" took the "Lion" in tow and all destroyers screened her from submarine attack, and we all steamed home slowly. None of our other ships showed the least signs of having been engaged.

The destroyers that went on had the most interesting time, as they saw the "Blücher" sink and picked up the survivors. Had bombs dropped at them while doing it. They (our destroyers) say the "Derfflinger" and "Seydlitz" were both badly on fire and awfully badly knocked about, and they wonder how they managed to steam away, but they have 13-inch armor, which must have saved them.

BY A SURVIVOR FROM THE "BLÜCHER"

SHOTS came slowly at first. They fell ahead and over, raising vast columns of water; now they fell astern and short. The British guns were ranging. Those deadly waterspouts crept nearer and nearer. The men on deck watched them with a strange fascination. Soon one pitched close to the ship and a vast watery pillar, a hundred meters high one of them affirmed, fell lashing on the deck. The range had been found. Dann aber ging's los!

Now the shells came thick and fast with a horrible droning hum. At once they did terrible execution. The electric plant was soon destroyed, and the ship plunged in darkness that could be felt. "You could not see your hand before your nose," said one. Down below decks there was horror and confusion, mingled with gasping shouts and moans as the shells plunged through the decks. It was only later, when the range shortened, that their trajectory flattened and they tore holes in the ship's side and raked her decks. At first they came dropping from the skies. They penetrated the decks. They bored their way even to the stokehold.

The coal in the bunkers was set on fire. Since the bunkers were half empty the fire burned merrily. In the engine-room a shell licked up the oil and sprayed it around in flames of blue and green, scarring its victims and blazing where it fell. Men huddled together

in dark compartments, but the shells sought them out, and there death had a rich harvest.

The terrific air-pressure resulting from explosion in a confined space, left a deep impression on the minds of the men of the "Blücher." The air, it would seem, roars through every opening and tears its way through every weak spot. All loose or insecure fittings are transformed into moving instruments of destruction. Open doors bang to, and jamb—and closed iron doors bend outward like tin plates, and through it all the bodies of men were whirled about like dead leaves in a winter blast, to be battered to death against the iron walls. . . .

In one of the engine-rooms—it was the room where the high velocity engines for ventilation and forced draught were at work—men were picked up by that terrible Luftdruck, like the whirl-drift at a street corner, and tossed to a horrible death amidst the machinery. There were other horrors too fearful to recount.

If it was appalling below deck, it was more than appalling above. The "Blücher" was under the fire of so many ships. Even the little destroyers peppered her. "It was one continuous explosion," said a gunner. The ship heeled over as the broadsides struck her, then righted herself, rocking like a cradle. Gun crews were so destroyed that stokers had to be requisitioned to carry ammunition. Men lay flat for safety. The decks presented a tangled mass of scrap iron. . . .

The "Blücher" had run her course. She was lagging lame, and with the steering gear gone was beginning slowly to circle. It was seen that she was doomed. The bell that rang the men to church parade each Sunday was tolled, those who were able assembled on deck, helping as well as they could their wounded comrades. Some had to creep out through shot holes. They gathered in groups on deck awaiting the end. Cheers were given for the "Blücher," and three more for the Kaiser. "Die Wacht am Rhein" was sung, and permission given to leave the ship. But some of them had already gone. The British ships were now silent, but their torpedoes had done their deadly work. A cruiser and destroyers were at hand to rescue the survivors. The wounded "Blücher" settled down, turned wearily over and disappeared in a swirl of water.

"STRICT ACCOUNTABILITY"

President Wilson's First Warning to Germany

PRESIDENT WILSON sent this note to Germany, February 10, 1915, six days after Berlin had issued its decree of a submarine blockade. On the same date a note was sent to London declaring that the United States would expect the British Government to "do all in their power to restrain vessels of British nationality in the deceptive use of the United States flag in the sea area defined by the German declaration." The use of neutral flags thus protested against had been defended in England on the ground of numerous precedents.

Following the reception of the note in Germany, on February 13, the German Legation at The Hague issued a warning to all naval vessels to keep out of a "war zone" around England and Ireland. Torpedoing of the "Falaba," "Gulflight" and an attack on the "Cushing" followed, and on May 1 the German warning was repeated by advertisements in American newspapers, signed by the German Embassy.

THE Government of the United States views those possibilities with such grave concern that it feels it to be its privilege, and, indeed, its duty, in the circumstances, to request the Imperial German Government to consider, before action is taken, the critical situation in respect of the relation between this country and Germany which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens.

It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is

limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible.

The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right of visit and search to have been recognized.

This Government has carefully noted the explanatory statement issued by the Imperial German Government at the same time with the proclamation of the German Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind the Imperial German Government very respectfully that the Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms for unneutral action to which the German Government believes the governments of certain other neutral nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United States has not consented to or acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken by the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate to

restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all such matters a position which warrants it in holding those governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward effects on American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do not justify; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance to take with a clear conscience and upon accepted principles the position indicated in this note.

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard, indeed, to reconcile with the friendly relations now happily subsisting between the two governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

The Government of the United States, in view of these considerations, which it urges with the sincere purpose of making sure that no misunderstandings may arise, and no circumstances occur, that might even cloud the intercourse of the two governments, expresses the confident hope and expectation that the Imperial German Government can and will give assurance that American citizens and their vessels will not be molested by the naval forces of Germany otherwise than by visit and search, though their vessels may be traversing the sea area delimited in the proclamation of the German Admiralty.

It is stated for the information of the Imperial Government that representations have been made to his Britannic Majesty's Government in respect to the unwarranted use of the American flag for the protection of British ships.

THE CAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL

By Bernard Pares

WHEN the great fortress of Przemyśl in Galicia fell to the Russians in March, 1915, there was a springtide of rejoicing among the Allies. Przemyśl was a fortress of the first class, and with it the Russians took 130,000 prisoners, one of the record captures of all wars. The name of the place was promptly changed to Peremyshl, the Russian form, and the captors were of course unaware that their tenure was to end in three months.

The author of this article was an English war correspondent, who accompanied the Russian armies in advance and retreat. This account was in the form of a dispatch sent by Pares from the front, March 30, 1915, a few days after Przemyśl capitulated.

THE fall of Przemyśl, which will now no doubt be called by its Russian name of Peremyshl, is in every way surprising.

Even a few days before, quite well-informed people had no idea that the end was coming so soon. The town was a first-class fortress, whose development had been an object of special solicitude to the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Of

course it was recognized that Peremyshl was the gate of Hungary and the key to Galicia; but, more than that, it was strengthened into a great point of debouchment for an aggressive movement by Austro-Hungary against Russia; for the Russian policy of Austria, like her original plan of campaign, was based on the assumption of the offensive. It was generally understood that Peremyshl was garrisoned by about 50,000 men, that the garrison was exclusively Hungarian, and that the commander, Kusmanek, was one

of the few really able Austrian commanders in this war. The stores were said to be enough for a siege of three years. The circle of the forts was so extended as to make operations easy against any but the largest blockading force; and the aerodrome, which was well covered, gave communication with the outside world. An air post has run almost regularly, the letters (of which I have some) being stamped "Flieger-Post." . . . The practical difficulties offered to the Russians by Peremyshl were very great; for the one double railway line westward runs through the town, so that all military and Red Cross communications have been indefinitely lengthened. . . .

For weeks past the fortress had kept up a terrific fire which was greater than any experienced elsewhere from Austrian artillery. Thousands of shells yielded only tens of wounded, and it would seem that the Austrians could have had no other object than to get rid of their ammunition. The fire was now intensified to stupendous proportions and the sortie took place; but, so far from the whole garrison coming out, it was only a portion of it, and was driven back with the annihilation of almost a whole division.

Now followed extraordinary scenes. Austrian soldiers were seen fighting each other, while the Russians looked on. Amid the chaos a small group of staff officers appeared, casually enough, with a white flag, and announced surrender. Austrians were seen cutting pieces out of slaughtered horses that lay in heaps, and showing an entire indifference to their

capture. Explosions of war material continued after the surrender.

The greatest surprise of all was the strength of the garrison, which numbered not 50,000 but 130,000, which makes of Peremyshl a second Metz. Different explanations are offered; for instance, troops which had lost their field trains and therefore their mobility are reported to have taken refuge in Peremyshl after Rava Russka, but surely the subsequent withdrawal of the blockade gave them ample time for retreat. A more convincing account is that Peremyshl was full of depots, left there to be supports of a great advancing field army. In any case no kind of defense can be pleaded for the surrender of this imposing force.

The numbers of the garrison of course reduced to one-third the time during which the food supplies would last; but even so the fortress should have held out for a year. The epidemic diseases within the lines supply only a partial explanation. The troops, instead of being all Hungarians, were of various Austrian nationalities; and there is good reason to think that the conditions of defense led to feuds, brawls and, in the end, open disobedience of orders. This was all the more likely because, while food was squandered on the officers, the rank and file and the local population were reduced to extremes, and because the officers, to judge by the first sortie, took but little part in the actual fighting. The wholesale slaughter of horses of itself robbed the army of its mobility. The fall of Peremyshl is the most striking example so far

of the general demoralization of the Austrian army and monarchy.

Peremyshl, so long a formidable hindrance to the Russians, is now a splendid base for an advance into Hungary.

THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE

By Count Charles de Souza

DE SOUZA, one of the foremost French war correspondents and an approved military authority, here recounts the first great assault with artillery that the war developed. It was made by the Allies on March 10, 1915, and the movement came as a relief after a winter of intolerable trench life. To their cost, the British learned that their preparations were insufficient to break the strongly fortified German positions, and costly blunders were made.

An impetuous advance carried the British under their own shell-fire, where they suffered heavily. This account, like most of the others of French and English sources, is rather optimistic—since the true story of the operation would have been too discouraging to publish at that time. This assault revealed that the Germans had so extended trenches behind trenches that their defensive was even stronger than their offensive.

THE battle of Neuve Chapelle was an action in which, through a surprise attack, the British reconquered the position which the Germans had occupied in October and powerfully organized in front of the British pivot at La Bassée. This position formed a salient in the British line, and in order to preserve the integrity of that line (in other words to make it stronger), it was necessary to take the village of Neuve Chapelle—which had been once before attacked unsuccessfully (October 28th). The

former attempt had failed because it had been made with inadequate means. This time the operation was carried out by two army corps, the 4th Corps and the Indian Corps, which were swiftly and secretly concentrated on the line Rue d'Enfer-Richebourg St.

Vast, their forward movement being covered and supported by the fire of 350 guns, British and French.

The Germans were surprised, outnumbered, outflanked on both sides, and, after a stubborn struggle, they were ousted from the position. The victory was complete, and would have been more satisfactory had it been less costly. The British casualties exceeded 12,000 out of 50,000 men engaged on that occasion.

This was due to the impetuosity of the new troops and of some officers who misunderstood the object of the attack, advanced too quickly and too far, and thus uselessly exposed their men to the effects of the severe counterblows which the Germans, with their accustomed thoroughness, did not fail to deliver. There also was confusion in the matter of bringing up reinforcements. The position, however, remained in the possession of the British, although their opponents did all they could to recapture it—a fact which when contrasted to the previous engagement makes it clear that the enemy was inferior both on the defense and the attack.

The French offensive in Champagne, which synchronized with the battle of Neuve Chapelle, was a more lengthy and methodical affair; it had also a totally different object. It started at the beginning of February and reached its climax at the date of Neuve Chapelle; it was carried out ostensibly to relieve the "pressure" exercised at the time by the Germans on the Russians in East Prussia and Suwalki; and for that reason it may be characterized as

the first attempt at a coördination of movements between the two fronts. Locally it yielded good results; it displayed once more the offensive qualities of the French troops and gave them good practice in the newly adopted methods of artillery preparation and the combination of infantry and artillery assaults on a large scale; but its primary object was not attained, simply because it was sought on a wrong assumption. Hindenburg's contemporaneous move in East Prussia was a false one, meant mainly to distract the attention of the Russians from another sector of their front.

It was part of the enemy's plan to exaggerate the number of their forces in that quarter, and they succeeded so far as to lead the Allies to believe that strong German units were being withdrawn from the Western front. It was computed in many quarters that Hindenburg had fifteen army corps with him in East Prussia, whereas he could not have had more than a third of that number.

Nevertheless, General d'Esperey's movement in Champagne was brilliant. The artillery bombardment was heavy and effective. Strong hostile positions were stormed between Souain, Perthes and Beauséjour, and the French made many captures, the Germans admitting in their communiqués that their losses in that part of France were greater than those they had suffered in East Prussia, which were computed by themselves at 15,000.

THE "LUSITANIA" SINKING

Accounts by an American Survivor and the German U-Boat Commander

ON May 1, 1915, American newspapers printed this German warning to prospective trans-Atlantic travelers, especially passengers of the "Lusitania," which was preparing to sail from New York. Six days later the British liner was torpedoed by a German submarine, as described by a survivor, E. C. Cowper, in a letter to a son of Elbert Hubbard, who was drowned with his wife. Cowper swam with a child for three hours before they were rescued. There follows an extract from the diary of the U-boat commander, Lieutenant Schwieger, who subsequently was lost, with all his crew, off Zeebrugge.

The sinking of the "Lusitania," with the loss of 1,198 lives, including 124 Americans, stirred the American people profoundly. It moved President Wilson to make his famous declaration, in a speech at Philadelphia, May 10, "There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."

NOTICE:—Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk. IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY.

Washington, D. C., April 22, 1915.

THE SINKING DESCRIBED BY ERNEST C. COWPER,
A SURVIVOR

A SHORT time before the torpedo hit us I called the attention of Elbert Hubbard and Mrs. Hubbard to the extra watch which had been put on for submarines, and walked them forward to where two men were right at the stem with glasses. Two were on each side of the navigating-bridge, and three were in the crow's-nest, which is half way up the foremast. He [Hubbard] expressed surprise at this, for he was sure a submarine would never make any effort to torpedo a ship filled with women, children and non-combatants. He mentioned the fact that there were no guns on board, and that there was no place to put them. I agreed that there were no guns, but pointed out that there were places to put them, and walked both round to the places which were built with the vessel for the mounting of guns if required. Nobody but one having a close acquaintance with a ship would know what the round, elevated patch on the deck was for; but I come from a seafaring family (my father having been drowned at sea while in command), and so I knew what they were for.

We then parted to go to our cabins before taking lunch. On finishing mine I went to the top deck, and was smoking . . . when I saw the torpedo coming toward us. I sought the shelter of the companionway until after the explosion, when I saw another coming and again took shelter. After the second one . . .

the vessel took a terrible list right away. . . . They [Mr. and Mrs. Hubbard] emerged from their room, which was on the port side of the vessel, and came on to the boat-deck. Neither appeared perturbed in the least. They linked arms—the fashion in which they always walked the deck—and stood apparently wondering what to do. I passed him [Hubbard] with a baby which I was taking to a lifeboat when he said "Well, they have got us. They are a damn-sight worse than I ever thought they were." They did not move very far away from where they originally stood. As I moved to the other side of the ship, in preparation for a jump when the right moment came, I called to him, "What are you going to do?" and he just shook his head, while Mrs. Hubbard smiled and said, "There does not seem to be anything to do."

The expression seemed to produce action on the part of Elbert Hubbard, for then he did one of the most dramatic things I ever saw done. He simply turned with Mrs. Hubbard and entered a room on the top deck, the door of which was open, and closed it behind him. It was apparent that his idea was that they would die together, and not risk being parted on going into the water. . . .


There was a preponderance of women and children on board. This fact is accounted for owing to the number of wives and children of men belonging to the Canadian contingents (which were almost wholly composed of Old-Country men) who were going to England, where they could live cheaper and be near

to the hospitals where their dear ones would be taken in case of injury.

Some of the horrors of the disaster can never be committed to print. I can say this: There were a surprisingly large number of women on board who were in advanced stages of pregnancy—presumably English women who were going to their parents for the birth of their children. I saw the corpses of four of these in the mortuary at Queenstown, and they had been delivered of their infants in the water, precipitated labor owing to shock being the cause. . . . Because Great Britain was at war there should be stretched out on the cold flagstones of the mortuary at Queenstown the bodies of four women in a condition which even animals respect, and this for the furtherance of the Kultur which Emperor William would impose on Europe, and America next, I suppose, were he not stopped (and he is stopped). And this is but one of the many horrors. . . .

FROM THE DIARY OF LIEUTENANT SCHWEIGER, THE U-20
COMMANDER

RIGHT ahead appear four funnels and two masts of a steamer. . . . Clean bow shot from 700 meters range. . . . Shot hits starboard side right behind bridge. An unusually heavy detonation follows with a very strong explosion cloud. (High in the air over first smokestack.) Added to the explosion of



THE "LUSITANIA" LEAVING NEW YORK HARBOR, MAY 1, 1915
SIX DAYS LATER SHE WAS TORPEDOED AND SUNK BY A GERMAN SUBMARINE

the torpedo there must have been a second explosion. (Boiler or coal or powder.)

The superstructure over point struck and the high bridge are rent asunder, fire breaks out and smoke envelops the high bridge. The ship stops immediately and quickly heels to starboard, at the same time diving deeper at the bows. She has the appearance of being about to capsize. Great confusion on board, boats being cleared and part being lowered to water. They must have lost their heads. Many boats crowded come down bow first or stern first in the water, and immediately fill and sink.

Fewer lifeboats can be made clear on the port side, owing to the slant of the ship. The ship blows off. In the front appears the name "Lusitania" in gold letters. . . . It seems as if the vessel will be afloat only a short time. Submerge to twenty-four meters and go to sea. I could not have fired a second torpedo into this throng of humanity attempting to save themselves.

May 7, 1915.

PRESIDENT WILSON PROTESTS TO GERMANY

INAUGURATING his policy of "watchful waiting," President Wilson did not formally protest to the Imperial German Government on the sinking of the "Lusitania" until May 13, 1915, when the first of his "Lusitania" notes stated, "The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

Receiving no satisfactory answer to the foregoing or to a second note of protest, on July 21, 1915, the President sent the accompanying instructions, through Secretary of State Robert Lansing, to James W. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin.

For a few weeks the Germans apparently desisted from their ruthless submarine warfare, scrupulously warning ships and giving their crews and passengers some chance to escape. But in August it was resumed, with a defiant challenge to the American Government.

neutrals in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable.

THE Government of the United States is not unmindful of the extraordinary conditions created by this war or of the radical alterations of circumstances and method of attack produced by the use of instrumentalities of naval warfare which the nations of the world can not have had in view when the existing rules of international law were formulated, and it is ready to make every reasonable allowance for these novel and unexpected aspects of war at sea; but it can not consent to abate any essential or fundamental right of its people because of a mere alteration of circumstance. The rights of

PRESIDENT WILSON PROTESTS TO GERMANY 267

It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt the new circumstances to them.

The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations as have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare. The whole world has looked with interest and increasing satisfaction at the demonstration of that possibility by German naval commanders. It is manifestly possible, therefore, to lift the whole practice of submarine attack above the criticism which it has aroused and remove the chief causes of offense.

In view of the admission of illegality made by the Imperial Government when it pleaded the right of retaliation in defense of its acts, and in view of the manifest possibility of conforming to the established rules of naval warfare, the Government of the United States can not believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the "Lusitania" or from offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for a needless destruction of human life by an illegal act.

The Government of the United States, while not indifferent to the friendly spirit in which it is made, can not accept the suggestion of the Imperial German Government that certain vessels be designated and agreed upon which shall be free on the seas now ille-

gally proscribed. The very agreement would, by implication, subject other vessels to illegal attack, and would be a curtailment and therefore an abandonment of the principles for which this government contends, and which in times of calmer counsels every nation would concede as of course.

The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government are contending for the same great object, have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the Government of the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost. It invites the practical coöperation of the Imperial German Government at this time, when coöperation may accomplish most and this great common object be most strikingly and effectively achieved. . . . Repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those [neutral] rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly.

RUSSIANS HURLED BACK ON THE DUNAJEC

By Bernard Pares

PARES, the English war correspondent, who reported the Russian capture of Przemyśl, was also an eye-witness to the frenzied fighting in Galicia where and when the Germans, under Mackensen, reversed the situation in that theater of war. Combining with the rallying Austrians, the Germans fell like a thunderbolt on the armies of Grand Duke Nicholas and swept them from the plains of Galicia with devastating effect.

This vivid account, dated May 3, 1915, was written when the Teuton tide was at its height on the Dunajec River, and the Russians were grimly disputing the enemy advance across Galicia from Austria.

Germany and even Austria have evidently made great preparations. The food supply in the Austrian army has been much improved; the proportion of Germans on the Austrian front has been enormously increased; heavy artillery has been concentrated; and the Emperor and Hindenburg have been reported to be here.

I set out with a nice bright-eyed chauffeur who did a splendid day's work with me. We had the main road for some distance, and none of the varieties later

THE advance of the Russians over the Carpathians was sure to draw a counter-stroke and it has come just where many have expected it, but with tremendous force. This is because it is not so much the work of the tired Austrians, but rather the biggest effort that Germany has yet put forth in her attempts to bolster her ally. We have all been preparing for May, and

seemed to trouble him. We went along a valley, and in a house standing high up by a church we found the staff of the Division. I had friends; and I was soon dispatched with a tall, determined Cossack to the point where the road climbed the hill. Here we left our machine, and in a hundred yards or so we had the whole scene before us.

There was a hut on the top of the hill; sitting in front of it one could see for at least ten miles in either direction. The Division was holding a front of eight miles with the Z's on the left, the O's in the middle, the R's on the right and the I's in reserve. The O's, who were just beyond a hollow, occupied a low line of wooded heights a thousand yards in front of me. The Z's held a lower wooded ridge, the R's connected with the O's over a valley and were posted along a less defined line, of which the most marked feature was a village with a little church tower. Against these three regiments were nine, mostly German, and backed by the most formidable artillery. Beyond each of the flanks of the Division one could see at intervals black clouds of smoke; one thick stream of smoke that stretched into the skies came from some distant petroleum works.

The whole line of the R's was being pounded with crash after crash, sometimes four black columns rising almost simultaneously at intervals along it; under each would break out little angry teeth of sparkling flame; the only thing that seemed not to be hit was the church tower, which, as each cloud died down,

came out simple again in the bright sunshine. The Z's were in patches of smoke that sometimes disappeared for a time.

What was happening to the O's was not so clear; so after watching the shells and shrapnel bursting along the line and on the slope for some hours, we descended by some winding gullies, drawing a shrapnel as we passed over a low shoulder, and soon reached the staff of the O's. Under the nearer wall of a hut, a group of officers was working the telephones, while a number of soldiers lay on logs around. The colonel came forward to me with a preoccupied smile: "A convoy for the flag," he explained, and turning to his men: "you have the flag there?" Then he took me into the open and pointed at the ridge some six hundred yards away; all his left was at grips with the enemy, who had come through at several points, and on the right his men were fighting at the close range of two hundred yards in the wood beyond the crest. . . .

A message came that his right flank was open and being turned. He seized the telephone and called to the reserve regiment: "Two companies forward at the double," reporting his action directly to the staff of the division. There was a peculiar humanness about all these messages; in form they were just ordinary courteous conversation. The Z Colonel reported that his line was penetrated at more than one point, but was holding out. The R telephone gave no answer at all. Life there was unlivable, the trenches

were destroyed, and on my way I had heard from soldiers a report that when taking ammunition to the R's they had seen the Austrians in our lines. Shells and shrapnel were crashing all round us, especially on our rear; a great cloud rose where I had sat at the top, and a hut that I had passed on the way down broke out in full flame. Nearer down there fell four black explosives at regular distances of fifty yards, "the four packets" as one officer called it. Our cover would all have gone with a single shot, and the men crouched to avoid the falling splinters from each shell. In this depressing atmosphere there went on the conversation between the colonel and the divisional staff: "I can get no contact with the R's. Cavalry is reported on both of my flanks. The R's have had to retreat." The answer was an order to retire at nightfall. Three hours at least had to run. The order was communicated in French over each battalion telephone. The colonel apologized for his elementary French; anyhow it was the French of a brave man. As disquietudes increased, the permission came to retire at once; but the colonel answered that this could not be done: he was in hot defensive action, and the enemy would follow on his heels; at present he was holding his own.

Twice on the telephone the fatal word "surrounded" had been used. My hosts urged me to go. "We have each a different duty," they said. It was with little heart that I faced for the slope, turning a few yards off to salute these brave men once more.

They were some wounded struggling up the gullies, one with a maimed foot, whom we helped along but who had to sit down at times and smoke. As we began to approach shelter, we suddenly saw on the hills to the west of us men coming down the slope towards us. "Perhaps ours, perhaps the enemy," said my Cossack, who never turned a hair throughout the day. We got our lame man up the big hill, but as soon as we had passed the crest he said that his strength failed him, and sat down with several others round a well.

The next thing was to look for the motor. We were now in comparative safety; for we were out of the line of fire, and the valley to the north of us was full of our own people. Officers galloped forward, looking at the line of our retreating field trains. In the valley there was a long train of wounded. I at last found our motor in the midst of it. We packed in the men with the worst wounds that we noticed; they lay without a groan, and one soldier said: "Thanks to Thee, O Lord; and eternal gratitude to you." A young soldier with an eager face pressed forward with a litter, begging us to take his wounded officer, whom he had brought five miles from the distant lines of the R's. Harchin—that was his name—was like a loving son, with his captain, walking by our side or standing on our step for mile after mile and all the while helping to hold the litter in position. He told us that no living man could have driven the R's from their position: but that the whole area was cov-

ered with shells till trenches and men were leveled out of existence. The companies left comparatively intact had all joined on to the O's. Of the O's themselves we could only hear vague rumors; it was said that most of them had made their way back.

There was no panic, no hurry in the great throng, as it retired. Each was ready to help his neighbor. Crossing a long hill we had to transfer some of our wounded to an empty cart which we commandeered, the men moving without a word. In the night Harchin kept holding up his officer and giving any comfort he could. "It's quite close now, your nobility, it's a good road now," he would say. We reached a hut where the kind Polish hostess showed us beds for our wounded; Harchin was constant and tender in his care, and I left the two together to await the arrival of the doctor. A private with a crushed face refused to lie on his bed for fear of spoiling it, and sat holding his bleeding head in his hands.

Through the darkness and past an incessant train of army carts, which, without any shouting on our part, did all they could to give us passage, I made my way to the corps of the staff and to the next Division; where I slept long into the morning. It was only later that we knew the full scope of our losses. The Division had against it double its number of infantry and an overwhelming mass of artillery. It had held its trenches till it was almost annihilated.

BRITAIN FAILS AT GALLIPOLI

Lord Kitchener's Official Report as Minister of War

THE aim of the disastrous Gallipoli Expedition was of course the capture of Constantinople. But after the landing of the British forces, mainly volunteers from Australia and New Zealand known as Anzacs, under General Hamilton, at Suvla Bay, August 8, 1915, and their defeat by the Turks, under Mustapha Kemal (later to become dictator of Turkey) the failure of the operation was a foregone conclusion.

The main British assault was the one here described by Lord Kitchener, then Minister of War, and by General Hamilton, commander-in-chief of the expedition. A feature of the heroic assault of August 9, when the British held the summit of Sari Bair for a short time, was the tragically mistaken shelling of the British troops by their own warships. Other battles were fought with varying results in this campaign, in which the British lost more than 50,000 men, before it was abandoned.

ON the Gallipoli Peninsula during the operations in June several Turkish trenches were captured. Our own lines were appreciably advanced and our positions were consolidated.

Considerable reënforcements having arrived, a surprise landing on a large scale at Suvla Bay was successfully accomplished on the 6th of August without any serious opposition.

At the same time an attack was launched by the Australian and New Zealand corps from the Anzac position, and a strong offensive was de-

livered from Cape Helles in the direction of Krithia. In this latter action French troops played a prominent part and showed to high advantage their usual gallantry and fine fighting qualities.

The attack from Anzac, after a series of hotly contested actions, was carried to the summit of Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair, dominating positions in this area. The arrival of transports and the disembarkation of troops in Suvla Bay were designed to enable troops to support this attack. Unfortunately, however, the advance from Suvla Bay was not developed quickly enough, and the movement forward was brought to a standstill after an advance of about two and one-half miles.

The result was that the troops from Anzac were unable to retain their position on the crest of the hills, and after being repeatedly counter-attacked they were ordered to withdraw to positions lower down. These positions were effectively consolidated, and, joining with the line occupied by the Suvla Bay force, formed a connected front of more than twelve miles.

From the latter position a further attack on the Turkish entrenchments was delivered on the 21st, but after several hours of sharp fighting it was not found possible to gain the summit of the hills occupied by the enemy, and the intervening space being unsuitable for defense, the troops were withdrawn to their original position.

In the course of these operations the gallantry and resourcefulness of the Australian and New Zealand troops, frequently formed the subject of eulogy in General Hamilton's reports.

It is not easy to appreciate at their full value the enormous difficulties which attended the operations

in the Dardanelles or the fine temper with which our troops met them.

There is not abundant evidence of a process of demoralization having set in among the German-led, or rather German-driven Turks, due no doubt, to their extremely heavy losses and to the progressive failure of their resources.

It is only fair to acknowledge that, judged from a humane point of view, the methods of warfare pursued by the Turks are vastly superior to those which have disgraced their German masters.

Throughout, the coöperation of the fleet was intensely valuable, and the concerted action between the sister services was in every way in the highest degree satisfactory.

FIELD REPORT OF GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON

THE first step in the real push—the step which above all others was to count—was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair ridge. The crest line of this lofty mountain range runs parallel to the sea, dominating the under features contained within the Anzac position, although these fortunately defilade the actual landing-place. From the main ridge a series of spurs run down towards the level beach, and are separated from one another by deep, jagged gullies choked up with dense jungle. . . . It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops,

but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success. . . .

The two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns.

The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division.

Among other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H. M. S. "Colne," had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at 9 p. m., H. M. S. "Colne" threw the beams of her searchlight onto the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly ten minutes. Then, after a ten-minute interval, came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9.20 and ending precisely at 9.30 p. m.

The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the enemy would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until the shelling was at an end. But on the eventful night of the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud cannonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes the searchlight's beam—came

the right covering column. At 9.30 the light switched off, and instantly our men poured out of the scrub jungle and into the empty redoubt. By 11 p. m. the whole series of surrounding entrenchments were ours.

Once the capture of Old No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering column carried on with their attack upon Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 p.m. the northernmost point, with its machine gun, was captured, and by 1 o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hill, a maze of ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of stormers found themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of unexampled height, depth and solidity, which completely closed the river bed—that is to say, the only practicable entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a strongly-held enemy trench running right across the opening of the Chailak Dere. Here that splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and their best, but in the end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah.

Thus was the mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of the right assaulting column.

Simultaneously the attack on Table Top had been launched under cover of a heavy bombardment from H. M. S. "Colne." . . . The scarped heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only; magazines were empty by order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired. Some 150 prisoners were captured, as well as many rifles and much equipment, ammunition and stores. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brigadier-General Russell and his men. There are exploits which must be seen to be realized. . . .

The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations in cliff climbing even to officers and men who had graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night, the density of the scrub, hands and knees progress up the spurs, sheer physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated hairbreadth escapes from the hail of random bullets—all these combined to take the edge of the energies of our troops. At last, after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split up into two parts. Dawn broke, and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although, considering all things, the left assaulting column had made a marvelous advance. . . .

At 4.30 a. m. on August 9, the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were heavily shelled. The naval guns, all the guns on the left flank, and as many as possible from the right flank (whence the enemy's advance could be enfiladed) took part in this cannonade, which rose to its climax at 5.15 a. m., when the whole ridge seemed a mass of flame and smoke, whence huge clouds of dust drifted slowly upwards in strange patterns on to the sky. At 5.16 a. m. this tremendous bombardment was to be switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.

General Baldwin's column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was moving up towards General Johnston's headquarters. Our plan contemplated the massing of this column immediately behind the trenches held by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Thence it was intended to launch the battalions in successive lines, keeping them as much as possible on the high ground. Infinite trouble had been taken to insure that the narrow track should be kept clear, guides also were provided; but in spite of all precautions the darkness, the rough scrub-covered country, its sheer steepness, so delayed the column that they were unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground, and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the Farm—Chunuk Bair—till 5.15 a. m. In plain English, Baldwin, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way—through no fault of his own. The mischance was due to the fact that time did not admit of the detailed careful recon-

naissance of routes which is so essential where operations are to be carried out by night.

And now, under the fine leader, Major C. G. L. Allanson, the Sixth Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to the lighters. Not only did this battalion, as well as some of the Sixth South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fast-retreating enemy. But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme moment Baldwin's column was still a long way from our trenches on the crest of Chunuk Bair, whence they should even now have been sweeping out towards Q along the whole ridge of the mountain. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell.

These falling so unexpectedly among the stormers threw them into terrible confusion. The Turkish commander saw his chance. Instantly his troops were rallied and brought back in a counter-charge, and the South Lancashires and Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land, and had seemed for a moment to have held victory in their grasp, were forced backwards over the crest, and on to the lower slopes whence they had first started. . . .

At daybreak on Tuesday, August 10, the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Chunuk Bair Hill Q against these two battalions, already weakened in numbers, though not in spirit, by previous fighting. First our men were shelled by every enemy gun, and then at 5.30 a.m. were assaulted by a huge column, consisting of no less than a full division plus a regiment of three battalions. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, while the Wilts, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The ponderous masses of the enemy swept over the crest, turned the right flank of our line below, swarmed round the Hampshires and General Baldwin's column, which had to give ground, and were only extricated with great difficulty and very heavy losses.

ITALY JOINS THE ALLIES

By Premier Antonio Salandra

ON May 23, 1915, Italy declared war on Austria (omitting to name Germany in the declaration), for the reasons given here by Premier Salandra, whom King Victor Emanuel, a week before, had invited to resume the Italian premiership. Since the outbreak of the war Germany had spent millions of money in propaganda work in Italy, buying newspapers and bribing politicians, even tempting the Roman Government with promises "to be kept after the war was won by the Central Powers." The paymaster was a former German Imperial Chancellor, Prince von Bülow.

Italy put no faith in such promises, and despite the defensive alliance between herself and the Central Powers, concluded, as the United States was soon to do, that she must fight them with the aid of the Allies, or be left to fight them alone eventually. Signor Salandra takes it for granted that the above stated facts are known.

results written in Imperial, Royal, and Archducal proclamations. Since I speak from the Capitol, and represent in this solemn hour the people and the Govern-

I ADDRESS myself to Italy and to the civilized world in order to show not by violent words, but by exact facts and documents, how the fury of our enemies has vainly attempted to diminish the high moral and political dignity of the cause which our arms will make prevail. I shall speak with the calm of which the King of Italy has given a noble example, when he called his land and sea forces to arms. I shall speak with the respect due to my position and to the place in which I speak. I can afford to ignore the in-

ment of Italy, I, a modest citizen, feel that I am far nobler than the head of the house of the Hapsburgs.

The commonplace statesmen who, in rash frivolity of mind and mistaken in all their calculations, set fire last July to the whole of Europe and even to their own hearths and homes, have now noticed their fresh colossal mistake, and in the Parliaments of Budapest and Berlin have poured forth brutal invective of Italy and her Government with the obvious design of securing the forgiveness of their fellow-citizens and intoxicating them with cruel visions of hatred and blood. The German Chancellor said he was imbued not with hatred, but with anger, and he spoke the truth, because he reasoned badly, as is usually the case in fits of rage. I could not, even if I chose, imitate their language. An atavistic throwback to primitive barbarism is more difficult for us who have twenty centuries behind us more than they have.

The fundamental thesis of the statesmen of Central Europe is to be found in the words "treason and surprise on the part of Italy toward her faithful allies." It would be easy to ask if he has any right to speak of alliance and respect for treaties who, representing with infinitely less genius, but with equal moral indifference, the tradition of Frederick the Great and Bismarck, proclaimed that necessity knows no law, and consented to his country trampling under foot and burying at the bottom of the ocean all the documents and all the customs of civilization and international law. But that would be too easy an argument.

Let us examine, on the contrary, positively and calmly, if our former allies are entitled to say that they were betrayed and surprised by us. . . .

The horrible crime of Sérajevo was exploited as a pretext a month after it happened—this was proved by the refusal of Austria to accept the very extensive offers of Serbia—nor at the moment of the general conflagration would Austria have been satisfied with the unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum. Count Berchtold on July 31st declared to the Duke of Avarna that, if there had been a possibility of mediation being exercised, it could not have interrupted hostilities, which had already begun with Serbia. This was the mediation for which Great Britain and Italy were working. In any case, Count Berchtold was not disposed to accept mediation tending to weaken the conditions indicated in the Austrian note, which, naturally, would have been increased at the end of the war. . . .

Where is, then, the treason, the iniquity, the surprise, if, after nine months of vain efforts to reach an honorable understanding which recognized in equitable measure our rights and our liberties, we resumed liberty of action? The truth is that Austria and Germany believed until the last days that they had to deal with an Italy weak, blustering, but not acting, capable of trying blackmail, but not enforcing by arms her good right, with an Italy which could be paralyzed by spending a few millions, and which by dealings which she could not avow was placing

herself between the country and the Government. . . .

The effect was the contrary. An immense outburst of indignation was kindled throughout Italy and not among the populace, but among the noblest and most educated classes and among all the youth of the country, which is ready to shed its blood for the nation. This outburst of indignation was kindled as the result of the suspicion that a foreign Ambassador was interfering between the Italian Government, the Parliament, and the country. In the blaze thus kindled internal discussions melted away, and the whole nation was joined in a wonderful moral union, which will prove our greatest source of strength in the severe struggle which faces us, and which must lead us by our own virtue, and not by benevolent concessions from others, to the accomplishment of the highest destinies of the country.

THE EXECUTION OF EDITH CAVELL

By Rev. H. Stirling Gahan, a British Chaplain in Brussels

MISS CAVELL, who was executed by a German firing squad at 2 a. m. October 12, 1915, was an English head-nurse of the Brussels Surgical Institute, in which capacity she had assisted in conveying wounded Allied soldiers—upon their recovery—across the frontier into Holland, whence they were able to rejoin their armies. Her activities were reported to the German authorities by a Belgian traitor (who was found murdered in the street nearly a year later), and on August 5 she had been arrested and lodged in the military prison of Saint Giles. Tried by court martial, she admitted her guilt and was killed.

Nothing showed more sharply the gulf between Germany and the rest of the world at that time than the fact that the German officials with one voice insisted on enforcing their law against Miss Cavell, rushing the execution through suddenly at night, a few hours after she had this interview with a British Chaplain in Brussels.

ally, but the solemn asseveration which accompanied them was made expressly in the light of God and eternity. She then added that she wished all her

ON Monday evening, October 11th, I was admitted by special passport from the German authorities to the prison of St. Giles, where Miss Edith Cavell had been confined for ten weeks. The final sentence had been given early that afternoon.

To my astonishment and relief I found my friend perfectly calm and resigned. But this could not lessen the tenderness and intensity of feeling on either part during that last interview of almost an hour.

Her first words to me were upon a matter concerning herself personally,

friends to know that she willingly gave her life for her country, and said: "I have no fear, no shrinking; I have seen death so often that it is not strange or fearful to me." She further said: "I thank God for this ten weeks' quiet before the end. . . . Life has always been hurried and full of difficulty. . . . This time of rest has been a great mercy. . . . They have all been very kind to me here. . . . But this I would say, standing as I do in view of God and eternity, I realize that patriotism is not enough . . . I must have no hatred or bitterness towards any one."

We partook of the Holy Communion together, and she received the Gospel message of consolation with all her heart. At the close of the little service I began to repeat the words, "Abide with me," and she joined softly in the end.

We sat quietly talking until it was time for me to go. She gave me parting messages for relations and friends. She spoke of her soul's needs at the moment and she received the assurance of God's Word as only the Christian can do.

Then I said "Good-by," and she smiled and said, "We shall meet again."

The German military chaplain was with her at the end and afterwards gave her Christian burial.

He told me: "She was brave and bright to the last. She professed her Christian faith and that she was glad to die for her country. . . . She died like a heroine."

"THEY SHALL NOT PASS" AT VERDUN

By Lord Northcliffe

NORTHCLIFFE, the great British newspaper proprietor, was a witness to the German assault on Verdun, as here described in a dispatch he wrote and sent to the London "Times," March 4, 1916. This mightiest effort of German artillery began February 21 and was kept up steadily for more than a month. The Germans were commanded by the Crown Prince. General Pétain took command of the defense March 1, and his cheery assurance, "Now, we shall have them!" has become almost as noted as that other Verdun battle-cry, "They shall not pass!"

Answering a question asked here, Count de Souza, the French military authority, states that the Germans "lost 100,000 men (as compared with 20,000 French) in this vain effort to command the Heights of the Meuse, the key to the whole region." Ludendorff, of the German High Command, states that the success of the Verdun operation would have forestalled the American Argonne-Meuse attack in 1918.

WHAT is the secret motive underlying the German attempt to break the French line at Verdun, in which the Crown Prince's army is incurring such appalling losses? Is it financial, in view of the coming war loan? Is it dynastic? Or is it intended to influence doubting neutrals? From the evidence of German deserters it is known that the attack was originally intended to take place a month or two hence, when the ground was dry. Premature spring caused the Germans to accelerate their plans. There were two final delays owing to bad weather, and then came

the colossal onslaught of February 21st.

The Germans made a good many of the mistakes we made at Gallipoli. They announced that some-

thing large was pending by closing the Swiss frontier. The French, who were not ready, were also warned by their own astute Intelligence Department. Their avions were not idle, and, if confirmation were needed, it was given by deserters, who, surmising the horrors that were to come, crept out of the trenches at night, lay down by the edge of the Meuse till the morning, and then gave themselves up, together with information that has since proved to be accurate. Things went wrong with the Germans in other ways. A Zeppelin that was to have blown up important railway junctions on the French line of communications was brought down at Révigny, and incidentally the inhabitants of what remains of that much-bombarded town were avenged by the spectacle of the blazing dirigible crashing to the ground and the hoisting with their own petard of 30 Huns therein. It is not necessary to recapitulate that the gigantic effort of February 21st was frustrated by the coolness and tenacity of the French soldiers and the deadly curtain fire of the French gunners.

Though a great deal of calculated nonsense has been sent out in official communiqués and dilated upon by dithyrambic Berlin newspaper correspondents as to the taking by storm of the long-dismantled fort at Douaumont, nothing whatever has been admitted by the Germans as to the appalling price in blood they have paid since February 21st and are still paying. The French losses are, and have been, insignificant. I know the official figure. It has been

verified by conversations with members of the British, French and American Red Cross Societies, who are obviously in a position to know. The wounded who pass through their hands have, in many cases, come straight from where they have seen dead Germans, as has been described by scores of witnesses, lying as lay the Prussian Guard in the first Battle of Ypres. The evidence of one army as to another army's losses needs careful corroboration. This exists amply in the evidence of many German prisoners interrogated singly and independently at the French Headquarters.

The case of one man, belonging to the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Regiment in the 5th Division of the 3rd Army Corps, may be taken as characteristic. On the morning of February 28th this prisoner reached the fort of Douaumont and found there one battalion of the 24th Regiment, elements of the 64th Regiment and of the 3rd Battalion of Jägers. The strength of his company had been, on February 21st, 200 rifles with four officers. On February 22nd it had fallen to 70 rifles, with one officer. The other companies had suffered similar losses. On February 23rd the prisoner's company was reënforced by 45 men, bearing the numbers of the 12th, the 52nd, the 35th, and the 205th Regiments. These men had been drawn from various depots in the interior. The men of the 12th Regiment believed that five regiments were in reserve in the woods behind the 3rd Corps, but, as time went on and losses increased

without any sign of the actual presence of these reserves, doubt spread whether they were really in existence. The prisoner declared that his comrades were no longer capable of fresh effort.

None of the prisoners questioned estimated the losses suffered by their companions at less than one-third of the total effectives. Taking into account all available indications, it may safely be assumed that, during the fighting of the first 13 days, the Germans lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners at least 100,000 men.

The profits—as the soldier speaks of such matters—being so small, what then were the overwhelming motives that impelled the attack on Verdun, and the chicanery of the German communiqués? Was it any of the reasons I have given above, or was it an effect of economic pressure which led to the miscalculation that the possible taking over of the French line at Verdun was a means of ending the war? The Germans are so wont to misread the minds of other nations that they are quite foolish enough to make themselves believe this or any other foolish thing. It cannot be pretended that the attack had in it anything of military necessity. It was urged forward at a time of year when weather conditions might prove, as they proved, a serious handicap in such matters as the moving of big guns and the essential observation by aëroplanes.

The district of Verdun lies in one of the coldest and also the most misty sectors in the long line between

Nieuport and Switzerland. Changes of temperature, too, are somewhat more frequent here than elsewhere; and so sudden are these changes that not long ago here occurred, on a part of the front, one of nature's furious and romantic reminders of her power to impose her will. The opposing French and German trenches, their parapets hard frozen, were so close that they were actually within hearing of each other. Towards dawn a rapid thaw set in. The parapets melted and subsided, and two long lines of men stood up naked, as it were, before each other, face to face with only two possibilities—wholesale murder on the one side or the other, or a temporary unofficial peace for the making of fresh parapet protections.

The situation was astounding and unique in the history of trench warfare. The French and German officers, without conferring and unwilling to negotiate, turned their backs so that they might not see officially so unwarlike a scene, and the men on each side rebuilt their parapets without the firing of a single shot.

This instance serves to illustrate the precarious weather in which the Germans undertook an adventure in the quick success of which the elements play such a part. That the attack would certainly prove more costly to them than to the French the German Staff must have known. That the sufferings of the wounded lying out through the long nights of icy wind in the No Man's Land between the lines would be great did not probably disturb the Crown Prince.

It is one of the most grewsome facts in the history of the War that the French, peering through the moonlight at what they thought to be stealthily crawling Germans, found them to be wounded men frozen to death. . . .

The vast battle of Verdun might have been arranged for the benefit of interested spectators, were it not that the whole zone for miles around the great scene is as tightly closed to the outer world as a lodge of Freemasons. Furnished with every possible kind of pass, accompanied by a member of the French Headquarters Staff in a military car driven by a chauffeur whose steel helmet marked him as a soldier, I was nevertheless held up by intractable gendarmes at a point twenty-five miles away from the great scene. Even at that distance the mournful and unceasing reverberation of the guns was insistent, and, as the sentry examined our papers and waited for telephonic instructions, I counted more than 200 of the distant voices of Kultur.


As one gets nearer and nearer the great arena on which the whole world's eyes are turned to-day, proofs of French efficiency and French thoroughness are countless. I do not pretend to any military knowledge other than a few scraps gathered in some half-dozen visits to the War, but the abundance of reserve shells for guns, from mighty howitzers to the graceful French mitrailleuse of the aëroplane, of rifle ammunition, of petrol stores, and of motor-wagons of every description, was remarkable. I can truly say

that the volume exceeded anything in my previous experience.

As one approaches the battle the volume of sound becomes louder and at times terrific. And it is curious, the mingling of peace with war. The chocolate and the pneumatic tire advertisements on the village walls, the kilometer stone with its ten kilometers to Verdun, a village curé peacefully strolling along the village street, just as though it were March, 1914, and his congregation had not been sent away from the war zone, while their houses were filled by a swarming army of men in pale blue. Such a wonderful blue this new French invisible cloth! A squadron of cavalry in the new blue and their steel helmets passes at the moment, and gives the impression that one is back again in what were known as the romantic days of war.

When one has arrived at the battlefield, there are a dozen vantage points from which with glasses, or, indeed, with the naked eye, one can take in much that has happened. Verdun lies in a great basin with the silvery Meuse twining in the valley. The scene is, on the whole, Scottish. Small groups of firs darken some of the hills, giving a natural resemblance to Scotland.

The town is being made into a second Ypres by the Germans. Yet, as it stands out in the sunlight, it is difficult to realize that it is a place whose people have all gone, save a few of the faithful who live below ground. The tall tower of Verdun still stands.



THE RUINS OF VAUX FORT, VERDUN, AFTER THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT
THIS ARTILLERY ONSLAUGHT INSPIRED THE PHRASE
"THEY SHALL NOT PASS"

Close by us is a hidden French battery, and it is pretty to see the promptitude with which it sends its screaming shells back to the Germans within a few seconds of the dispatch of a missive from the Huns. One speedily grows accustomed to the sound and the scene, and can follow the position of the villages about which the Germans endeavor to mislead the world by wireless every morning.

We journey farther afield, and the famous fort of Douaumont is pointed out. The storming of Fort Douaumont, gunless and unmanned, was a military operation of little value. A number of the Brandenburgers climbed into the gunless fort, and some of them were still there on March 6th, supplied precariously with food by their comrades at night. They were practically surrounded by the French, whose Headquarters Staff regarded the whole incident as a simple episode in the give-and-take of war. The announcement of the fall of Fort Douaumont to the world evinces the great anxiety of the Germans to magnify anything concerning Verdun into a great event. It should also cause people to apply a grain of salt to German official communiqués before swallowing them.

Who are the men who organized the great battle for the French side? Let me at once say that they are young men. General Pétain, one of the discoveries of the war, till lately colonel and after this date promoted to chief command, is still in his late fifties; most of the members of his staff are much younger.

One hears of luxury at Headquarters, but I have not experienced it, either at our own Headquarters or at the French. General Pétain, when I enjoyed his hospitality at luncheon, drank tea. Most of his young men contented themselves with water, or the white wine of the Meuse.

In the brief meal he allowed himself the General discussed the battle as though he were merely an interested spectator. In accordance with the drastic changes that the French, like the Germans, are making in their Command, his rise has been so rapid that he is little known to the French people, though greatly trusted by General Joffre and the Government. I naturally did not ask his opinion on any matters connected with the War. We discussed the Australians, the Canadians, the great growth of the British army, and kindred matters.

At another gathering of officers some one asked whether the French would not expect the British to draw off the Germans by making an attack in the West. "It is questionable," replied one young officer, "whether such an attack would not involve disproportionate losses that would weaken the Allies." The same officer pointed out that, although the capture of Verdun would cause great regret, owing to the historic name it bears, it would not, for many reasons, be more important than the pressing back of any other similar number of miles on the front. Forts being of little account since the introduction of the big German hammers, he believed that General Sar-

rail had said that the question was not one merely of dismantling the forts, but of blowing them up. As it is, whenever the Germans capture a piece of land where an old fort happens to be, they will use it as an advertisement. But though the French officers are not looking to Britain, so far as I could learn, for active coöperation now, they are most certainly urging that when our new armies and their officers are trained we shall aid them by bearing our full share of the tremendous military burden they are carrying.

The present attack on the French at Verdun is by far the most violent incident of the whole Western War. As I write it is late. Yet the bombardment is continuing, and the massed guns of the Germans are of greater caliber than have ever been used in such numbers. The superb calm of the French people, the efficiency of their organization, the equipment of their cheery soldiery, convince one that the men in the German machine would never be able to compare with them. Whatever may be the result of the attack on the Verdun sector, every such effort will result in adding many more thousands of corpses to those now lying in the valley of the Meuse, the numbers of which are being so carefully concealed from the neutral world and the Germans themselves; and could neutrals see the kind of men whom the Germans do not scruple to use as soldiers, their faith in Teutonic physical efficiency would receive a shock.

AMERICAN INTERVENTION PROPOSED IN 1916

*Historic Memorandum Approved by President Wilson and
Initialed by Sir Edward Grey*

THE accompanying "Memorandum" drawn up by Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Colonel Edward M. House, confidential representative of President Wilson, is a most interesting revelation in Grey's memoirs, "Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916," from which this account is taken by permission of Frederick A. Stokes Company. As Grey states, President Wilson explicitly approved of this document, dated February 22, 1916 (three years before the war ended), which provided that the United States should call a peace conference, should suggest certain terms, including the return of Alsace-Lorraine, and "if it failed to secure peace, the United States should leave the conference on the side of the Allies, if Germany was unreasonable."

Visiting Berlin shortly after this memorandum was made, Colonel House quickly learned, and so informed President Wilson, that Germany would consent to no such terms of peace except under compulsion.

IN February, 1916, House drafted with me a memorandum to define as precisely as could be done in advance the action that President Wilson would be prepared to take, and the terms of peace that he would use all the influence of his country to secure. A copy was left with me, and House took the memorandum to Washington to get the text confirmed by the President. From Washington he cabled confirming it, with the alteration of only one word. The following is the final form of the document as authorized by President Wilson:

MEMORANDUM

Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a conference should be summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany.

Colonel House expressed the opinion that, if such a Conference met, it would secure peace on terms not unfavorable to the Allies; and, if it failed to secure peace, the United States would leave the Conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies, if Germany was unreasonable. Colonel House expressed an opinion decidedly favorable to the restoration of Belgium, the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine to France, and the acquisition by Russia of an outlet to the sea, though he thought that the loss of territory incurred by Germany in one place would have to be compensated to her by concessions to her in other places outside Europe.

If the Allies delayed accepting the offer of President Wilson, and if, later on, the course of the war was so unfavorable to them that the intervention of the United States would not be effective, the United States would probably disinterest themselves in Europe and look to their own protection in their own way.

I said that I felt the statement, coming from the President of the United States, to be a matter of such importance that I must inform the

Prime Minister and my colleagues; but that I could say nothing until it had received their consideration. The British Government could, under no circumstances, accept or make any proposal except in consultation and agreement with the Allies. I thought that the Cabinet would probably feel that the present situation would not justify them in approaching their Allies on this subject at the present moment; but, as Colonel House had had an intimate conversation with M. Briand and M. Jules Cambon in Paris, I should think it right to tell M. Briand privately, through the French Ambassador in London, what Colonel House had said to us; and I should, of course, whenever there was an opportunity, be ready to talk the matter over with M. Briand, if he desired it.

(Initialed) E. G.

Foreign Office,
February 22, 1916.

At present there was no use to be made of it. We believed and the French believed, that defeat of the German armies was the only sure overthrow of Prussian militarism, and to the French the recovery of the lost provinces of 1870 had become an object to be fought for. Before 1914 France had given up the idea of going to war to recover them, but once war was forced upon her, she was determined to fight on to win them. Both France and Russia had up to this time suffered more heavily in the war than we had. We could never be the first to recommend peace

to them. We still had large reserves of men to train, group and bring into action. We were bound to go on till we had used all our yet undeveloped strength to support our Allies, and in the effort to defeat Germany. We all felt that we could take no initiative in the American direction. . . .

The communication to the French was a matter of extreme delicacy. If nothing was said to them, and if things took a sudden turn for the worse, I should be open to the gravest reproach; the French would say with justice that they ought to have been told that this means of terminating the war had been open to the Allies. The imputation would be that I had kept the knowledge of it from them, lest they should be disposed to take advantage of the opportunity offered by it. The memorandum was in effect an offer by President Wilson to end the war in the terms described, and, if Germany refused, then to bring the United States into the war against her. If we ignored President Wilson's offer, the Allies might forfeit his sympathy, and for that we alone should be held responsible, if the French had not known of what had passed between House and ourselves.

On the other hand, to recommend the memorandum to the French was to suggest that we were weakening and to undermine their confidence in our determination to support them. Furthermore, to have made such a recommendation without the approval of the Cabinet or at least the War Committee would have been disloyal to colleagues; and the War Com-

mittee, with my full concurrence, had decided not to take the matter up. I therefore let M. Briand, then French Prime Minister, know of it without recommending it. . . .

It appears from recent German disclosures that in the autumn of 1916, if not before, the German Government became aware of the intention of President Wilson to approach them, and that they eventually countered this by an intimation to him of their terms of peace that may well have made him despair of anything like a just peace being secured except by the use of force. If so, the House Memorandum, by the time I sent it to Balfour, had ceased to have importance for President Wilson, who knew now that even such terms as he thought just could not be obtained from Germany except by force; and that, if the United States was to take any part in securing them, it must be by the use of force. The German defiance in the submarine warfare precipitated war between America and Germany, but the German manner of countering his mediation policy must surely have turned President Wilson's thoughts in the direction of war.

How does it all look now? In the light of after-events, it is clear that Germany missed a great opportunity of peace. If she had accepted the Wilson policy, and was ready to agree to a Conference, the Allies could not have refused. They were dependent on American supplies; they could not have risked the ill-will of the Government of the United States, still

less a rapprochement between the United States and Germany. Germans have only to reflect upon the peace that they might have had in 1916 compared with the peace of 1919.

Did the Allies also miss an opportunity? The notion would have been scouted when the Treaty of Versailles was signed; judged by that, and in the light of victory, the terms of the House Memorandum seem preposterously inadequate. But now, some years after the mighty peace of 1919, the condition of Europe is sufficiently disappointing to make it interesting to imagine what the course of events might conceivably have been if the Allies and Germany in 1916 had told President Wilson that they were ready for the Conference he was prepared to summon.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

Admiral Sir David Beatty's Official Report

ON May 31, 1916, occurred the one great naval battle of the war, off Jutland, Denmark, between the British Grand Fleet under Admiral Jellicoe, and the German High Sea Fleet, under von Scheer. In point of forces engaged, it was the greatest naval battle in the history of the world, although indecisive. Night separated the combatants, the German fleet retiring to its mine-shielded base, from which it never ventured again.

This account is by Vice Admiral Beatty, who commanded the advance British force which bore the brunt of the fighting, and who had previously fought the Germans off Heligoland. Of the main fleet, comprising 29 dreadnaughts, 9 battle cruisers and a host of lesser craft, the British lost 3 battle cruisers and 8 destroyers. Unofficially, the Germans lost 1 dreadnaught, 1 battle cruiser, 2 light cruisers and 5 destroyers, in a fleet of 25 dreadnaughts, 5 battle cruisers and other craft.

Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to eastward and northeastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m. They appeared to be five battle cruisers.

AT 2.20 p.m. reports were received from "Galatea," the light cruiser stationed on the eastward flanks, indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to S. S. E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base.

At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn

After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the light cruiser squadrons was excellent and of great value.

From a report from Galatea at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered "Engadine" to send up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. At 3.08 p.m. a seaplane was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in "Engadine" about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of reports, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

At 3.30 p. m. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed line of battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squad-

ron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, who were not at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.W.E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.

It would appear that at this time we passed through a screen of enemy submarines. The destroyer "Landrail" of 9th Flotilla, who was on our port beam trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of "Lydiard" and "Landrail" undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers from closer submarine attack. "Nottingham" also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.

Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, "Nestor," "Nomad," "Nicator," "Narborough," "Pelican," "Petard," "Obdurate," "Nerissa," with "Moorsom"

and "Morris" of 10th Flotilla, "Turbulent" and "Termagant" of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m. simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before arriving at a favorable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy was forced to retire on their battle cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. (Some torpedoes were fired by the enemy, two of which crossed the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been turned away to avoid the attacks.) Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavorable for torpedo attack.

"Nestor," "Nomad" and "Nicator" pressed home their attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them at a range of 6,000 and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. "Nomad" was badly hit and apparently remained stopped between the lines. (She was sunk later by the German Battle Fleet.) Subsequently "Nestor" and "Nicator" altered course to

the S.E., and in a short time the opposing battle cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battle-ships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favorable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, "Nestor" was badly hit and swung to starboard, "Nicator" altering course inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. "Nicator" made good her escape and subsequently rejoined the 13th Flotilla. "Nestor" remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. (She was sunk later by the German Battle Fleet.) "Moorsom" also carried out an attack on the enemy's Battle Fleet.

"Petard," "Nerissa," "Turbulent" and "Termagant" also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes at 7,000 yards after the engagement with enemy destroyers. "Petard" reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while "Nerissa" states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions.

From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle cruisers was a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long

range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced and the outline of the ships very indistinct.

At 4.26 p.m. there was a violent explosion in "Queen Mary"; she was enveloped in clouds of gray smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of her officers and men were subsequently picked up by "Laurel."

At 4.38 p.m. "Southampton" reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. "Southampton" with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy battle fleet and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. "Southampton's" reports were most valuable.

The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in "Barham," this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

At 4.57 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy Battle Fleet. "Fearless," with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla, joined the battle cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. "Champion," with 13th Flotilla, took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.

The weather conditions now became unfavorable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 p.m.

Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and undoubtedly one of their battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation and was corroborated by "Princess Royal" and "Tiger." Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury.

At 5.05 p.m. "Onslow" and "Moresby," who had been detached to assist "Engadine" with the seaplane, rejoined the battle cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of "Lion." At 5.10

p.m. "Moresby," being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the 6th ship in the line. "Moresby" then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined "Champion." In corroboration of this, "Fearless" reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable."

At 5.35 p.m. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the northeastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the westward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron. Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy battle cruisers bore southeast. At this time only three of the enemy

battle cruisers were visible, closely followed by battle-ships of the "König" class.

At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Light Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her, and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time, I made a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of the bearing and distance of the enemy Battle Fleet. At 6.33 p.m. "Invincible" blew up.

After the loss of the "Invincible," the squadron was led by "Inflexible" until 6.50 p.m. By this time the battle cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron, then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles, and I ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of.

From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 p.m. attacked with the torpedo. "Falmouth" and "Yarmouth" both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of

the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. "Indomitable" reports that about this time one of the "Derfflinger" class fell out of the enemy's line.

Meanwhile, at 6 p.m. "Canterbury" had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat destroyers "Shark," "Acasta" and "Christopher"; as a result of this engagement the "Shark" was sunk.

At 6.16 p.m. "Defense" and "Warrior" were observed passing down between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy fire. "Defense" was seen to blow up and "Warrior" passed to the rear disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement with the enemy's light cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when "Black Prince," of the same squadron, was sunk, but as a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 p.m. reporting the position of a submarine, it is possible that her loss was the result of a torpedo attack. There is much strong evidence of the presence of a large number of enemy submarines in the vicinity of the scene of the action.

At about 6.05 p.m. "Onslow," being on the engaged bow of "Lion," sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavoring to attack with torpedoes. "Onslow" at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. "Onslow" then closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the commanding officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them; having started correctly, they must have crossed the enemy's attack. Damage then caused "Onslow" to stop.

At 7.15 p.m. "Defender," whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, was struck by a shell which damaged her foremost boiler, but closed "Onslow" and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m. 1st June, when "Onslow" was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers

to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of "Onslow," and Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of "Defender," for special recognition. . . .

Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again; and made straight for the "Derfflinger" to attack her. The incident appeared so courageous that it seems desirable to investigate it further.

Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the "König" class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we reëngaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was S.W., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. Again after a very short time the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of gray smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they undoubt-

edly turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.

At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support. We soon located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by "Lion" and turned away 8 points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. "Princess Royal" set fire to a three-funneled battleship; "New Zealand" and "Indomitable" report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and "Falmouth" reported they were last seen at 8.38 p.m. steaming to the westward, an explosion on board a ship of the "Kaiser" class being seen at 8.40 p.m.

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